Problems of Communism

MAY-AUGUST 1988



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Problems of Communism

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TO OUR READERS: We publish this "double" May-August issue as a means of getting back on schedule and conveying at the earliest possible moment the wealth of material at hand. Regular bi-monthly publication will resume with the *September-October 1988* issue.—**The Editors**.

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Cover: General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, right, makes a point to Aleksandr Yakovlev (in glasses) and Yegor Ligachev at the 19th CPSU Conference. Photo from TASS via Sovfoto.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

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Articles

19th CPSU Conference

Michel Tatu

The 19th CPSU Conference has provided many clues about the strength of the opposition to Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of restructuring and the infighting among the Soviet leadership. While the entire top leadership agrees that a *perestroyka* is necessary to eradicate corruption, to raise worker productivity, and, more generally, to modernize the Soviet economy, the conservative majority in the Politburo does not endorse the policies subsumed under the slogans of *glasnost'* and "democratization." Yegor Ligachev, the "second" secretary, was very much the spokesman for this majority at the party conference. He also spoke for the party apparatus, which in fact remained in control of the proceedings at the conference, even though Gorbachev made some significant gains for his more radical program.

Politics and History under Gorbachev

Thomas Sherlock

The use of Soviet history as a tool of reform has emerged over the past two years as an essential element of Mikhail Gorbachev's political strategy, as writers and historians have engaged in a widening campaign of de-Stalinization and a search for reformist predecessors and precedents in early Soviet history. However, there remains considerable hesitancy in some circles about a process that ultimately runs the risk of placing in question the legitimacy of the October Revolution and rule by the communist party.

Crisis and Political Ritual in Postwar Poland

Andrzej Flis

In light of communist ideology, the socialist system appears to be a perfect society. Since, logically speaking, anything perfect cannot be improved, questioning the socialist system and its institutions is presented by communist authorities as profane–as an attack on something sacred. Thus, one may argue that there is a gnostic discontinuity in the conception of reality that exists in communist systems, which can be described by the dichotomy of the sacred vs. the profane. This discontinuity explains the removal of political opposition beyond the pale of the communist system, and the party authorities' deep attachment to political ritual as the only socialist reality in communist states. It also explains why the constitutional system of these states prevails over the political breakdowns that occur cyclically.

Special Section

East-West Relations and Eastern Europe

(A Soviet-American Dialogue)

On July 6–8, 1988, a group of American and Soviet specialists met in Alexandria, Virginia, to discuss with considerable openness "The Place and Role of Eastern Europe in the Relaxation of Tensions between the USA and the USSR." Published herewith are the discussion papers tabled by Dr. J. F. Brown of RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, CA) and by a group of scholars from the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System (Moscow), and the text of a special address by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski.

(Abstracts continued on the reverse side)

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Notes

China's America Watchers

David L. Shambaugh

China's America policy has been guided by an elite corps of America watchers that has remained remarkably intact since the founding of the People's Republic of China. In recent years, the profession has expanded dramatically in response to the institutionalization of Sino-American relations—today about 500 individuals in government, academe, research institutes, and journalism are America watchers. They have done much to present a more factual and less ideological set of interpretations of the United States to China's elites and public during the past decade.

Soviet Statistics on Ukraine: Selective Omissions

I. S. Koropeckyj

Until the most recent times, statistics reported in the Ukrainian statistical yearbook were considerably less complete than those published in the yearbooks for the USSR as a whole and for most of the other Soviet republics. This evidently reflected a conscious decision to withhold from domestic and foreign audiences possible evidence of economic slowdown in Ukraine, relatively lower standards of living (compared to other republics), and siphoning of Ukrainian national income off to other parts of the Soviet Union.

Books

New-Type Socialist Armies

Larry L. Watts

It is only recently that Western analysis of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) militaries has come to deal with the issue of their behavior during intra-state conflicts. Indeed, three new studies examine NSWP military behavior, especially the motives behind it, using the Polish and Czechoslovak armies as case histories. Although the authors of these studies argue that the NSWP militaries are indoctrinated and politicized "red" entities, it appears that the role and motivational orientation of these "communist" armies continue to fall within expected traditional military behavioral patterns.

Insiders' Views of the Soviet Army

Sergei Zamascikov

Fictionalized stories of life in the Soviet military written by former Soviet servicemen living in the West—and recently in the Soviet Union as well—deserve attention. Not only do they include information on the structure of Soviet military life and relations within the ranks of the army, but they provide a far more realistic portrayal of the Soviet soldier's life than can be found elsewhere.

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19th Party Conference

Michel Tatu

Did the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference of June 28–July 1, 1988, result in the complete acceptance of the *perestroyka* policy, as has been widely asserted? Has Mikhail Gorbachev's position really been strengthened by it? What ought we to think about the balance of forces at the top level of the Soviet leadership in light of the conference, the strength of the opposition to the General Secretary's policy, or the position of the still largely mysterious "number two" man in the party, Yegor Ligachev? These and similar questions have been intensely discussed both before and after the party conference by specialists in the West, with some indirect participation—and this is the new contribution of *glasnost'* to Kremlinology—by several writers inside the Soviet Union.

Before trying to answer these questions, let us be clear about a few basic facts. There has always been a struggle for power inside the Soviet leadership: even at the peak of Stalin's rule (as we now realize more fully) or during the "years of stagnation" under Leonid Brezhnev, some maneuvering took place among contenders eager to position themselves for greater authority inside a particular system and/or for eventual succession to the top leader. But this "fact of life" in a totalitarian system (and in other systems, too, to some degree) is inevitably much more in evidence in a period of reform.

Any change provokes resistance, and any resistance has "fallout" in the top echelon, if only because it provides the main actors with an opportunity for enlarging their constituencies in their "normal" rivalry. Gorbachev's *perestroyka* is certainly no exception. While most members of the Soviet leadership have been careful to deny the existence of any split in their ranks, many of them, notably the General Secretary, have also emphasized the high degree of opposition to the policy of change. In some circumstances—for example, during the Yel'tsin affair in late 1987[1]—they even admitted that heated debate over *perestroyka* erupted directly in the Politburo. The debates at the party conference, though muted on this issue, did not change the impression of considerable political infighting.

The Andreyeva Affair

But before discussing the party conference itself, we have to look at an important preliminary event: the Andreyeva affair. The so-called "anti-*perestroyka* platform" that was contained in a long letter signed by Nina Andreyeva (a chemistry teacher in Leningrad) and published by *Sovetskaya Rossiya* on March 13, 1988, and its rebuttal in *Pravda* on April 5, were exhaustively described in the Western press. Actually, this platform might have gone unnoticed, or at least it need not have raised the excitement that it subsequently did. First, the letter was published in *Sovetskaya Rossiya,* an official newspaper but not as authoritative as *Pravda*; second, there had been several similar neo-Stalinist statements made over the past year, most notably at a meeting of the secretariat of the RSFSR Writers' Union in March 1987,[2] and a complaint similar to Andreyeva's, written also by a dissatisfied and unknown lady, had appeared

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[1]For an analysis of the Yel'tsin affair, see Timothy Colton, "Moscow's Party Organization," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1988, pp. 53–54; also Michel Tatu, *Gorbatchev, l'URSS va-t-elle changer?* (Gorbachev: Will the USSR Change?), Paris, Le Centurion, 1987.

[2]See *Literaturnaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Mar. 27, 1987.

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At left, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev speaks at the June 28, 1988, opening session of the 19th All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; above, a view of the nearly 5,000 delegates in attendance.

—Gamma-Liaison, and TASS via Sovfoto.

in *Pravda* in August 1987.[3] After all, *glasnost'* has been and continues to be used by opponents of *glasnost'*. But two new elements transformed the Andreyeva article into a more important case.

First, it was immediately perceived by people familiar with the circumstances as a deliberate attempt to "consolidate conservative forces"[4] on the eve of the party conference, or more bluntly put, as a "trial of strength" before that event.[5] The moment was indeed a difficult one for the reformers. The beginning of riots and agitation in Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in late February had certainly strengthened the hand of conservatives in the party. They could blame these events on the *glasnost'* policy and hold the General Secretary responsible. "Khrushchev had destabilized Poland and Hungary with the 20th Party Congress in 1956," the argument ran, "now Gorbachev destabilizes the Soviet Union itself." Furthermore, preparations for the party conference, the election of delegates, etc., had to begin in earnest. The Andreyeva affair effectively delayed these preparations. The elections of the delegates, which originally were to take place in "April–May 1988,"[6] in fact took place in May–June, and, on the whole, started only at the end of May.

Second, the perception of the Andreyeva article as a "trial of strength" derived from the awareness that powerful people stood behind Andreyeva, including Politburo members, in particular, Yegor Ligachev, the number two man in the Secretariat. To be sure, the name of Ligachev was never mentioned directly in a Soviet publication in this connection: the taboo of "no split, no fac-

[3]See Vera Tkachenko in *Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 21, 1987.

[4]See Fedor Burlatskiy in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Apr. 20, 1988.

[5]A statement by the writer Ales Adamovich during a television debate, June 13, 1988. The Andreyeva article, said Adamovich, was not "a simple letter like any other," but an attempt to bring the "forces of evil" back to power.

[6]See the resolution of the June 1987 CC plenum which convoked the conference, TASS, June 26, 1987.

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tion" in the Politburo still overrides *glasnost'* in its present form. But the rumors and indications leaked to the Western press[7] were indirectly confirmed by heavy-handed hints in the Soviet media. For example, Yuriy Karyakin asked in the pages of *Ogonek* who "the main alchemist" hiding behind the "poor chemist" of Leningrad was.[8] Earlier, Pavel Demidov, a commentator for the professional organ *Zhurnalist,* had reported the rumor that the Andreyeva article was approved "nearly at the top level" (thereby hinting at a role for the number two man of the party) and that for this reason it was interpreted as a "guideline."[9] Without confirming these rumors, Demidov pointed out that the response to this "platform" published in *Pravda* on April 5, 1988, "never mentions the name of the author, and this has its significance." He added that in effect this omission made the article into a "manifesto of forces against *perestroyka,* not the creed of an uninformed and erring individual."

Giulietto Chiesa, the well-informed *L'Unità* correspondent in Moscow, was able to give the best picture of the genesis of the Andreyeva article, since he got hold of the presumably original letter that she had sent to various Moscow editorial offices earlier, in September 1987.[10] He reported that Andreyeva had also sent the same letter to the CPSU Central Committee, "to Yegor Ligachev personally," and that at a meeting with editors, Ligachev had praised the text as "an example to follow." But only 5 out of 18 pages in the original letter were in the final version (many harsh anti-Semitic statements were deleted, although some were retained), which also included many "additions" prepared by a special group of *Sovetskaya Rossiya*'s editorial staff.[11]

The only part of this story that Andreyeva later denied was that she had sent her "letter" to Ligachev's personal attention.[12] But it is clear that its publication, even in the "small" *Sovetskaya Rossiya,* was portrayed by party channels as an example to emulate or, more precisely, a "guideline" that was not to be infringed upon or criticized. For example, a meeting of the Cinematographers' Union was held on March 23, ten days after the publication of the Andreyeva article, to criticize her statement. But the report of Aleksandr Gel'man at this session was published by *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* only two weeks later, on April 9, *after* Andreyeva had already been rebuked in *Pravda*. This fact confirms that, with a few exceptions, a new "Andreyeva line" dominated in the media for 24 days at a crucial period during the preparations for the party conference.

At the same time, Andreyeva's "triumph" was limited. Although some radical reformers have asserted that high party officials "pushed" the Andreyeva text at all newspapers in order to have it published everywhere, to the extent that I was able to check, no national or republic newspaper reprinted the text. (The best-known newspaper to reprint it was *Neues Deutschland* in East Berlin.) And various Soviet sources disagree on how many regional newspapers (oblast publications are not available abroad) published the Andreyeva article between March 13 and April 5. Yuriy Afanas'yev, the reformist historian, stated in a polemical article in *Pravda* of July 26, 1988, that "more than 30 obkoms of the party have followed the guideline of the Andreyeva article," but a *Pravda* editorial note qualified his statement by saying that "this information could not be confirmed."

In his *Zhurnalist* article mentioned earlier, Demidov gives the following account: the Andreyeva article was reprinted in Gorkiy by *Gorkovskaya Pravda* on March 15; then in Sverdlovsk by *Ural'skiy Rabochiy,* in Voroshilovgrad (by *Voroshilovskaya Pravda*) and in Donetsk (*Vecherniy Donetsk*); finally in Novgorod (*Novgorodskaya Pravda*) on March 31.[13] On the other hand, we have been told that *Tambovskaya Pravda* criticized the Andreyeva article on April 2 (before *Pravda*'s condemnation) and that *Znamya Yunosti,* the newspaper of the Belorussian Komsomol organization, refused to reprint the piece despite a note from TASS recommending the article's publication.[14]

The March 29th "Message"

Although we do not know the wording of the TASS recommendation, we do have the text of another instruction sent by the same news agency to all local newspapers on March 29, 1988. It reads as follows: "Regarding the questions of the newspapers about the reprinting of the Nina Andreyeva article, we communicate that this question has to be decided in agreement with the local party

[7]See, for example, Philip Taubman's article in *The New York Times,* reprinted in the *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Apr. 21, 1988.

[8]*Ogonek* (Moscow), No. 19, 1988, signed for press May 3, 1988.

[9]See Pavel Demidov, *Zhurnalist* (Moscow), No. 5, 1988, signed for press Apr. 25, 1988.

[10]*L'Unità* (Rome), May 23, 1988.

[11]We do not know what role Valentin Chikin, editor of *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, played, but we can assume that Vladimir Denisov, chief of the science and education department on the newspaper staff, was involved, since the Andreyeva "letter" wrote about the education of young students in a scientific institute. Denisov, as correspondent of *Sovetskaya Rossiya* in Tomsk (and Kemerovo) between 1978 and 1982, had developed a working relationship with Ligachev, first secretary of the Tomsk obkom (oblast party committee) up to 1983. We cannot exclude the possibility that Denisov was the "link" between *Sovetskaya Rossiya* and Ligachev in this matter, if the latter did not receive directly the Andreyeva article, as Chiesa claims.

[12]See Agence France Presse, June 25, 1988.

[13]*Zhurnalist,* No. 5, 1988.

[14]*Moscow News,* No. 18, May 1, 1988.

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authorities." Demidov, who quoted this message, added this comment: "The aim was to let it be known that this publication did not have the character of a guideline, that its reprinting was not approved." Personally, I would support a more neutral interpretation: the Andreyeva piece was not a *must,* but it was not forbidden either; it could be reprinted if the local first secretary wished it (and indeed it was published in Novgorod after the TASS instruction). Nevertheless, the March 29 communication was a signal indicating caution, a retreat from the more approving line heralded in the preceding instruction, whose text is still unknown.

One may add that two of the most important obkom first secretaries involved in the Andreyeva "reprinting" were removed from their jobs after this incident, although in a relatively mild way: Yuriy Khristoradnov, first secretary of the Gorkiy obkom since 1974, was elected chairman of the Union Soviet of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 24, 1988, and relieved from his job in Gorkiy on June 16; Yuriy Petrov, first secretary of the Sverdlovsk obkom, was relieved on June 16 and sent to Cuba as the new Soviet ambassador on July 15. Nothing has happened, so far, to other regional leaders who were involved,[15] including Ivan Nikulin, the first secretary in Novgorod, who "violated" the second, cautious signal from TASS.

With this background, one can try to reconstruct partially the events of that troubled period insofar as the top leadership is concerned. On March 14, 1988, one day after the publication of the Andreyeva article, Mikhail Gorbachev left for an official visit in Yugoslavia, where he remained until March 18. The General Secretary was weakened by the demonstrations in Armenia (and the subsequent pogrom in Sumgait), and his trip was particularly low-key. Gorbachev was not accompanied by a Politburo member, only by Vadim Medvedev, the Central Committee secretary in charge of socialist countries. His close supporter in the Politburo, Aleksandr Yakovlev, had gone to Mongolia at the same time; he came back to Moscow on March 19, after a stopover in Irkutsk. One can assume that Ligachev and his friends used this opportunity to improve the balance of forces in their favor, particularly by "promoting" the Andreyeva article.

It is quite probable that Gorbachev did not pay much attention to this article at first; he may not have even read it before leaving for Yugoslavia. But upon his return, he was no doubt briefed on the article and its consequences, and on the role played in this matter by Ligachev. He saw the danger and decided to move, taking advantage of Ligachev's own absence from the capital—the "Second" Secretary was in Vologda for four days, from March 27 to 30. (It is probably no coincidence that the second TASS instruction on the Andreyeva article was sent on March 29.) There were rumors that several Politburo sessions took place both during Ligachev's absence and after his return. It is said that one session approved the full-page editorial directed against Andreyeva that was published by *Pravda* on April 5 (this text was supposedly written by Aleksandr Yakovlev); another Politburo meeting is said to have issued a "warning" to Ligachev and deprived him of an important duty—control of the media and domestic propaganda—and transferred this responsibility to Yakovlev.[16] Rumors intensified when Ligachev was not seen in public after April 12, but abated when he reappeared, at the right-hand side of Gorbachev, at the Lenin day commemorations on April 22.

The Andreyeva case was more than the "creed" of an individual using *glasnost'* to express conservative views. It had all the ingredients of high-level political infighting. In the first phase (approximately to the end of March), Ligachev and the conservative group in the Politburo used this and similar writings[17] to redirect the preparation of the national party conference onto a more conservative course and, perhaps, also to boost Ligachev from the number two spot to the level of a "number one–minus" of sorts: on several occasions while Gorbachev was in Yugoslavia, the name of Ligachev appeared in the press ahead of those of his Politburo colleagues present in Moscow, a very rare violation of the firm principle that only the general secretary is listed out of alphabetical order.

In the second phase, beginning at the end of March, Gorbachev moved swiftly to exploit what had been clearly a mistake on the part of Ligachev. As he had done a year before in the Mathias Rust affair, the General Secretary demonstrated his ability to react quickly and forcefully (in the earlier case against the military) when confronted with a clear and "good" case. The Andreyeva article offered him a good opportunity to take the initiative again at precisely the time when the preparations for the party conference had to get going, and also to reduce the authority of Ligachev, which had

[15]Except for Vasiliy Mironov, first secretary of the Donetsk obkom, who died on June 11, 1988.

[16]According to one Soviet editor talking to this writer in November 1987, Yakovlev was at that time responsible for propaganda abroad only; domestic propaganda was the duty of Ligachev.

[17]One of those cases was an article by Mikhail Malakhov published in the April issue of *Molodya Gvardiya* (and signed to press on March 11, two days before the publication of Andreyeva's article). As a party veteran from the 1930's, Malakhov suggested that all functionaries who had been wrongly arrested during the Great Purge had already been released before World War II, i.e., that all others were guilty. And Malakhov got a further recognition when *Pravda* published on April 1 an interview with him, although on other, nonpolemical topics and together with other veterans.

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been enhanced in the aftermath of the Yel'tsin affair in November 1987. His actions "cancelled" to some extent the advantage of the conservatives, by creating a more favorable climate for the reformers and putting the conservatives on the defensive.

Indeed, the first result of the Andreyeva "collapse" was an orgy of *glasnost'* in the media that compelled nearly everybody to support *perestroyka* and to denounce various "braking mechanisms."[18] A powerful wave of proposals on all aspects of political life poured forth in newspapers and television programs (the boldest proposals being presented by readers' letters). Some of the proposals made their way into the "Theses" for the conference approved by the Central Committee on May 23 and published on May 27,[19] and into the resolutions of the party conference itself. It is fair to say that the conference would have looked quite different had there not been the Andreyeva incident or, rather, the reaction to it.

But the "victory" was not and could not be complete. Ligachev had been put on the defensive and probably stripped of an important function (the control of the domestic media), but he was not demoted, and he clearly remained number two in the party. Although he did not repeat in his speech at the party conference that he "chairs" the sessions of the party Secretariat, as he had told me in an interview in December 1987,[20] he conveyed a similar meaning by stating that he is "leading the current work of the Secretariat, on instruction of the Politburo."[21] He remained the leader—as well as the spokesman—of the apparatus. He was a key figure in the long and protracted process of electing delegates to the party conference, of arranging the conference itself, and of defining the scope and nature of the reform of the political system—the main business of the conference. And while the developments in the summer were clearly a "plus" for Gorbachev and his program, we must also keep in mind the extensive resistance, the uncertainties, and the infighting that were apparent at every step of the process.

Why Hold a Party Conference?

One may well ask why Gorbachev decided to convene a decisional gathering of such an ambiguous nature as a party conference. (He first broached the idea at the January 1987 plenum, but it was accepted only at the June 1987 plenum.) The last such conference was convened 47 years earlier (in the spring of 1941, a few months before the German invasion), and no clear regulations concerning its rights and statutes existed. Although a conference brings together as many delegates as a congress (5,000), it officially ranks third among party gatherings, not only below the regular congresses but also below Central Committee plenums, which bring together ten times fewer people.[22]

A more recent precedent might have been created by the 21st CPSU Congress, which was an "extraordinary" or "out of order" (*vneocheredny*) congress convened by Nikita Khrushchev in 1959 and the only event of that type in Soviet party history. In 1959, Khrushchev wanted to change the Central Committee in line with his 1957 victory over the "anti-party group," by purging it of pro-Malenkov and pro-Molotov elements. In 1987–88, Gorbachev similarly wanted to have a Central Committee more attuned to *perestroyka* than the one elected in March 1986, without having to wait for the next congress, the 28th, scheduled for 1991. Five years seems a long time when "radical reform" or "revolution" is unfolding. Several Soviet officials, speaking privately in the first part of 1987, clearly indicated that the Central Committee had to be renewed as soon as possible. In his report at the June 1987 plenum, Gorbachev himself mentioned "changes in the composition of the central bodies of the party" as having been among the tasks of past conferences.[23]

But the attempt to alter the Central Committee failed in both cases. In 1959, the apparatus wanted to limit, with the approval of Mikhail Suslov, the personal power of Khrushchev. Suslov himself announced the "good news" to the 21st CPSU Congress that since it was an "extraordinary" congress, there was no need to elect a new Central Committee.[24] In 1987, the resolution of the June plenum convening the party conference did not list changes in the leadership among the items on the agenda. To be sure, the resolutions adopted at the end of the 19th conference, on July 1, 1988, reiterated the 1939 regulation about allowing conferences to rejuvenate the composition of the Central Committee partially—up to 20 percent of the total membership. But this was to ap-

[18]See, for example, the appeal published in *Pravda*, Apr. 19, 1988, by a number of writers and artists, where we find the signatures of highly conservative figures such as Yuriy Bondarev, Viktor Karpov, Nikolay Gribachev, and Sergey Mikhalkov, alongside the *perestroykists* Mikhail Shatrov, Yuriy Baklanov, Andrey Voznesenskiy, and others.

[19]The Theses, as adopted by the CC plenum on May 23, were published in *Pravda*, May 27, 1988.

[20]*Le Monde* (Paris), Dec. 4, 1987.

[21]*Pravda*, July 1, 1988.

[22]See the article of Vasiliy Bondar, a party historian, in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Mar. 27, 1987. Bondar describes the last party regulations governing a conference, adopted at the 18th CPSU Congress in 1939.

[23]See *Partiynaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 13, July 1987.

[24]Ironically, Suslov was himself one of the very few beneficiaries of an out-of-congress election: he was elected full CC member at the 1941 party conference, without having previously served as a candidate member—in violation of the rules adopted two years earlier.

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ply next time, not at the 19th conference.

The confirmation for nearly three more years, up to March 1991, of the 1986 pre-*glasnost'* Central Committee was not only an anomaly politically, but a severe disappointment for Gorbachev and the reformers.[25] But as one of the old Central Committee members told me: "This is in line with *perestroyka*: the new leaders will have to show their capacities before being elected to the Central Committee, and they will have this opportunity by taking part in the plenums without the right to vote." This may be true, but the same probation period was not exacted from the old members, who were mostly appointed under Brezhnev, and who are now supposed to know best how to denounce the "stagnation years"—and promote *perestroyka*.

The May Compromise

The decisions of the June 1987 plenum were confirmed and reinforced by a plenum in May 1988, devoted to preparations for the conference. Certainly the post-Andreyeva climate helped Gorbachev to include in the Theses adopted at that plenum ideas more radical than would have been possible a year earlier. While the conference itself was to go further than the Theses in many respects (notably by creating a carefully tailored post of President of the Supreme Soviet for Gorbachev, by limiting office-holders to two consecutive five-year terms, by ordaining that there be more candidates than seats in most elections, etc.), in some other areas, the Theses were more "liberal" than the final resolutions, especially where freedom of assembly and the right to form informal groups were concerned. At the same time, it was also agreed that although the conference would vote "recommendations" and put out ideas, their implementation would be left to other meetings and bodies. For example, party statutes could be changed only at the next regular party congress. The May plenum also decided on the duration of the conference itself: it was to run no more than four days and close on July 1.

In other words, the apparatus and its main organ, the Central Committee, was to keep control of the event. The apparatus also played a decisive role in the process of selecting and electing the delegates to the conference. To be sure, several other influences were also at work. After all, local and regional party bosses did not need special instructions from the top—all they had to do was to follow the long tradition of designating delegates to party congresses and deputies to various soviets. In the party Secretariat itself, while Ligachev was one influence, Gorbachev and his probable associate Georgiy Razumovskiy in the Organizational Party Work Department were another. In addition, public opinion was a new factor playing a role in various Moscow institutes, where reformist intellectuals were put forward to oppose the delegates selected by the apparatus. But these alternative candidates nevertheless needed an intervention on the part of the top leadership to prevail, and this was not forthcoming in all cases.[26] A decision from above was probably also necessary to exclude from the delegate list those officials who were routinely appointed by local authorities, but who met with the disapproval of the population, as happened in Sakhalin and in Yaroslavl'.[27] Although this popular phenomenon represented something quite new in Soviet practice, it did not change the basic fact that approximately 90 percent of the delegates were "good" regular apparatchiks, much closer to Ligachev's view of *perestroyka* than to the radical approach of a Yel'tsin, a Yakovlev (whether Yegor, the editor of *Moscow News*, or Aleksandr, the Politburo member), and in many respects, Gorbachev himself.

A closer look at the debates during the conference over some key issues will show where the main obstacles to political reforms lie, and also how Gorbachev had to maneuver to place himself in a "centrist" position and, in fact, make important concessions to the conservative party apparatus in the process.

[25]According to a computation made with the SOVT data base, there were already in May 1988 more than 40 "dead souls" among the 306 full members of the CC: people who had been dismissed from their principal post after 1986 and would not have been entitled to a seat if there had been a new election. Approximately the same number of new leaders had been appointed in the meantime to a CC-rank post, but held no CC seat. If we add the new republican leaders appointed in the last few weeks before the party conference (notably the first secretary in Estonia, who is not even an alternate CC member), there were more than 50 such anomalies. Let us add that already in 1986, several of Brezhnev's officials previously pensioned off had been—surprisingly—reelected to the CC, such as Nikolay Tikhonov, head of the USSR government up to 1985; Boris Ponomarev, the CC secretary in charge of the International Department; and Nikolay Baybakov, chairman of Gosplan for more than 25 years. Altogether, nearly two-thirds of the present CC full members (65 percent) are holdovers from the 1981 CC, either as full members or as candidates. More than half are 60 years old or more, while members under 50 years of age account for only 6.5 percent of the membership.

[26]In Moscow, for which we have the best account, the gorkom (city party committee) first secretary, Lev Zaykov, listed 12 radical "*perestroykists*" whose candidacy had been heavily debated: only four of them appeared on the final list. However, in addition, several others were elected on direct instruction from the top (the historian Yuriy Afanas'yev), or elected elsewhere—e.g., *Ogonek* editor Vitaliy Korotich in Kherson (Ukraine), and even Boris Yel'tsin in Karelia. See *Moskovskaya Pravda*, June 4, 1988.

[27]The case of F. I. Loshchenkov, who was first secretary of the Yaroslavl' obkom for more than 25 years and is still a minister in the USSR government, is especially interesting, since he is a close associate of Ligachev. He was nevertheless excluded from the list of the Yaroslavl' delegates after being duly elected. *Pravda*, June 17, 1988.

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

Actor Mikhail Ul'yanov addresses the 19th Party Conference in a speech punctuated by pointed exchanges with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

—Novosti via Gamma-Liaison.

The Role of the Media

An immediate and major bone of contention was the role of the media. Revelations and criticisms in the press about the past and/or the present were certainly what upset the average apparatchik the most, just as the "excesses" of *glasnost'* in the Czechoslovak newspapers during the Prague Spring became the single most important factor that ultimately brought the Soviet tanks into Prague in August 1968. The basic theme of the majority of speeches at the party conference sounded very familiar: *glasnost'* is good, but its "excesses" are bad; journalists behave in an "irresponsible" way when they paint too many things in black, when they use "leader" and "bureaucrat" interchangeably, when they arouse public opinion against "decisions of regularly elected party committees," etc. In other words, the media is free only so long as what it reveals suits the party and its leaders. This attitude, bolstered by 60 years of Stalin-Brezhnev tradition, remains very difficult to overcome. Some speakers, more actively opposed to *glasnost'*, went further: they denounced the "attempt" by some "forces" to get control over the media, to "settle accounts" with good communists and establish the domination of one "clan." Those who came to the defense of the media against these accusations were a tiny minority—there were a few journalists who took the floor, like the chief editors of *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, in addition to some intellectuals like Georgiy Arbatov.

But where did Gorbachev stand in this debate? The following exchange between the General Secretary and Mikhail Ul'yanov, a famous actor, is illuminating. A consistent advocate of *glasnost'*, Ul'yanov had criticized earlier interventions seeking to "put the screws on the press" and had proposed that editors be elected to their positions by party congresses and conferences instead of being appointed by the apparatus. (A similar proposal was not incorporated into the final resolutions.) But when Ul'yanov observed that the regional press was less dedicated to *glasnost'* than the national (Moscow) newspapers, he was interrupted by Gorbachev:

Gorbachev: On the one hand, the local press is moving more slowly in the direction of *perestroyka*. But on the other, it has avoided some of the wild stuff [*likhiye*] that the central press has served us sometimes. A person can be insulted in our newspapers and magazines. Is this permissible in a socialist society?

Ul'yanov: Are you really in favor of a situation where no mistake is made and no harm done to anybody, i.e., are you in favor of reducing the role of the press, or do you support, as I understood you, an elevation of the role of the press, even if there are mistakes?

Gorbachev: "We should not give up the press, this national forum, to the domination of one group after another. Earlier, there was one group, now we have another. Here is the problem, and that is what we have to see [long applause].[28]

In other words, Ul'yanov had to realize that the General Secretary did not distinguish between the "stagnation writers" of the Brezhnev years, who had suppressed truth and openness for decades, and the "reformist" writers of today, without whom, it may be said, the policy of *perestroyka*—already ineffective in the area of the economy—would be altogether nonexistent.

Did Gorbachev really mean what he said? It is possible to doubt it. It is clear, for example, that if such controversial editors as Vitaliy Korotich (*Cgonek*) or Yegor Yakovlev (*Moscow News*), both of whom were conference delegates, kept their job even at the peak of Ligachev's power in the winter of 1987–88, this was due to the protection of Gorbachev himself, together with that of Aleksandr Yakovlev and other reformist leaders. But this

[28]Ibid., June 30, 1988.

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statement of the General Secretary's (reiterated in his report and other statements) was an important concession to the conservatives and a warning to the editors—they had to work at their own risk and could be eventually sacrificed.

No Purge From Above

A similar concession could be observed on the equally hot issue of the behavior of "anti-*perestroyka*" forces. As mentioned earlier, the "May compromise" had confirmed that there would be no changes in the Central Committee and the leadership. This decision was reinforced during the conference itself by the abandonment of the procedure of certification (*attestatsiya*), which required party functionaries to undergo an examination of their competence.[29] But Gorbachev decided to make a virtue of this necessity, and to formulate this "no purge" situation into a doctrine of his own. Again, the General Secretary engaged in a significant exchange with a speaker, this time with Viktor Postnikov, the director of a farm in Stavropol' territory:

Postnikov: Mikhail Sergeyevich! *Perestroyka* is a revolution. You have said that we are going to do it quietly, with humane methods. But since it is a revolution, we won't get anywhere with these means. We know you: you are humane by nature; you want to educate the bureaucrats with humane methods. In fact, they ought to be stripped of their functions.

Gorbachev: Viktor Ivanovich, you portray Mikhail Sergeyevich as a simpleton [*prostak*]. I think that if the Central Committee again starts to purge bureaucrats, we won't get anywhere. We have tried already to do many things from the top; it does not help. Today we try, through the reform, through the media, to put all of society into motion. And then the bureaucrat will not know where to go. The earth will burn his feet. It is not a question of being fair or pleasing everybody.

Postnikov: You have made me change my mind.[30]

In fact, there was little in the argument of the General Secretary to change one's mind. To try to make a revolution, to break the power of the apparatus, but to refuse to change this apparatus from the top, i.e., to keep it in power, is not convincing. It is as though one wanted to make the French Revolution by and through the French aristocracy (even if the king had been more reformist than Louis XVI was). And the conference itself could not yet be seen as a "Night of August 4," since the party aristocracy only envisaged a change in the rules of the game, not the abolition of its privileges as the main ruling body.[31] But here, Gorbachev probably had no choice: to push personally for a purge would have made his position much more precarious than it already was. He could not conceal his complicity with those speakers who called for a purge. Postnikov was a close friend from Gorbachev's native Stavropol' territory, V. I. Mel'nikov, first secretary of the Komi obkom, who asked publicly for the resignation of two Politburo members (Mikhail Solomentsev and Andrey Gromyko) and two Central Committee members (Viktor Afanas'yev and Georgiy Arbatov), had apparently "cleared" his speech with the General Secretary.[32] In any case, his "doctrine" as Gorbachev had formulated it made it mandatory for speakers like Postnikov and Mel'nikov to express their views: "the people" had to speak in favor of this purge on which Gorbachev could not or was unwilling to decide by himself.

The Yel'tsin-Ligachev Duel

The same ambiguities and problems are evident in the statements of Boris Yel'tsin and Ligachev on the final day of the conference, and in the stand between the two that Gorbachev took. Yel'tsin probably did a disservice to Gorbachev in October 1987 by moving too early—by exposing the right problem (the stand of Ligachev on *perestroyka*) at the wrong time. Nevertheless, he has performed a useful role for the General Secretary by functioning as a sort of lightning rod on several occasions. Too radical to be "in line" for an important job, he is an ideal scapegoat. Not only can he be blamed for being "leftist," but he has to be heard out as a stand-in for "the people," in the same way as the Postnikovs, Mel'nikovs, and Ul'yanovs have to be heard. That is why Gorbachev wanted him to speak at the conference, and insisted that Yel'tsin present his demand for rehabilitation. Actually, given what had been said in the media over the past few months and at the conference itself, there is no valid ground for maintaining the typically Stalinist judg-

[29]The *attestatsiya* procedure was included in the Theses approved in May, and again in Gorbachev's report to the conference, but was heavily criticized by many delegates. The resolutions did not mention it.

[30]*Pravda*, July 1, 1988.

[31]To be sure, privileges of the nomenklatura were strongly attacked by some delegates, but defended—or, more precisely, denied or minimized—by many others. Ligachev, for example, pointed out that the party apparatchik ranks 26th on the scale of wages in the Soviet Union. All these defenders missed the fact that in a state-organized market with scarce products, privileges are hardly contingent on salaries.

[32]Moscow television on June 30 showed how Mel'nikov said in reply to a question by Gorbachev as to who those "stagnation leaders" specifically were who had to go: "Both of us know who they are: Solomentsev . . . ." In the *Pravda* account (July 1, 1988), the first part of Mel'nikov's sentence was deleted—only the names were mentioned.

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ment rendered in October 1987 about Yel'tsin's "politically erroneous position." This also explains why Gorbachev criticized him only for tactical mistakes and not for the basic points of his program, despite its radical character.[33] In fact, Gorbachev was careful to endorse neither Yel'tsin's position nor that of his main opponent, Yegor Ligachev. Indeed, one significant element of Gorbachev's final speech was that he did not deem it suitable to say a single word of praise about the man who was kept in the number two position.

Let us turn now to the speech of Ligachev, which gives us many clues on his position—and that of the powerful forces behind him—at this crucial juncture. Several elements should be pointed out here. Although Ligachev's position on the reexamination of the past did not differ from the ones he had taken in the preceding year, it was adapted to the new situation. It was obvious that Stalin had to be "thrown to the wolves"—his crimes condemned—and Ligachev did just that by revealing that members of his own family had been shot or arrested under Stalin (let us note in passing that Andreyeva said the same thing about her family in her famous article). But at the same time, he paid ritual homage to the "heroic work" of the people in the 1930's accomplished in spite of the personality cult. In Ligachev's view, it is wrong to assert that a whole generation of Soviet people "has been fed only with lies and demagogy," or had been "exploited."

The debate over the the Stalinist era is not only of historical interest; the assessment of the Stalin era determines the assessment of what kind of reforms are necessary today. It raises important questions, such as

[33]Let us just mention Yel'tsin's point that the two-term limitation should start from the last elections, not from the next one, and also its coupling with an age limit of 65 years, effective immediately, for Politburo members. In June 1988, this would have meant the retirement of Gromyko, Ligachev, Solomentsev, Viktor Chebrikov, Shcherbytskyi, and Zaykov, precisely the most conservative members. Yel'tsin was also the most articulate, as earlier, in denouncing the privileges of the nomenklatura, and he asked that the finances of the party be subject to complete control. See *Pravda*, July 2, 1988.



Boris Yel'tsin addresses the 19th Party Conference. —Tass from Sovfoto.

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those raised by Yuriy Afanas'yev, the radical historian, in *Pravda* on July 26, 1988: Were Stalin's crimes only "deformations" of a basically sound system, or did they deform both the regime and society? Can the existing society be called "socialist"? Afanas'yev answered "No" and was criticized for this answer in an editorial note. To be sure, *Pravda* (and Ligachev) base their argument on what Gorbachev had said in his November 2, 1987, address on the 70th anniversary of the Revolution—namely, that there was "no other way" to build socialism than that chosen by Stalin. But the view on history, which reflected an early compromise among the leadership, has changed drastically since that time. Moreover, this argument did not address Afanas'yev's contention that half-truths about Stalinism mean half-measures in terms of reform, that there cannot be a "revolution" if the past is presented as not that bad after all, if "socialism" has already been built, and if it possesses so many advantages.

Ligachev underlined his own position by giving his "full and total support" to two speeches delivered earlier, by the writers Yuriy Bondarev and Borys Oleynyk. While the latter was moderate, Bondarev propounded extremely conservative views. Not only did he develop the theme that "everything is being lost, all the good old values are being destroyed," but he went so far as to voice approval for those who hand in their party cards in order not to be in the same ranks with opportunists and traitors.[34] Bondarev likened the present leadership course to that of an airplane pilot "who has taken off, but does not know where he is going to land." In other words, Gorbachev cannot be sure that he is going to find his way to a "socialist" airport.

Ligachev used a similar metaphor when he explained his view of *perestroyka*: "We must solve energetically, with innovation, the problems that arise, but we must do so carefully, taking into account the consequences. Together with decisiveness, we need a cautious approach [*osmotritel'nost'*]. As folk wisdom has it: before entering a place, know the way out." Needless to say, Ligachev disagreed with Yel'tsin on "the strategy of *perestroyka,*" not just on tactical elements, as Gorbachev had, in his speech.

Ligachev went beyond the standard criticism of the media made at the conference; he was the only one to suggest, however obliquely, that "the CC and the editorial boards of the newspapers and magazines will draw the necessary conclusions about the perfectly correct and principled interventions of the delegates on this matter." The formulation "conclusions to be drawn" has always meant a change of course, and quite often has entailed "organizational measures" in order to "reinforce the leadership" of a given publication, that is, the ousting of some editors. What will happen in this connection remains to be seen, but this ominous suggestion reinforced Gorbachev's warning about a "clan" trying to replace another clan in the leadership of the media. Ligachev's main criticism of the media was that it promoted the idea of "increasing resistance" to *perestroyka,* that it had "compiled lists" of persons supposedly opposed to Gorbachev and his policy. According to Ligachev, this was nonsense: "We have no fractions, no reformers or conservatives, but many would like there to be such." This was much more than a ritual demonstration of loyalty to Gorbachev; it was a clear message to him and other reformers: the necessary changes will have to be made with everybody in the party (except some corrupt elements), in other words, with the apparatus as it is now, not without it or against it, as Yel'tsin and other radicals would like. It follows that any attempt to denounce "conservative forces," even by

Party Secretary Yegor Ligachev addresses the final session of the 19th Party Conference.

—UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.

[34] Ibid., June 30, 1988.

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means of such episodes as the Andreyeva affair (significantly, Ligachev did not allude to it in his speech, which may be an indirect confirmation that he was involved in it), constitutes an impermissible attempt to destabilize the party and "split the leadership."[35]

Ligachev also sketched an interesting picture of the situation within the leadership. In his view, the right people were those who formed the "hard core" of the leadership in March 1985, those who had insisted on having Gorbachev as general secretary after Konstantin Chernenko's death. Ligachev described those events as follows:

We have to tell the full truth: we were living in alarming [trevozhnyye] days. I found myself at the center of these events, so I can have an opinion. Radically different decisions could have been made, there was a real danger. I can say that it is thanks to the firm position taken by Politburo members Chebrikov, Solomentsev, Gromyko, and by an important group of obkom first secretaries that the March plenum made the only correct decision. Then the April [1985] plenum looked reality in the face, unveiled the mistakes, and decided on the strategy of acceleration and renewal. Here is the basis for my interpretation of the present period and of that time; here is, in my view, the dialectical unity of renewal and continuity.[36]

Ligachev's remarks prompt several observations. This is the first time that we learn about such a specific role for Ligachev at the time of the succession. Ligachev had no seat on the Politburo, being neither a member nor a candidate; he was only a CC secretary, and the most junior one at that (he had been elected in December 1983). But he was in charge of the important Organizational Party Work Department. We can assume that in this capacity, Ligachev could mobilize what he calls an "important group" of regional first secretaries with whom he was in touch to support Gorbachev and oppose Gorbachev rivals being then mentioned in the press—e.g., Viktor Grishin and/or Grigoriy Romanov.

Also interesting is Ligachev's selectivity in naming Politburo members. Chebrikov was in March 1985 a candidate member only (he was elected full member, together with Ligachev, at the next plenum, in April 1985), so that he had no right to vote. He was, however, strongly rumored to be the man who, as chairman of the KGB, threatened to pull out his files on Grishin and his Moscow "mafia," and possibly also on Romanov and his "excesses" in Leningrad. But there were full Politburo members other than Gromyko and Solomentsev[37] who should have been mentioned but were "forgotten" by Ligachev. While the omission of Brezhnev's old appointees excluded from the Politburo after Gorbachev became general secretary (Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Grishin, Romanov, Nikolay Tikhonov, and Geydar Aliyev) is understandable, two of the ten March 1985 members still have the same positions today: Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi and Vitaliy Vorotnikov. We know that the first, the long-time head of the party in Ukraine, was visiting the United States at the time of Chernenko's death and was probably less directly involved in the struggle for the succession. But the omission of Vorotnikov, a Moscow-based member and still head of the government of the Russian republic, is more surprising, especially since he seems to share the conservative views of Ligachev. Nevertheless, Vorotnikov was the object of an unpleasant allusion by the Number Two to corruption in Krasnodar.[38] Also unexpected is the absence of positive references to the 1985 Politburo candidate members, other than Chebrikov, who still are in high positions: Eduard Shevardnadze (who certainly supported the election of his friend Gorbachev), Petr Demichev, and Vladimir Dolgikh.

But Ligachev's most important point was to send a more general message to Gorbachev by way of these reminiscences: the right type of leadership for today is roughly the same as in March 1985; it must include Chebrikov, Solomentsev, Gromyko, and Ligachev himself,

[35]We have here an interesting comparison with Yel'tsin's arguments about destabilization. While Ligachev wants to proceed step by step, with the apparatus keeping its full authority, Yel'tsin thinks that this apparatus "is not restructuring" and that the main objective in this situation is to keep the confidence of the population by settling "one or two problems in the next two to three years." Otherwise, he says, "the faith [of the people] may be shaken at any time. . . ."

[36]*Pravda,* July 1, 1988.

[37]As we have seen, the speaker Mel'nikov had named Gromyko and Solomentsev (together with *Pravda* editor Afanas'yev and Arbatov) as examples of Brezhnev-era holdovers who should be removed from their jobs. Ligachev may have used this opportunity to "rehabilitate" some of those persons; it was Gromyko and Solomentsev who were selected to chair the two next sessions of the conference, and later a vaguely identified delegate, Mamayev, sent a written message to defend Gromyko (but not Solomentsev) which was read aloud.

[38]In his speech at the party conference, Ligachev revealed that he, with the support of Gorbachev, had started to clean corruption "particularly in Uzbekistan and in the Krasnodar territory, a year or a year and a half before the April [1985] plenum," i.e., at a time "when other persons formed the leadership of the country, when the situation was very dangerous for those who handled that kind of matter: you could find yourself at any time, and in the best case, ambassador to a distant land." This is not very flattering to Chernenko or to Andropov, who was general secretary "one year and a half" before the April plenum, but even less pleasant for Vorotnikov, who was first secretary in Krasnodar for one year, up to the summer of 1983. Vorotnikov was presented at the time as the right leader, appointed by Andropov, to replace a highly corrupt Brezhnev crony. But according to Ligachev, the cleaning up in the area started at the earliest at the end of 1983, i.e., *after* Vorotnikov's incumbency there.

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all of whom happen to form the hard core of the present conservative majority in the Politburo. They are also Yuriy Andropov's appointees for the most part, and their basic position immediately after Brezhnev's death and to this day can be summarized as follows: Yes, it was necessary to get the country out of the "stagnation" years, to clean up the corruption, and to put people back to work; yes, an "acceleration" had to take place, and "*perestroyka*" in place of this earlier slogan was fine. But the leadership had to be particularly careful and prudent about *glasnost'*, history, a market economy, and the like, in order not to destabilize the system, and to be sure that the "plane" would "land" in what was still a "socialist" country. This position explained their reservations about the ideas of the radical reformers and of Gorbachev himself.

Where Were You Then?

But there were even more ominous warnings addressed to the General Secretary in Ligachev's speech. The reference to the 1985 situation was to remind Gorbachev who had made him "king." But it also was a question asking "Where were you then?" To be sure, Ligachev had praise for the Gorbachev of today, and even for the pre-1985 Gorbachev, but not for the Gorbachev before 1983, i.e., in the late Brezhnev years. It was clear where Ligachev had been in Brezhnev's days. At that time, he explained, he was a quasi-exile in Siberia, in a place (Tomsk) where "you hardly can be more in exile," but where he did his best to solve the problems of the area (and, incidentally, did much better than Yel'tsin, who resorted to rationing food in Sverdlovsk).

Ligachev did not say anything about Gorbachev, but everybody knows that the future general secretary made a brilliant career in this period, at the peak of the "stagnation years," as a member of the Brezhnev leadership: party secretary in 1978, candidate Politburo member in 1979, and full member in 1980. Who could do better? It is not being too Machiavellian to assume that Ligachev and his friends want to set limits to Gorbachev's de-Brezhnevization campaign by reminding him of his past, in the same way that some anti-Khrushchev forces in the 1960's were hinting at the purges in Ukraine to compromise Khrushchev and prevent him from going too far with his own reforms. It was considered useful to remind Gorbachev that, after all, he was also vulnerable, while others, like Ligachev, were much better able to withstand accusations about the past.

Altogether, the performance of Ligachev at the conference was impressive. It was carefully tailored to meet the main preoccupations of the apparatus, and for this reason was greatly applauded. (Nevertheless, as many observers have noted, his opponent Yel'tsin was much more popular in the streets.) Not only did Ligachev minimize the issue of nomenklatura privileges; he also reflected the views of the average apparatchik by saying nothing on the subject that was most controversial for him: the accretion of functions for the first secretaries of the regional party committees through concurrent nomination to the post of chairman of the regional soviets.

This idea, first formulated in Gorbachev's report (but not in the Theses), met with considerable criticism from many speakers at the conference, including from reformers like Leonid Abalkin and Yel'tsin, who said that he "did not understand" the proposal. As a result, Gorbachev had to take the floor again, on the third day of the meeting, in order to defend his proposal at some length. One could have expected Ligachev to move decisively in support of the General Secretary, but he did not. Evidently, the Number Two wanted to distance himself from a principle which was not in line with the separation of functions between the party and the state, which exposed the apparatchiks to the sanction of a popular vote outside of party channels, and which violated a comfortable precept of the old system: "the man who decides is not responsible, the one who is responsible does not decide."[39] Eventually, the proposal was included in the final resolutions, but Gorbachev had to concede that the combining of functions will stand only "as a general rule," in other words, there would be exceptions. It remains to be seen how this rule will be implemented. It is possible that it will find itself on the list of "harebrained schemes" blamed on the General Secretary in the course of some "de-Gorbachevization," as had happened with some of Khrushchev's ideas in the early 1960's.

This is not to say that the events in the first half of 1988, including the conference itself, were not favorable for the General Secretary: clearly, Gorbachev used his vast power to initiate bold proposals, to push around the conservative majority of the Politburo, and to make some significant advances for *perestroyka*. He pushed de-Stalinization to the point of a generalized attack on the "command-administrative system" inherited from Stalin and Brezhnev; he consolidated *glasnost';* he outlined a political calendar that will dominate the entire coming year and that ought as well to consolidate his position as number one. At the same time, these events represent only a step in a long and protracted struggle on a road that remains highly dangerous because of numerous impediments, some of them self-imposed, that could block the way ahead.

[39]See, for example, the arguments of I.D. Laptev, *Pravda*, July 1, 1988.

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As in 1956–57

The first and major impediment at this juncture derives from the delicate balance of power that has been struck in the party and its leadership. The situation in this respect can be compared to that of 1956–57, the period between the 20th CPSU Congress of February 1956 and the "anti-party crisis" of June 1957, when Khrushchev pushed the conservative Politburo into promoting his initiatives, and thereby achieved highly significant results, but simultaneously brought on the collapse of the collective leadership. Clearly, Gorbachev wants to forestall a similar situation. As one Soviet observer told me: "The too neat victory of 1957 engendered the plot of 1964, and that is what we have to avoid."

But the counterargument is that the "centrist" approach chosen by Gorbachev could lead to half-reforms and half-results, at a time when the high expectations aroused in the population call for something more. Resistance and opposition of all kinds still remain and explain the already existing disappointment with economic reform, which may indeed be sabotaged by some elements in the regime willing to create popular dissent. To be sure, the campaign against corruption can be used to sweep away many holdovers from the Brezhnev era. But there is now a tendency, even among uncorrupted elements, to prevent investigations from going too far so as not to destabilize the political system.[40]

In any case, although the uproar created by the media and the debates at the party conference are certainly unprecedented and promising, it should not obscure the fact of the "survival" of the party apparatus, including its silent majority, whose reasoning can be assumed to go this way: To be sure, we are being pushed around, but we know how to weather a storm. Now that the conference is over, it is up to us to show that we are still the authority. Regarding the media, we have not been deprived of the right to appoint the editors and fire them as the need arises. As far as the deputies of the revitalized soviets are concerned, we will still have a large influence on their selection and on their activities through party channels. The fact that the "correct" decision may be reached by 75 percent of the vote, and not by 99 percent as earlier, is regrettable, but not decisive. The same reasoning applies to Gorbachev himself: He may be president of the Supreme Soviet, but we will see what kind of power he will have.[41] And even that will not be a full guarantee against a repetition of the 1964 coup against Khrushchev; at the time, the 500 or so members of the plenum got together in one day to ratify his expulsion. If necessary, we can do the same with the 2,300 deputies of the 'Congress of Soviets,' and have at least 70 percent vote with us.

This does not mean that such a scenario is a probability (the leadership will do its best to avoid it in view of the certain disappointment it would create abroad and the serious frustrations it would foster at home); but it is well to remember that it should not be entirely ruled out. Even if Gorbachev prevails and progresses in his policy of reform, he will have to remove some other restrictions that are still embodied in his political scheme. Nobody in the Soviet Union, not even Yel'tsin (who made this point in his speech), is prepared at this moment to accept a multi-party system or to abandon the dominant role of the CPSU. And it is possible to achieve a large degree of democratization, if not democracy itself, with the present one-party system.

But this would necessitate the creation of various "movements" and associations outside of the party and also the abandonment of the so-called "democratic centralism" principle, which prohibits the formation of different "groupings" inside the party. On the first point, the warm reference in Gorbachev's report to a "*perestroyka* movement," which is supposed to ally party and nonparty members in support of the present policy, was met with criticism by the apparatchiks and considerably watered down in the final resolutions. On the second point, Gorbachev himself is a prisoner of the Lenin heritage: it is the Father of the Bolshevik Revolution himself who established democratic centralism in 1921. While anything can be said about Stalin now, nothing or very little can yet be said about Lenin, though it will be clearly necessary at some point to criticize the man who disbanded the only assembly ever elected in Russia, who suppressed all other parties, and who banned all noncommunist newspapers.

[40] As the prosecutors in the "Uzbek mafia affair" explained in *Ogonek* (No. 26, 1988), the huge network of corruption developed by Sharaf Rashidov in Uzbekistan had ramifications not only in Uzbekistan, but in Moscow also. But they had to "negotiate" a full year before obtaining the right to arrest Brezhnev's son-in-law Yuriy Churbanov, first deputy minister of internal affairs, in January 1987. The prosecutors imply that there are many more corrupt officials to be unmasked in Moscow now, but that some "honest people" want to close the case for political reasons. Yel'tsin in his speech named Solomentsev in this connection: as the head of the Party Control Commission, the latter must approve any arrest of important functionaries, and seems to play the role of a brake in this matter.

[41] Although Gorbachev described in detail in his report to the conference the vast powers of the new president (nominating the prime minister, chairing the Defense Council, etc.), nothing was said about these prerogatives in the final resolutions. Given the precedent of an existing chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet with his largely ceremonial functions, the temptation will be strong to reduce the power of the new president in order to maintain the privileges of the Politburo and of the party Secretariat.

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True, Gorbachev said in his report that "democratic centralism" should be modified today by decentralization, and it is also clear that the freer debate in the party has led to the emergence of "trends," if not factions. But the test case in this matter is the rehabilitation of Yel'tsin, and it has not happened yet. Moreover, while Gorbachev himself has not used in the past year or two the word "monolithic," several speakers at the conference praised this sacred cow of the Stalinist heritage.

Where Is the Army?

Finally, let us ask about what seems to be the "missing link" in the present struggle: the attitude of the armed forces and/or the secret police. During periods of important struggle for power in a communist country, the military has taken a clear position, or at least its top leaders have. Let us only mention Marshal Georgiy Zhukov's role in the fight against Beria in 1953 and then against the anti-party group in 1957, as well as the decisive support of Lin Biao in China for the mobilization of the Red Guards at the start of the Cultural Revolution. In Moscow, there is now more than a struggle for power, there is a battle between various ideas and various forces over socialism's future, over a new "revolution." But we do not see clearly where the army stands in this battle.

After the disappearance or dismissal of the prominent spokesmen for the military of the Brezhnev-Chernenko period (Marshals Dmitriy Ustinov, Nikolay Ogarkov, and Sergey Sokolov, among others), the political role of the military became much less visible, probably to the satisfaction of the entire "hard core" of the 1985 leadership (Ligachev himself does not seem to have any strong leanings toward the military). The new military commanders—Generals Dmitriy Yazov and Aleksey Lizichev, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev—seem to be in line with *perestroyka* as well as with "new thinking" in the area of foreign policy and disarmament. But their support is low-key and somewhat subdued. A clear statement in favor of *glasnost'* and political reform by one of the principal new military leaders at the party conference might have been expected—as a useful boost for the policy of the General Secretary and as a warning to his foes. Instead, there was only a short and orthodox speech by General B. Gromov, commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, who limited himself to defending the "internationalist duty" of the Soviet troops there.[42]

To be sure, the military does support, as it did already in the early 1960's, the denunciation of Stalin's crimes, particularly the killing of 40,000 Soviet officers in 1937 and 1938. The army newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* has published valuable testimonies about this period, as well as many new details on the role of the Red Army in the arrest of Beria in 1953. General Dmitriy Volkogonov, the chief military historian, has published the most comprehensive portrait so far of Stalin (including his involvement in nonmilitary affairs), and no doubt the military is even more interested than other institutions in a "restructuring" of the economy that would better the performance of Soviet industry and technology.

But political reform and *glasnost'* are another matter. They may be perceived by the military as destabilizing, especially when it comes to ethnic relations among Soviet nationalities, an area where the Red Army has played and is playing an increasingly integrative role.

The same reservations are likely to be felt even more in the ranks of the KGB. Indeed, KGB Chairman Chebri-

Lt. Gen. B. Gromov, commander of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, signs an autograph during the 19th Party Conference, which he addressed.

—Novosti from via Sovfoto.

[42]In add tion to Commander B. Gromov, one other representative of the military to speak at the conference may have been the delegate who sent a note to the presidium to "rehabilitate" Andrey Gromyko after the attacks by Mel'nikov. The name of this delegate, Mamayev, was given without any precision, but SOVT data shows an Aleksey M. Mamayev, with the rank of major-general, as being head of a department in the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF). See *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 4, 1988.

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kov has clearly aligned himself with the conservative wing of the leadership, as was shown by the vocal tribute he received from Ligachev at the party conference and by his own highly orthodox statements on dissent, imperialist "diversion," and the like.[43] The KGB's participation in the *glasnost'* campaign has been modest. Since the firing of a KGB official in Voroshilovgrad at the end of 1986 made headlines, the secret police has hardly been mentioned in the media, except for some noncontroversial factual reports in the weekly *Argumenty i Fakty*. Strangely enough, no role has been attributed to the KGB in the investigations of the various Uzbek and Moscow "mafias" (all of them have been handled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs or by the Procurator General's office), even though in Andropov's time, all important affairs of this kind were invariably considered to be in the KGB's domain.

Two Logics

Let me conclude by saying that there is no definitive answer at this point to the question of whether Gorbachev and his reformist policy will survive. In fact, while it will be easy to say that he has failed if, for example, he has to leave power, it will be much more difficult to ascertain that he has succeeded, given that he will have to overcome chronic difficulties as well as new ones certain to arise in the process of reform. We have already witnessed the nationalist agitation, and many other problems are likely to appear in the course of economic reform as prices, social inequalities, and popular unrest all increase.

More generally speaking, two logics are at work. If we judge according to internal logic, the logic of the system as it is "structured" now, the prospects for success are dim: most long-time observers of the system can only conclude on the basis of past experience and their "innermost convictions" that the present *glasnost'* orgy is provisional, that sooner or later the screws will be tightened and the situation brought back to "order." It is worth noting that this reasoning is very often encountered in Eastern Europe, where rulers and and dissidents alike know all too well what the Soviet system is.

But there is also another logic, the logic of history and general common sense. This logic strongly suggests that the Soviet-type communist system is coming to an end, that democracy is progressing nearly everywhere in the world at this juncture, and not only because mankind needs freedom. The so-called "formal" or "bourgeois" freedoms, derided for decades by communist propagandists, are now increasingly perceived as a necessary precondition for economic development and social progress in the modern age. The changes of regimes in South Korea, Taiwan, Burma, and so forth, have all been precipitated by this perception.

We can conclude, in line with this logic, that "Gorbachevism" is one approach to removing the insuperable obstacles to modernity in the Soviet Union and that it will eventually succeed. Even if it fails now, sooner or later another Gorbachev will come up with a reform program that will, broadly speaking, go in the same directions—toward a rehabilitation of the private sector in the economy and much greater freedom in information, culture, and political life. But this may be true only in the long run.

In the short run, the present Gorbachev will have to choose between a "neutralization" of his reformist policy, i.e, a dilution of his radical ideas through the "braking" power of the apparatus, and more steps forward on the reformist road, which will increase instability. The first option does not seem very likely, given Gorbachev's energy and consistency, his stubbornness in returning to the same ideas after a time, after the main resistance to them has been overcome. If he goes on, the political crisis already growing behind the scenes since approximately the beginning of 1987 will erupt in new, more chaotic developments. Sooner or later, there will be a showdown between Gorbachev and Ligachev and between their respective factions. This could come during preparations for the next party congress, which might well be convened earlier than 1991.

It may be that the maintenance of the present delicate balance of power between reformers and conservatives, the difficult coexistence between proponents of a "radical" revolution and the "half-Brezhnevite" hard core of the 1985 leadership, was the only possible course of action in 1988. But this situation cannot be other than unstable and provisory. And the victory of real reform is not yet guaranteed.

[43] *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Sept. 11, 1987, and *Pravda*, Sept. 2, 1988.

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Politics and History under Gorbachev

Thomas Sherlock

The use of Soviet history as a tool of reform has emerged over the past two years as an essential element of Mikhail Gorbachev's political strategy.[1] At first unwilling to address divisive historical issues, particularly those of the Stalin years, the General Secretary has come to countenance and even encourage wide-ranging de-Stalinization and a search for reformist predecessors and precedents in early Soviet history. Although the phenomenon still has an instrumental cast to it, political leaders, writers, social scientists, and other commentators have reopened a number of pages of Soviet history and subjected them to a more objective reading. There is considerable hesitancy in some circles, however, to advance a process that ultimately runs the risk of placing in question the legitimacy of the October Revolution and rule by the communist party.

Gorbachev's own initial caution was evidenced in the new party program approved at the 27th CPSU Congress in early 1986, which devoted only part of a single line to criticism of the Stalin period.[2] When asked, in an interview with *L'Humanité* on February 4, 1986 (shortly before the congress), whether "various circles in the West" were correct in doubting that the "vestiges of Stalinism" had been overcome in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev replied that "Stalinism" was a concept invented by the opponents of socialism to discredit the Soviet Union and socialism as a whole. The USSR, he asserted, had already applied the lessons learned at the 20th Party Congress (where Khrushchev launched his de-Stalinization campaign).[3]

Yet, already, prominent voices were being raised rejecting a cautious approach to the past. In September 1985, the historian Yuriy Afanas'yev, then head of the history section of the party's theoretical journal, *Kommunist,* published an article entitled "The Past and Ourselves." He said that an inadequate understanding of history was "extremely dangerous," and argued that only by rejecting attempts to idealize and manipulate the past could Soviet society understand the present and come to grips with its problems.[4] Another such voice was that of poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko. At the December 1985 congress of the Soviet writers' union, he condemned the "blank spots" in Soviet history and its periodic rewriting and observed that only "fearlessness

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[1]On the topic of history and politics under Gorbachev, see Stephen Wheatcroft, "Unleashing the Energy of History, Mentioning the Unmentionable, and Reconstructing Soviet Historical Awareness: Moscow 1987," *Australian Slavonic and East European Studies* (Parkville, Victoria), Vol. 1, No. 1, 1987, pp. 85–132; R. W. Davies "Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution: The First Phase," *The Socialist Register 1988,* London, Merlin Press, 1988, pp. 37–78; and Mark von Hagen, "History and Politics Under Gorbachev: The Struggle for Professional Autonomy," *Harriman Institute Forum* (New York), forthcoming.

[2]The sentence read: "Displaying Bolshevik principledness and self-criticism, relying on the masses' support, the party performed a large amount of work to eliminate the consequences of the personality cult and deviations from Lenin's norms of party and state leadership and to rectify errors of a subjectivist and voluntarist nature." From the "CPSU Program New Edition Adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress," as printed in *Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 7, 1986, and translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Mar. 10, 1986, p. O/2.

[3]Reproduced in M. Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Articles), Vol. 3, Moscow, Politizdat, 1987, pp. 162–63.

[4]*Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 14, September 1985, pp. 107–09, 112–13.

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in the face of the past" would offer solutions to the problems of today.[5]

Toward the middle of 1986, as Gorbachev came to perceive the need for broad social and political reform in the Soviet Union, he apparently began to perceive the utility of a broad re-examination of Soviet history. This shift was suggested by the July 1986 call in *Pravda* for publication of a new party history, one that would deal openly with "negative phenomena" of the past, including those of the Stalin years.[6]

One can discern three intertwined political calculations that may account for Gorbachev's willingness to allow a re-opening of the Soviet past and a revived de-Stalinization campaign. The first was recognition that, as Afanas'yev argued, the socio-economic and political dysfunctions of Soviet society are in part due to the loss, through excessive controls over the arts and the social sciences, of a collective ability to evaluate the health and coherence of the Soviet system. In effect, Gorbachev gradually came to realize that innovation and adaptation to changing circumstances required the existence of what Hugh Heclo calls "men collectively wondering what to do."[7]

A second factor was the perceived need to undermine bureaucratic, as well as popular, resistance to reform. Gorbachev's program originally sought to reinvigorate the economy through a new "discipline" campaign, moderate decentralization of administrative functions, and the introduction of technological innovation. Yet, even these relatively modest measures were resisted by important segments of the party and state "administrative class," which out of personal interest as well as ideological conviction, were committed to the maintenance of the hierarchically-organized economic mechanism that had survived relatively intact from the Stalin period.[8]

Moscow economist Gavriil Popov illustrated by historical analogy the threat to reform posed by recalcitrant bureaucrats. He quoted Lenin's explanation of the failure of the Great Reforms of the 1960's, which, according to Lenin, "gave birth to [the revolution of] 1905." He concluded with Lenin's observation that "reforms enacted by feudal landowners can be only feudal in nature."[9] In other words, to introduce effective reforms, one must neutralize supporters of the old system. In keeping with that logic, Gorbachev has unleashed a new de-Stalinization campaign designed to review the past, to delegitimize the cultural and ideological supports of the Stalinist "command economy" and of its political defenders, and thereby to pave the way for the introduction of "new thinking." This campaign recalls J. H. Plumb's observation that "warring authorities" often produce "warring pasts."[10]

The third factor, closely related to the reformers' unwillingness to base the success of their program entirely on the state and party bureaucracies, was the decision to appeal to the creative and technical intelligentsia as an alternative base of social support. The binding element of this alliance—the removal of many of the existing bureaucratic restrictions on freedom of speech and association—has permitted the intelligentsia, particularly the liberal creative intellectuals, to launch a broad attack on the Stalin era.[11]

The alliance with the intelligentsia has doubtless extended the de-Stalinization campaign beyond limits originally envisaged by Gorbachev. Although the liberal intellectuals are Gorbachev's most fervent supporters, they are also intent on pursuing their own agenda. Their assault on Stalinism is due in part to the fact that the intelligentsia, as Gorbachev himself has acknowledged, "suffered enormous, at times irretrievable, losses because of the violations of socialist legality and the repressions of the 1930's."[12] The intellectuals also

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[5]*The New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1985. According to this account, Yevtushenko's more intemperate remarks were censored from the published version of his speech.

[6]*Pravda*, July 8, 1986. Already in January, the party newspaper had published a favorable review of a Yevtushenko poem, *FUKU!*, which condemned history's cruel rulers, who shed "seas of blood" in pursuit of their goals (ibid., Jan. 12, 1986—the poem had appeared in *Novyy Mir* [Moscow], No. 9, September 1985).

[7]Hugh Heclo, *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1974, p. 305, cited in Timothy Colton, "Gorbachev and the Politics of System Renewal," in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, Eds., *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1988, p. 156. The émigré historian Alexandr Nekrich describes the loss of Soviet collective memory and its replacement with "artificial memory" in his memoir, *Otreshis' ot strakha* (Renounce Fear), London, Overseas Publications Interchange, 1979, pp. 293–94. For Gorbachev's views on the importance of "understanding our history" in order to solve current problems, see his speeches of January 8th and February 18, 1988, in *Pravda*, Jan. 15 and Feb. 19, 1988.

[8]This opposition was stressed by Anatoliy Butenko in an interview with *Moskovskaya Pravda* (Moscow), May 7, 1987.

[9]Gavriil Popov, "The Facade and Intrigues of the 'Great' Reform," in *EKO* (Novosibirsk), No. 1, 1987, pp. 172, 174–75.

A year later, the reformer Fedor Burlatskiy offered similar advice in a more explicit fashion. Burlatskiy argued that to allow the apparatus a predominant role in the conceptualization of a reform program would inevitably lead to dilution and enervation. *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1988.

[10]J. H. Plumb, *The Death of the Past*, London, Macmillan, 1969, p. 40.

On the issue of archaic norms and institutions dating from the Stalin period, see Gail Lapidus, "State and Society: Toward the Emergence of Civil Society in Russia," in Seweryn Bialer, Ed., *Politics, Society, and Nationality Inside Gorbachev's Russia*, Boulder, CO, Westview, forthcoming.

[11]For Gorbachev's comments on the easing of censorship, see M. Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (hereafter, *Perestroika*), New York, Harper and Row, 1987, p. 81.

[12]Ibid.

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view themselves as the moral conscience of their society, as did their 19th-century counterparts.[13] Finally, they perceive the need to sustain the liberal spirit of "restructuring" by destroying the political and cultural conditions that support bureaucratic controls over intellectual inquiry.

The re-opening of the past was set in motion by the extensive personnel changes carried out during Gorbachev's first two years in office. These changes logically began in the supervisory organs of the party Central Committee's (CC) Secretariat. In the summer of 1985, Aleksandr Yakovlev, who is now considered second only to Gorbachev in terms of shaping the reform program, was returned to his old post as head of the CC Propaganda Department (he was acting head in 1973 before his "exile" as ambassador to Canada). At the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, he was elected Central Committee secretary for propaganda and agitation, and at the CC plenum in January 1987, he was promoted to candidate member of the Politburo. At this time, Yakovlev added to his list of duties the supervision of the CC Science and Educational Institutions Department.[14] (The relatively late departure of Yakovlev's predecessor in the Secretariat, Mikhail Zimyanin, accounts in large part for the slow pace of "restructuring" in the social sciences—more on which below.) At the end of the June 1987 plenum, Yakovlev was elected a full member of the Politburo.

There was considerable turnover in the CC departments under Yakovlev's control, which supervise ideology, culture, the mass media, and scientific and educational establishments. Virtually all of the changes involved the replacement of the old guard of followers of the late Mikhail Suslov with younger, better-educated, and (presumably) less dogmatic officials. Similar changes were made in government posts relating to culture, the media, and publishing, and several editors were replaced at the journals and newspapers of the Central Committee. New editors were also installed at the Soviet literary journals in 1986. The respected writ-

Author Grigoriy Baklanov, editor of Znamya *magazine.*

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ers Grigoriy Baklanov and Sergey Zalygin were appointed to head *Znamya* and *Novyy Mir* respectively. Vitaliy Korotich took charge at the illustrated weekly *Ogonek* in April 1986, and Yegor Yakovlev became editor of *Moscow News* in August of the same year.[15]

In June 1986, Gorbachev directed the renewed CC apparatus to:

adopt a new style of working with the intelligentsia. It is time to stop ordering it about, since this is harmful and inadmissible. The intelligentsia has wholeheartedly welcomed the program for the democratic renewal of society.[16]

[13]This point is also made by Sheila Fitzpatrick in "Sources of Change in Soviet History: State, Society, and the Entrepreneurial Tradition," in Bialer and Mandelbaum, op. cit., p. 55.

The Leningrad writer Daniil Granin stresses the "civic responsibility" of the intelligentsia and the need for a "great cleansing" of Soviet society. See *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Feb. 12, 1986. See also, A. Volodin, "On the Traditions of Our Country's Intelligentsia," *Pravda*, Mar. 10, 1987.

[14]On Yakovlev's rise, see Jerry Hough, "Gorbachev Consolidating Power," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1987, p. 34.

[15]Drawn from *A Biographical Dictionary of 100 Leading Soviet Officials*, 3rd ed., Munich, Radio Liberty Research, March 1986. Also, Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 136/87, Apr. 10, 1987; ibid., RL 256/87, July 9, 1987; and Nancy P. Condee and Vladimir Padunov, "Reforming Soviet Culture, Retrieving Soviet History," *The Nation* (New York), June 13, 1987.

[16]Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, p. 81. The remarkable change in the leadership's approach to the intelligentsia is illustrated by the changing historical treatment of Andrey Zhdanov, "cultural tsar" under Stalin and the bête noire of the creative intelligentsia. On February 24, 1986, *Pravda* praised Zhdanov for allowing "no deviations from the party's general line and no compromise with ideology hostile to the Soviet people. . . ." By 1987, the party's relationship with the intelligentsia was described in terms of partnership, and the party's theoretical journal lashed out at Zhdanov for his "crude interference in creative activity" and appealed to the intellectuals to "join us for united work in a new war, in new conditions, on the basis of mutual trust. . . ." *Kommunist*, No. 15, October 1987, pp. 7, 9.

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Renewal in the political establishment under Gorbachev encouraged revolt "from below." At the Fifth Congress of the Union of Cinematographers in May 1986, the leadership of the union board was unexpectedly voted out and replaced by younger, more liberal artists. A similar revolt against the conservatives and bureaucratic controls took place at the 15th Congress of the All-Russian Theater Society in October of the same year. The society was disbanded and the gathering was transformed into the First Congress of a new Union of Theater Workers of the RSFSR. Reformers in the writers' union, however, were considerably less successful in pressing their demands for a change in leadership.[17]

As a whole, renovation in the media and cultural spheres during Gorbachev's first two years was dramatic. As a consequence of changes in key personnel, an increasing number of anti-Stalinist works, particularly literary works, began to appear.

Dominant Themes

Three broad, overlapping themes have emerged in the Gorbachev-era works of Soviet writers, economists, and historians examining the Stalin period: (1) the criminal nature of Stalin; (2) the perversion of Leninist socialism by Stalinism; and (3) the continuing damage inflicted by Stalinism on Soviet society.

In the first case, examination of Stalin as a political figure has placed particular emphasis on political terror. Anatoliy Rybakov's *Deti Arbata* (Children of the Arbat) highlights Stalin's role in engineering the December 1934 assassination of Leningrad party leader Sergey Kirov, as a prelude to nation-wide terror. Regarding Stalin's ruthlessness, one of Rybakov's characters recalls Stalin's words in Tsaritsyn in 1918, " 'Death resolves all problems. There is no longer a man or a problem'," and concludes that "Stalin proved to be right."[18] In his November 2, 1987, speech, Gorbachev openly referred to Stalin's "crimes."[19]

The second theme, Stalinism's perversion of Leninist socialism, is understandably volatile. Under Gorbachev, the issue of collectivization and the fate of the peasantry under Stalin has received particular attention, in part because Soviet agriculture remains the most intractable of the economic problems inherited from the Stalin era.

To be sure, this is not the first upsurge in the post-Stalin USSR of critical examinations of collectivization and rural life. For a time after the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, it was permissible to illuminate the "mistakes and excesses" of collectivization and the distortion of the "Leninist principle of voluntarism" that was manifest in the drive to create the collective farms (*kolkhozy*).

Such negative assessments of the history of collectivization even survived Khrushchev's removal from office in 1964.[20] In the Brezhnev years, the works of the "village prose" school continued to examine in both subtle and explicit ways the damaging effects of collectivization. For example, works such as Mikhail Alekseyev's fictionalized autobiography *Drachuny* (The Pugnacious Ones) offered frank, if brief, descriptions of usually taboo topics, such as the famine of 1932–33.[21] Publicists and novelists were occasionally able to voice the heterodox view that collectivization was resisted by most peasants.[22]

A few historical monographs also provided a relatively open examination of party rural policy during and after the establishment of the *kolkhoz* system. Perhaps the most valuable of these was the second edition of Yu. Arutyunyan's *Sovetskoye krest'yanstvo v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny* (The Soviet Peasantry in the Years of the Great Fatherland War), published in 1970.[23] Basing his account on previously closed archival material, Arutyunyan described how, during World War II, the regime utilized compulsory state procurements at extremely low prices to obtain farm output "virtually for nothing." Payments in cash and kind to the peasantry were "totally inadequate for subsistence." Peasants were eventually driven, Arutunyan reports, to subvert the procurement quotas and to expand their private plots illegally, at the expense of state holdings.

These examples remained, however, exceptions. Furthermore, a Central Committee resolution of July 23, 1982, stated that it would henceforth be impermissible to publish works whose depiction of Soviet history in general and of collectivization in particular departed "from the living truth."[24]

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[17]Condee and Padunov, loc. cit.; and John B. Dunlop, "Soviet Cultural Politics," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1987, pp. 34–56.

[18]As published in *Druzhba Narodov* (Moscow) No. 6, 1987, pp. 80–81.

The fictional and nonfictional portrayals of Stalin's brutality and criminality are voluminous. One of the most dramatic is the article by historian Vasiliy Polikarpov containing excerpts of letters written to Stalin by the Old Bolshevik Fedor Raskol'nikov in 1938 and 1939, when the latter was in Paris. Stalin's list of crimes and victims are described as "endless"; the dictator is termed a "traitor" to socialism who forced his followers to "wade . . . through pools of blood. . . ." *Ogonek* (Moscow), No. 26, June 1987.

[19]From the text, as published in Mikhail Gorbachev, *October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues* (hereafter, *October and Perestroika)*, Moscow, Novosti, 1987, p. 26.

[20]See Nancy Whittier Heer, *Politics and History in the Soviet Union*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1971, Ch. 8.

[21]Moscow, Molodaya Gvardiya, 1982.

[22]See for example, O. Volkov in *Nash Sovremennik* (Moscow), No. 11, 1978, p. 186.

[23]Moskva, Nauka. The first edition was published in 1963.

[24]*Spravochnik partiynogo rabotnika* (The Party Worker's Handbook), 23rd ed., Moscow, Politizdat, 1983, pp. 456–59, as cited in Davies, loc. cit., p. 39.

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

ПРАВДА

Орган Центр. Ком. и Моск. Ком. ВКП (б)

Головокружение от успехов.

(К вопросам колхозного движения).

At top, a photo released by the Soviet Union in 1978 shows Russian peasants joining a collective farm in 1930; at bottom, a photostat of the headline of the March 2, 1930, Pravda *article "Dizziness with Success," in which Stalin admitted to excesses in the collectivization campaign.*

—TASS from Sovfoto, and the Hoover Institution Library.

Turning to the Gorbachev period, the first notable example of the re-examination of the fate of the peasantry was the December 1985 speech by Yevtushenko cited above. Referring to the years of building socialism, the poet stated that " . . . contrary to Lenin's legacy, the precious agricultural wisdom of many peasants, undeservedly branded as kulaks, was crushed under foot."[25]

The central difference between the Khrushchev and Gorbachev periods in terms of re-examining collectivization and, indeed, the entire Stalin period is the scope and degree of criticism. Under Gorbachev, prominent politicans, academics, and writers—in a wide variety of forums—have offered a comprehensive critique that often explicitly rejects the political, economic, and ideological rationale of Soviet rural policy in the late 1920's and early 1930's. While in power, Khrushchev had con-

[25]Loc. cit.

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tinued to defend strongly the agricultural and industrial policies of that epoch, offering little information on the human toll of the "revolution from above." Only late in life would he admit that the "Stalin brand of collectivization brought . . . nothing but misery and brutality."[26]

By contrast, Abel Aganbegyan, Gorbachev's chief economic adviser, has graphically described the "misery and brutality" of rural life under Stalin, stating that collective farm workers lacked the basic rights of citizens, while payments in kind by the state for agricultural production often failed to "ensure the reproduction of human power."[27] Gorbachev himself has severely criticized the methods used in the collectivization, acknowledging that force, not persuasion, was the primary means used to implement the program.[28]

Although the General Secretary reverts to the conventional justification of collectivization as a necessary response to a threatening international environment, others, particularly reformist economists, have rejected this standard explanation. Indeed, although Soviet historiography has traditionally implied a continuity in the "building of socialism" from Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) through forced collectivization,[29] the current materials attack the initiation of collectivization in 1929 as a clear turning point in Soviet history—a point at which the Leninist NEP was overthrown and Stalinist "bureaucratic socialism" took root. For example, Nikolay Shmelev argues that collectivization was not a response to the rise of fascism, but rather the result of irrational pricing policies in 1927, which forced the peasants to reduce production. The decline in output, Shmelev states, led to the decision by the government to resort to "state grain acquisition through force."[30]

Shmelev has also provided figures on the human and economic toll of collectivization. In a lecture at a research institute attached to the party Central Committee, he stated that collectivization had created a "monstrous machine" that brutalized and impoverished the Soviet countryside, leading to a 40 percent drop in agricultural production. According to Shmelev, five million families were branded as kulaks and deported—a figure exceeding the highest estimates appearing in the West.[31] Other Soviet social scientists, too, have examined the human toll of collectivization, particularly the starvation of millions of deportees and villagers.[32]

The academician and influential agricultural specialist Vladimir Tikhonov has openly questioned the class justification for collectivization and the drive to eliminate the kulaks in the countryside. Although it was widely acknowledged prior to Gorbachev that Stalin's blows against the kulaks often fell on the middle peasant, Tikhonov goes further, to argue that very few kulaks remained after the village-led expropriations of 1917-18, and that "millions" who were "de-kulakized" during collectivization were in fact simply peasants who produced somewhat more than their neighbors. As for the then-prevailing assumption that only highly concentrated production units can produce "positive results," Tikhonov observed, "the world of economics does not work like this."[33]

Mikhail Sholokhov's well-known novel about collectivization, *Virgin Soil Upturned*, has now come under criticism for offering the coercive, semi-literate party activists Davydov and Nagulnov as role models while condemning peasants who were willing to "work day and night" in order to improve their economic conditions.[34] But perhaps the most damning indictment of collectivization is found in the recently published novel *Muzhiki i baby* (Muzhiks and Womenfolk) by Boris Mozhayev. The peasants in this account are united in violent resistance to collectivization, and only the worst elements of the village and the local party secretary support the state's policy.[35]

Other writers have led the way in rejecting Stalin as

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[26]*Khruschev Remembers*, tr. and ed. by Strobe Talbott, Boston, Little, Brown, 1970, p. 74.

[27]Abel Aganbegyan, *The Economic Challenge of Perestroika*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1988, pp. 50–53 (pagination from galleys).

[28]Gorbachev, *October and Perestroika*, pp. 24–25.

[29]For the "standard" view of the NEP under Brezhnev, see Yu. Polyakov, V. P. Dmitrenko, and N. V. Shcherban, *Novaya ekonomicheskaya politika:Razrabotka i osushchestvleniye* (The New Economic Policy: Its Elaboration and Implementation), Moscow, Politizdat, 1982.

[30]"Advances and Debts," *Novyy Mir*, No. 6, 1987, p. 144.

[31]Shmelev's lecture was summarized in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), June 16, 1987. In addition, see G. Shmelev (also an economist), "Do Not Dare to Command," in *Oktyabr'* (Moscow), No. 2, 1988, pp. 3–25.

Moshe Lewin concludes that at least 2 million families were deported, while Robert Conquest speculates that the number may have reached 3 million households. See Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power. A Study of Collectivization*, New York, Norton, 1975, pp. 507–08; and Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 126.

[32]The famine in the countryside is examined by sociologist Vladimir Shubkin in *Znamya* (Moscow), No. 4, 1987, p. 183, and by the historian Yegor Bestuzhev-Lada in *Nedelya* (Moscow), No. 15, Apr. 11–17, 1988. Economist Yevgeniy Ambartsumov suggests that forced collectivization resulted in 10 million deaths (*Moscow News*, No. 25, June 26–July 3, 1988).

[33]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Apr. 8, 1987. Tikhonov's argument has since been taken up in print by others. See, for example, G. Shmelev, loc. cit.; Vasiliy Selyunin, "Sources," in *Novyy Mir*, No. 5, 1988, p. 167; and writer Sergey Antonov, in *Moscow News*, No. 51, Dec. 27–Jan. 3, 1988.

The writer Vasil Bykov, in an interview in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of May 14, 1986, recounts how peasants were branded as kulaks in order to satisfy the directives of the political authorities. De-kulakization was also driven by personal animosity and the desire to acquire the jobs and property of others (see Bestuzhev-Lada, loc. cit.).

[34]See Lev Voskresenskiy in *Moscow News*, No. 32, Aug. 9, 1987, as cited in Davies, loc. cit., pp. 49–50.

[35]The novel was published in *Don* (Rostov-na-Donu), Nos. 1–3, 1987.

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Lenin's heir, thereby bringing into question the ruling party's claim to legitimacy based on continuity of leadership. Their portrayal of the Stalin era is one of unrelieved political, cultural, and economic oppression. The works of Tengiz Abuladze, Vasiliy Grossman, and Daniil Granin liken the Soviet Union under Stalinism to Nazi Germany.[36]

The plays of Mikhail Shatrov are particularly critical of Stalin and Stalinism. A figure in *Diktatura sovesti* (Dictatorship of Conscience), staged in February 1986, describes socialism as a system of masters and of slaves. The obedience of the latter is secured by having them spy on one another, by a hierarchical and militarized social structure (the "*mundir*"), and by the shame that the slaves have been made to feel for their own opinions. In this play, Lenin is absolved of blame for the distorted view of socialism held by others.[37] Shatrov's *Dal'she . . . Dal'she . . . Dal'she!* (Onward . . . Onward . . . Onward!), completed in August 1987, directly condemns Stalin for undermining Lenin's authority, for complicity in the murders of Kirov and Trotsky, and for fabrication of the Moscow purge trials. Here, Shatrov's Lenin applauds Rosa Luxemburg's observation that "with no general elections, no freedom of the press and assembly, no free conflict of views in every social institution, public activity will be extinguished . . . . The bureaucracy will become the sole active element." For his crimes and betrayal of socialism, Stalin is condemned by Shatrov's Lenin.[38]

The third theme of the anti-Stalinist writings—the continuing cost of the Stalinist legacy—has been developed in numerous ways. At the conclusion of both *Diktatura sovesti* and *Dal'she . . . Dal'she . . . Dal'she!* the audience is left with little doubt that Shatrov is referring not only to the political and socio-economic pathologies of the Stalin period, but also to the "vestiges" of Stalinism. Others have been more explicit. For political scientist Nikolay Butenko, the Stalinist party of "another kind" survives today, possessing only the patina of genuine "democratic centralism," while Aleksandr Gel'man of the Cinematographers' Union asserts that the party, particularly its leading organs, has been the primary force opposing democracy.[39]

In his foreword to Mozhayev's *Muzhiki i baby*, Tikhonov links the past and the present by arguing that both the method of collectivization and the bureaucratic institutions imposed on the countryside at the time continue to cripple the work ethic of the peasantry. Only reforms designed to restore the peasant as master of his own land, he argues, will provide a corrective.[40]

Although Gorbachev himself has addressed each of the three themes of the de-Stalinization campaign, he has concentrated on the second and third. In his November 2, 1987, speech, Gorbachev traced the roots of the Stalinist system to the process of accelerated collectivization and industrialization of the late 1920's. Belief in the "universal effectiveness" of centralized administration spread to the "superstructure," excluding meaningful public participation in political, social, and economic life. The weakening of the role of the soviets and other organs of popular will, he argued, created a "shortage of democracy" and a fertile soil for Stalin's dictatorship and the repressions of the 1930's. Elsewhere, the General Secretary stated that public and state structures remain "bureaucracy-ridden," and the Soviet citizen remains alienated from his "constitutional right" to participate in the "affairs of the state."[41]

For Gorbachev and the reformers, this bureaucratization is sustained by a mind-set promoted by "dogmatism and scholasticism" in teaching. In an October 1986 speech to heads of social science departments, Gorbachev called for the revision of academic lectures, textbooks, and programs, in order to foster independent judgment and "creative thinking."[42] At the Central Committee plenum of January 1987, Gorbachev returned to the damage wrought by the "personality cult" in its absolutizing of the conceptualizations of economic and social organization in which the role and interests of the party-state and its regulatory organs were paramount.[43]

According to the reformers, the arid dogmatism of the Stalin period, reflected in such works as Stalin's *Short Course* history of the party and his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* socialized generations into viewing Soviet politics and economics as static and unchanging.[44] Hence, Soviet society was stripped of the

[36]Abuladze's film *Pokayaniye* (Repentance) was released in late 1986; Grossman's novel *Zhizn' i sud'ba* (Life and Fate) appeared in *Oktyabr'*, Nos. 1–3, 1988; and Granin's novel, *Zubr* (Aurochs), in *Noyy Mir*, Nos. 1 and 2, 1987.

[37]It was published in *Teatr* (Moscow), No. 6, 1986.

[38]*Znamya*, No. 1, 1988, pp. 21, 22, and 49.

[39]See the interview with Butenko in *Borba* (Belgrade), Sept. 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 23, 1987, p. 46. Gel'man's comments appear in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), Apr. 9, 1988.

[40]*Don*, No. 1, 1987, pp. 18–21. Writer Anatoliy Strelyanyy argues that the rural procurement system founded in the 1930's continues to impoverish the countryside and serves no social purpose beyond the satisfaction of the power interests of local party officials. See "Rural Everyday Life," *Novyy Mir*, No. 12, 1986, pp. 231–41.

[41]From the text of the November speech as published in *October and Perestroika*, pp. 24–26; also *Perestroika*, pp. 45–46, 112.

[42]*Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1986.

[43]Moscow Tass, Jan. 27, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 28, 1987, pp. R/5, R/22, R/24, and R/25.

[44]For a critique of *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, see Boris Bolotin in *Moscow News*, No. 34, Aug. 30–Sept. 6, 1987. The author argues that the ideological heritage of Stalinism, particularly the refusal to accept the market in conditions of socialism, has left a deep impression on the

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collective ability to ponder and question which values and principles should be considered socialist, and to adapt to changing circumstances, through such measures as expansion of individual labor and cooperative activity, decentralized economic management, and the competitive elections of enterprise leaderships and of deputies to soviets.

Political Rehabilitations

The logic of reform has influenced the decision to re-open the cases of many individuals purged under Stalin. The historian Nikolay Maslov, in mid-July 1987, observed that:

many party functionaries well merit a civic rehabilitation since they had not been spies, assassins, or agents of foreign intelligence services, but all of them had been convicted on such charges.[45]

Gorbachev, in his November speech, also stated that many party and nonparty persons had suffered in the 1930's as a result of falsified accusations, and he criticized the Brezhnev leadership for failing to continue the "process of restoring justice" begun under Khrushchev. Moreover, he reported that the October 1987 CC plenum had re-opened the issue of the purges and that the Politburo had subsequently established a commission for "comprehensively examining new facts and documents" relating to the Stalinist repressions. The purges and the rehabilitation process, he stated, would be an important part of a "treatise" on the history of the CPSU to be prepared by a special commission of the Central Committee.[46]

One can probably trace the decision to re-open the rehabilitation process back to the April 1985 CC plenum. As evidence, we have the statement of USSR Supreme Court Chairman Vladimir Terebilov in an April 1988 interview that he had supervised 450 judicial rehabilitations over "the past three years."[47] It is indicative of the political complexity of the undertaking that it was only in July 1987 that the first political rehabilitation was announced, that of the Old Bolshevik and ex-Trotskyist Nikolay Muralov, a rehabilitation that the Supreme Court had actually accomplished in January of that year.[48] The second rehabilitation, that of the Old Bolshevik Ivar Smilga (also a member of the Trotskyist opposition of the 1920's), was revealed by the historian Nikolay Maslov in a lecture at the Moscow City Party Committee, although the date of the decision was not disclosed.[49]

The delay in publicizing the rehabilitations suggests that Gorbachev most likely was either constrained by his colleagues to postpone publicity or felt that such publicity would endanger his reform program. More than a year after assuming office, Gorbachev had warned Soviet writers that a re-opening of the past would drain the reform movement of energy.[50] A less probable explanation would be that announcements were being withheld in order to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution.

The rehabilitation process serves the Gorbachev reform program in several important ways. It strengthens the appeal of liberal reform by undermining the contention of many Soviets that Stalinism was based on order, justice, and purpose and remains an entirely appropriate model for revitalizing the Soviet system.[51] It is also a means through which the regime seeks to communicate to the population its commitment to thoroughgoing reform and its respect for legal norms. In addition, the regime hopes the rehabilitation process will increase its moral authority and reduce the alienation of many individuals, particularly intellectuals, who have long viewed the Soviet system as an "inauthentic society"—to use Amitai Etzioni's term.[52]

Gorbachev and the reformers are well aware that there remains widespread skepticism and fear that the

thinking of those who are now over 50, among whom are the vast majority of mid- and higher-level administrators and scholars. These individuals form the core of the group that views Gorbachev's economic reforms as a "retreat from the principles of socialism."

For a psychological portrait of a high party official who resists Gorbachev's reforms, see Fedor Burlatskiy, "Polemical Dialogue on Restructuring," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Oct. 1, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 8, 1986, pp. R/6–19. Also see the results of a poll that revealed that 79 percent of party secretaries in the polled region were unable to comprehend the difference between old and new methods of economic management. *Pravda*, June 17, 1987.

[45]*Moscow News*, No. 29, July 26–Aug. 3, 1987.

[46]*October and Perestroika*, p. 27.

[47]*Le Monde* (Paris), Apr. 24–25, 1988.

[48]*Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* (Moscow), July 5, 1987.

[49]*Moscow News*, No. 29, July 26–Aug. 3, 1987. For a comprehensive list of those rehabilitated to date, see *Pravda*, Aug. 5, 1988.

[50]See Aaron Trehub, "Gorbachev Meets the Writers: A Samizdat Account," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 399/86, Oct. 23, 1986.

[51]Popular support for Stalin and Stalinism is not confined to the Stalin generations but is also present among younger members of Soviet society whose idealization of the period often represents an indirect protest against moral malaise and corruption. It is also rooted in the negative reaction of many to the emergence under *glasnost'* of social "permissiveness" and elements of disorder: hippies and punkers, demonstrations on Red Square, and "radical" unofficial groups calling for a multi-party system. See Vladimir Bykov in *Moscow News*, No. 48, Nov. 29, 1987; and Pavel Volobuyev in ibid., No. 51, Dec. 27–Jan. 3,1987.

[52]According to Etzioni, a "relationship, institution, or society is inauthentic if it provides the appearance of responsiveness while the underlying condition is alienating." See Etzioni, *The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes*, New York, Free Press, 1968, pp. 619–22, 633–48. The disparity between "words and deeds" that concerns the reformers closely approximates such a state of affairs.

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extensive legislative program of *perestroyka,* which devolves new rights to both individuals and social groups, will remain "just another campaign." For example, numerous Soviet sources confirm that prospective or existing members of the new urban and rural cooperatives are unwilling either to begin new ventures or to expand existing ones due to a pervasive fear that they will suffer the same fate as the "NEPmen" of the 1920's, who "found themselves a long way from home" after the anti-cooperative campaign of the first Five-Year Plan.[53] The rehabilitation policy is designed in part to demonstrate graphically to Soviet citizens that the powers of the state will be confined by the law and that legally-sanctioned social initiative, whether in the economy, politics, or culture, will not bring arbitrary bureaucratic interference.

Moreover, many of the beneficiaries of "posthumous justice" have been individuals whose ideas provide important ideological support for *perestroyka.* In July 1987, it was announced that the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court had rehabilitated, "due to the absence of an event or crime," the economists and scientists convicted of leading the fictitious Labor Peasant Party.[54] Prominent among those rehabilitated was Aleksandr Chayanov, a specialist on rural cooperatives and the small family farm. One of Chayanov's early works influenced Lenin's article "On Cooperation," which outlined the New Economic Policy. Opposed to Stalin's "all-out collectivization (*sploshnaya kollektivizatsiya*)," Chayanov and others were arrested in the early 1930's on charges of "wrecking" the Soviet system. Since the rehabilitation of Chayanov and his colleagues, appeals have appeared in the press to study their works for answers to the "needs and concerns of today." In particular, the works contain evidence that supports Gorbachev's efforts to broaden the use of the "family contract" form of farming.[55]

The civic rehabilitation in February 1988 of Nikolay Bukharin and other defendants at the 1938 purge trial is of much broader significance. Bukharin's rehabilitation has placed his conciliatory rural program, as well as his advocacy of moderate cultural and political lines, in direct opposition not only to the Stalinist "revolution from above," which dramatically expanded the bureaucratic reach of the state, but also to the terror of the 1930's, which destroyed the party as an autonomous political institution. The resurrected image of Bukharin is seen as

Joseph Stalin and Nikolay Bukharin at observances of the 12th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1929.

—Sygma.

a powerful antidote to the prevailing "Stalinist" relationship between the Soviet party-state and society and to "bureaucratic centralism" in the party.[56]

Re-imaging of the Past

The return to the ideas of Bukharin and Chayanov in Soviet political discourse is part of a broader re-imaging of Lenin and his New Economic Policy as a means of strengthening the ideological foundation for reforms that seek to loosen state controls over society and provide a measure of autonomy for individuals and enterprises alike. This reworking of conventional historical wisdom seeks to blunt the criticism by conservatives that the Gorbachevtsy are departing from the "principles of socialism" and undermining the foundations of the Soviet system.[57]

Gorbachev himself has publicly encouraged the depiction of the NEP as a model of reform, and justified his own turn to "radical" reform by comparing it to Lenin's

[53]Interview with historian Vladimir Dmitrenko in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Oct. 3, 1987, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter, *CDSP*), Nov. 11, 1987, p. 4.

[54]Lev Voskresenskiy, "Posthumous Justice," *Moscow News,* No. 33, Aug. 16, 1987.

[55]Ibid.

[56]The rehabilitation of Martemyan Ryutin, author of the well-known anti-Stalin platform of 1932 (which called for the dictator's removal), has been employed to underline the expanded limits of intra-party debate. The Politburo's special commission on the purges referred to the document as falling within the acceptable limits of intra-party discussion. See *Pravda,* Aug. 5, 1988.

Official approval of Bukharin's views was reflected in the re-publication of his 1929 speech, "The Political Testament of Lenin," in *Kommunist,* No. 2, January 1988, pp. 93–102.

[57]Gorbachev has felt compelled to return to this criticism after he initially addressed it at the 27th Party Congress. See, for example, his speech to the June 1987 Central Committee plenum in *Pravda,* June 26, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* June 26, 1987, p. R/8; his speech before media, cultural, and ideological workers on January 8, 1988, in *Pravda,* Jan. 13, 1988; and his speech before the CC plenum of February 18, 1988, in ibid., Feb. 19, 1988.

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decision to reject the coercive policies of War Communism and embrace the NEP. At the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev invoked the "*prodnalog*" (tax-in-kind) of the NEP to describe elements of his agricultural policy, and in November 1987, he called Lenin's last writings on the NEP an "immense theoretical asset for the party," noting that they stressed the advancement of socialism through a consistent reduction of bureaucracy and the enlistment of the working masses "to a man" in running the state.[58] Party-history courses reportedly now focus on the lessons to be derived from the NEP for the contemporary period of reform.[59]

The selective invocation of Lenin's works by the reformers has not been limited to the leader's late writings. The reformers also seek ideological grounding for their efforts to recast the relationship between state and society in his earlier works, in particular the semi-anarchist utopian tract, *State and Revolution,* written immediately prior to the October Revolution. An assault on the traditional state as a bureaucratic "excrescence" on society, this study modeled the future proletarian society after Marx's description of the Paris Commune of 1871 in his *The Civil War in France*. Lenin approvingly quoted Marx's perception of the key features of the commune: a reduction of the pay of officials to the level of workmen's wages, the right to recall elected officials at any time, and the gradual "withering away" of the state through the participation of the people in popular assemblies. Historian Afanas'yev and others have argued that this Lenin tract is entirely relevant to Gorbachev's efforts to generate popular initiative and support for the system by protecting civil society from the bureaucratic tendency to stifle economic innovation and exclude authentic political participation.[60]

There has also been of late a partial rehabilitation of Nikita Khrushchev as a symbol, and of his period as a model, of reform. After his ouster in 1964, Khrushchev slipped into historical obscurity, his policies condemned under the euphemism of "voluntarism." Under Gorbachev, the creative intelligentsia—particularly those who were students in the 1950's and 1960's—have led the way in reviving interest in the Khrushchev period. In recently published reminiscences, novels, and political commentaries, the period is remembered as a time of optimism, debate, and intellectual vigor that replaced the fear and conformity of the Stalin years. The Khrushchev period is valued by reforming intellectuals and politicians alike for its various efforts to dislodge entrenched bureaucracy, decentralize economic controls, and "democratize" the political process. As such, the period is portrayed as largely analogous to the cultural freedom and reforming atmosphere witnessed under Gorbachev.[61]

Although Khrushchev is still criticized for policy caprice and millenarianism, for allowing his own personality cult to form, and for erratic behavior toward intellectuals, his decision to launch the de-Stalinization campaign at the 20th Party Congress has been praised by Gorbachev as an act of personal courage aimed at liberating the country from the "negative aspects of socio-political life engendered by the Stalin personality cult," in particular, the Stalinist "command-bureaucratic" method of administration and the spiritual and material neglect of the people. Gorbachev has observed that Khrushchev's efforts failed in large part because they were not fully supported by the development of "democratization processes."[62]

The positive re-evaluation of Khrushchev has brought an intensified denigration of the Brezhnev period, which

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[58]*Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986; and *October and Perestroika*, p. 16.

[59]A. Shirokov, "Some Questions of Method in Teaching CPSU History," *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta* (Moscow), No. 1, 1987, pp. 82–89, espec. p. 89.

[60]Afanas'yev in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Mar. 21, 1987; E. Kuzmin in *Pravda*, Aug. 8, 1987; B. Lazarev, "The Apparatus of State Administration: Lenin's Ideas and the Contemporary Scene," *Kommunist*, No. 8, May 1987; and V. Gavrilov, *Lenin's "The State and Revolution"—The Main Tasks of the Proletarian Revolution*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1988.

In arguing for reform of the political system at the 19th Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev himself invoked the model of the Paris Commune. He recalled Lenin's "well-known" definition of the socialist state as one " 'which is not a state in the proper sense of the word' " or even a " 'half-state'." *Moscow News*, No. 27, July 10–17, 1988, Supplement. The General Secretary was quoting from Lenin's "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution," first published as a pamphlet in September 1917, and included in V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 4th printing, 1980, pp. 68, 85.

[61]For one of the first positive references under Gorbachev to the Khrushchev period as a time of cultural and spiritual renewal, see the article by the poet Bulat Okudzhava in *Izvestiya*, Mar. 14, 1986. Khrushchev's name was not, however, mentioned. See also Alexandr Bovin in *New Times* (Moscow), No. 5, 1987; and Igor Dedkov, "A Discourse About One Generation," in *Moscow News*, No. 16, Apr. 19, 1987.

Of considerable interest are the novels of Vladimir Makanin, which describe the transitory hopes and enthusiasm of the generation socialized under Khrushchev's reforms: *Odin i odna* (A Lone Man and Woman) in *Oktyabr*, No. 3, 1987, and *Ostavshiy* (Those Left Behind) in *Znamya*, No. 9, 1987. The memoirs of Aleksey Adzhubey, Khrushchev's son-in-law and editor of *Izvestiya* under Khrushchev, were to be published in *Znamya* in the summer of 1988 under the title of "Remembering Khrushchev and His Times." An excerpt appeared in *Moscow News*, No. 20, May 15, 1988.

[62]*Perestroika*, p. 43; and *October and Perestroika*, p. 34–35.

Others continue to criticize Khrushchev's lack of concern for "theory and political strategy," his willingness to allow his own cult to be created, and his erratic behavior toward the intellectuals. The Khrushchev period is portrayed by liberal intellectuals as a cautionary tale, demonstrating not only the pitfalls of poorly planned and poorly executed reforms, but also the weakness of change if progressive forces in society do not apply pressure on the leadership and help shape the process of reform. See Burlatskiy in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Feb. 24, 1988; V. Z. Drobyzhev in *Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), No. 12, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 23, 1988, pp. 69–72; and Yuriy Levada and Viktor Sheynis in *Moscow News*, No. 18, May 1, 1988.

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is now labeled the "period of stagnation." At the January 1987 plenum, which introduced Gorbachev's "democratization" program, the Soviet Union's loss of "momentum" and decline of economic growth was traced to the late 1970's and the failure of the leadership to enact timely political and economic reforms.[63] Two months later, Georgiy Smirnov "moved" the origins of the "braking mechanism" back to the October 1964 plenum that removed Khrushchev from office:

The measures taken by the party leadership after the October 1964 plenum were directed against the democratization of the party and government apparatus that had been earlier implemented, although it had not been systematic and clear in purpose. For example, certain democratic principles that had been introduced into the party rules were altered.[64]

Smirnov's comments clearly suggest that the Central Committee moved against Khrushchev not simply to stabilize a nation disrupted by ill-conceived and rash policies—which was the official explanation—but also to protect political position and privilege.

This indictment of virtually the entire party leadership is unprecedented, and underlines the desire of the reformers to reject most of the Brezhnev legacy in the domestic sphere. Through his approval of Khrushchev's political reforms, Smirnov also offers precedent and ideological grounding for the broadly similar proposals favored by Gorbachev, which under the rubric of "democratization" envisage the establishment of what one influential political analyst calls a "constitutional state" based on provisions that would limit the period an individual could hold a party or state position.[65]

[63]M. Gorbachev speech to CPSU CC Plenum, as issued by Moscow TASS, Jan. 27, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 28, 1987, p. R/8.

[64]G. Smirnov, "The Revolutionary Essence of Renewal," *Pravda*, Mar. 1, 1987. Smirnov was referring to Article 25 of the new Party Rules introduced at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, which stipulated that all party committees, from the Central Committee to that of the primary party organization, be extensively renewed at each election. The figure for the Presidium (Politburo) and Central Committee was to be 25 percent. After Khrushchev's ouster, at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966, the institutional changes embodied in Article 25 were repealed and replaced with an informal commitment to virtual lifetime tenure of office—the policy of "stability of cadres." See Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York, Vintage, 1971, pp. 597–99.

[65]See interview with Aleksandr Bovin in RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 455/87, Nov. 11, 1987. In the resolutions adopted by the 19th CPSU Conference, a uniform five-year term of office was adopted for all elective party bodies from the CPSU Central Committee down to the district party committees. Limits on the number of terms in elective posts were placed on members of bureaus and secretaries of party committees (apparently not on all members of committees), including members of the CC Politburo and the party general secretary. No more than two consecutive terms are to be allowed. *Pravda*, July 5, 1988.

The Trotsky Tangle

The current process of historical rehabilitation and the viewing of historical figures in a more balanced and human light inevitably raises the issue of Leon Trotsky—accused at the 1936, 1937, and 1938 Moscow purge trials of having instigated from abroad wide-ranging sabotage and spying in the Soviet Union. Even Trotsky's ideological foes, Bukharin and his fellow defendants, were condemned in their 1938 trial for allegedly colluding with the exiled Trotsky in attempts to dismember the Soviet Union and overturn the socialist system.

However, now that prominent ex-Trotskyists such as Nikolay Muralov, Ivar Smilga, Khristyan Rakovskiy, and Arkadiy Rozengol'ts have been rehabilitated and the proceedings against them declared false, the next logical step would be to rehabilitate Trotsky, if only in the "civic" or juridical sense. How this issue is handled will be a test of historical *glasnost'* under Gorbachev. Failure to rehabilitate Trotsky would undermine reformist efforts to portray the party under Gorbachev as devoted to judicial objectivity and historical justice. Yet, even the reformers find much that is distasteful in the historical Trotsky.

Trotsky is being incrementally and selectively restored to historical respectability in the Soviet Union. Shatrov's play *Dal'she . . . Dal'she . . . Dal'she!* portrays Trotsky in a favorable light, and in a memorable moment has him confront Stalin in the following words:

I reject with contempt . . . the charge of espionage and contact with special services. There were no such contacts except perhaps for one. On August 20, 1940, I was mortally wounded by a blow on the back of my head with an ice-pick . . . . A satanic act of vengeance. . . . You killed me without even the appearance of a trial, Stalin.[66]

For the most part, it is the Trotsky of the immediate revolutionary period—perhaps up to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk—that is being rehabilitated, although his subsequent prestigious position among the Bolsheviks in the Red Army is clearly, if briefly, depicted in Vasiliy Grossman's long-suppressed novel of the Stalin era, *Zhizn' i sudba* (Life and Fate).[67] Historian Pavel Volobuyev has written that although Trotsky was not a "genuine" Bolshevik, his credentials as a revolutionary and Social Democrat are unimpeachable.[68] Military historian Vasi-

[66]*Znamya*, No. 1, 1988, p. 6.

[67]*Oktyabr'*, No. 2, 1988, pp. 72–74, 79.

[68]*Moscow News*, No. 51, Dec. 27–Jan. 3, 1987.

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Vasiliy Grossman, author of Zhizn' i Sud'ba, *a long-suppressed novel about the Stalin era, which was recently published in the Soviet Union.*

—From the German-language translation of Grossman's novel, *Leben und Schicksal*, Albrecht Knaus Verlag.

liy Polikarpov, using Stalin's words from a November 1918 *Pravda* article, praised Trotsky's role in organizing and carrying out the armed rising against the Provisional Government.[69] Even Gorbachev has included Trotsky among the "respectable" leaders of the party in the early revolutionary period.[70]

At the same time, there are articles that either fail to acknowledge or minimize Trotsky's contributions as head of the Military Revolutionary Committee in 1917.[71] Other articles, devoted to the anniversary of the Red Army, cast an entirely negative light on Trotsky's subsequent role as Commissar of War.[72]

Opinions seem divided on the issue of Trotsky as a political intriguer. Some focus on his political "intrigues" in the pre-revolutionary period.[73] Others in the media and belles-lettres portray him as a complex historical figure whose opposition to Lenin was more often due to principled disagreement than to factional in-fighting and the quest for personal power.[74] In *Deti Arbata,* Ryabakov seems to suggest Trotsky should have succeeded Lenin but failed to beat out Stalin for the party leadership because he, Trotsky, was a "stranger (*chuzhak*)," a late-comer to the ranks of the Bolshevik party.[75] Yet, Gorbachev has criticized Trotsky for "excessive" pretensions to party leadership, vacillation, and cheating, and praised both Stalin and Bukharin for their role in defeating "Trotskyism" and intra-party factionalism in the 1920's.[76]

For a number of reasons, then, it is likely that Trotsky will continue to be denied "political" rehabilitation for some time to come. Most important, such a rehabilitation for Trotsky would raise sensitive questions about the legitimacy of the succession to Lenin. Furthermore, Trotsky's "leftist" positions in foreign and domestic policy are perceived by the reformers to be completely out of step with Gorbachev's program. For example, in his November 2, 1987, speech, Gorbachev harshly criticized Trotsky for having advocated the "export of revolution," exploitation of the peasantry, and the use of "administrative and military means in running society."[77]

Trotsky's proposals on industrial wage policy have been particularly criticized, for disregarding the role that "material interest" plays in stimulating labor productivity. His support for labor armies and wage leveling after the introduction of the NEP is said to have revealed his inability to break with the "temporary" measures of War Communism and to understand the NEP as a fundamental rejection of the use of "administrative" means to promote economic development.[78]

Conservatives, too, evaluate Trotsky negatively and oppose his full rehabilitation. They scorn him, often with barely-concealed anti-Semitism, and condemn "Trots-

[69] *Ogonek*, No. 26, June 1987.

[70] *October and Perestroika*, p. 19.

[71] Historian A. Yakovlev argues that historical *glasnost'* should be used to further expose the "treacherous activity of the Judas Trotsky . . . ." *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Nov. 6, 1986.

[72] See, for example, the article on corps commander Boris Dumenko in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 28, 1988.

[73] See the interview with the historian Yu. Korablev in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Feb. 21, 1988; and the publication (in *Kommunist*, No. 6, April 1988, pp. 3–5) of Lenin's letter of Oct. 28, 1909, which criticizes Trotsky's political tactics.

[74] M. Shatrov, "The Brest Peace," *Novyy Mir*, No. 5, 1987.

[75] See *Druzhba Narodov*, No. 6, 1987, p. 122.

[76] *October and Perestroika*, p. 20.

[77] Ibid. Vasiliy Selyunin in "Sources" (loc. cit.) indicts Lenin and Feliks Dzerzhinskiy along with Trotsky for supporting concentration camps and compulsory labor during the Civil War, but levels the harshest criticism at Trotsky, particularly for failing to embrace the ideas embodied in the NEP. Yevgeniy Ambartsumov in *Moscow News*, No. 25, June 26–July 3, 1988, maintains that Trotsky instituted the "bone-crushing machine" that eventually destroyed him.

[78] See S. S. Khromov, "Historical Experience in Solving the Problem of Labor Productivity in Industry in the First Years of the NEP," *Istoricheskiye Zapiski* (Historical Notes), Vol. 113, Moscow, Nauka, 1986, pp. 5–45.

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kyite internationalism" as the bearer of alien values. Still other conservatives use the image of Trotsky to highlight the dangers that "leftist" reformism poses to party unity and to the edifying role of Soviet culture.[79] Members of the bureaucratic establishment can hardly be expected to favor the rehabilitation of a party leader who provided the most systematic critique of the Soviet "command-bureaucratic" system.

The refurbishing of Trotsky's historical image will doubtless receive a boost from the planned publication in the Soviet Union (see below) of Roy Medvedev's historical works, which will fill in more "blank spots" by examining Trotsky's criticism of the process of bureaucratization in the 1920's, Lenin's positive evaluation of Trotsky in his last years, and the aborted alliance of the two leaders against Stalin and the forces of bureaucracy in the party.[80] Yet, Trotsky's adherence to highly coercive policies is likely to keep his historical image under a cloud for some time to come.

Historians and History

One of the anomalies of the current Soviet de-Stalinization campaign is that its primary exponents have been largely journalists, writers of fiction, economists, and others within the creative and technical intelligentsia, and not professional historians. The "restructuring" of historical science, particularly that relating to party history, has, in the words of Academician Aleksandr Samsonov, "barely begun":

Criticism is heard of historians that they, in contrast to writers, have shown themselves unequal to the needs of the time; that writers have already published several works on the complex prewar decades, on the life of the country in the era of the personality cult. [But] there has yet to appear serious works by historians on the same periods. It is a just criticism. . . .[81]

Several factors explain the lack of "renewal" in Soviet historiography. Of obvious importance is the nature of the historian's craft. It requires considerably more time to research and write a history than to produce a publishable article for the mass media.[82] Furthermore, unlike writers of fiction, historians apparently have few innovative manuscripts "in the drawer" ready for publication.[83] The historians also work in an environment that is removed from the pressures of "full cost accounting," a condition that has induced many editors and directors to publish deliberately provocative "historical" works in order to strengthen the financial position of their journals, theaters, and newspapers.

Also important is the fact that conservative scholars and administrators of the Brezhnev period remain in control of most of the institutes of history and the related scholarly journals. The absence of creativity and of freedom of research is largely due to the continuing influence of this group, which presided over the imposition of harsh controls after Khrushchev's ouster and fears loss of authority and professional standing.

An example of such a conservative figure is the chief editor of the Central Committee journal *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (Questions of CPSU History), Vasiliy Kas'yanenko, who is the leading "official" authority on the Stalin years. Similarly, Fedor Vaganov, chief of the Main Archives Administration, is author of a strong attack on Bukharin.[84] He has been accused of opposing "restructuring" in Soviet history and the use of new documentary evidence, and, implicitly, of impeding access to critical archival material.[85] Conservative historians have been openly accused of stopping the advance of learning for

[79]On Russian nationalism and the image of Trotsky, see John B. Dunlop, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 343. Also see Nina Andreyeva's controversial article which links contemporary Soviet "leftwing liberal socialism" with Trotsky's "internationalism" (*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Mar. 13, 1988); and the speech of KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov in *Pravda*, Sept 11, 1987.

[80]See Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, New York, Vintage, 1973, pp. 34–41; and idem, *On Stalin and Stalinism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 51 and 90. Medvedev notes that Lenin, in some of his last letters, "expressed unambiguous approval of Trotsky." He also observes that although Trotsky had little sympathy for Bukharin's economic program, he nevertheless condemned from his enforced exile, the Stalinist "revolution from above" and recommended the suspension of *sploshnaya kollektivizatsiya* and forced-draft industrialization.

There are, of course, many other factors that place long-term pressure on the standard negative image of Trotsky. For example, the 1932 anti-Stalin "platform" of the recently rehabilitated Ryutin stated that Trotsky's criticism of the bureaucratization of the party was correct. It also called for Trotsky's readmission to the party in the interest of intra-party democracy and debate. The "platform" was never published in the Soviet Union, but some of its details have been recently revealed. See, for example, Lev Razgon in *Moscow News*, No. 26, July 3–10, 1988. On the "platform," see also Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purges of the Thirties*, New York, Macmillan, 1973, p. 52.

Otto Latsis, the influential deputy editor of *Kommunist* recently voiced approval of the publication of Trotsky's works and his civic rehabilitation. See *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 28, 1988. On the other hand, Dmitriy Volkogonov plans to treat Trotsky as the "dictator who never was" in his biography of Stalin. A shortened version of his preface appeared in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Dec. 9, 1987.

[81]*Nauka i Zhizn'*, No. 6, 1987, p. 51. Also see Aleksandr Samsonov's comments in the round table discussion in *Kommunist*, No. 12, August 1987, p. 76; and Yuriy Afanas'yev's lecture as recorded in *Nauka i Zhizn'*, No. 9, 1987, pp. 56–60.

[82]Yu. Polyakov in the round table discussion in *Kommunist*, No. 12, August 1987, p. 74.

[83]Samsonov in ibid., p. 76.

[84]*Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Mar. 21, 1987, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 22, 1987, p. 4. For more on Trapeznikov, see historian Petr Rodionov in ibid.,

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20 years, and even of engaging in the wholesale falsification of history.[86] Not surprisingly, these historians resist publication of such criticisms, and consequently such views have surfaced largely in "restructured" journals such as *Kommunist* and *Nauka i Zhizn'* and in "liberal" newspapers such as *Moscow News* and *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*.

Yuriy Afanas'yev has been particularly outspoken about this group, In a 1987 article, he stated:

There were and are specific people who directly "created" the stagnation. They must at least be made known, especially because their way of thinking and means of operating are working in the same direction even today. The campaign to curb scientific explorations in history in the early 1970's was headed by S. P. Trapeznikov [the head of the Central Committee Science and Education Institutions Department], who enjoyed unlimited freedom of action in managing our science and placed in all positions people who were dependent on him, and, on this basis were bound together by "business" ties.[87]

The sources of inertia, however, extend even beyond the control of journals, institutes, and archives by the conservatives. Even when provided a forum for their views, most historians have remained silent. According to reformers both within and outside the historical sciences, it is "tremendously difficult" to find scholars willing to produce even newspaper articles on sensitive issues of Soviet history.[88]

Three factors may explain this silence in the face of opportunities to express one's views. First, many Soviet historians today may simply not be competent to offer complex historical re-evaluations. According to one observer, the aridity of the social sciences under Brezhnev led to a mass exodus of the most promising history students from the profession, leaving it seriously depleted of talented researchers.[89] It is argued that those who remained failed to develop appropriate analytical skills and are unable to go beyond "commenting on the decisions that had been made by political authorities."[90]

Second, most historians have been conditioned to wait for signals from "above" before attempting to venture into risky areas of research.[91] In this context, the signals from Gorbachev remain somewhat contradictory as to how Soviet history, particularly that relating to the Stalin era, should be treated. A clear party "line" on the matter has yet to appear: existing texts have been withdrawn from use, and a competition is being held for contributions to a new party history, which will serve as a guide for historians to the permissible limits of research and debate.[92] But until the new text appears, most historians—lacking "authoritative explanations and directives" to guide them—prefer to sit on the fence.[93]

Third, many historians submit to self-censorship despite the "circumstances of relaxation" under Gorbachev, due to memories of widespread reprisals suffered in the past by innovative historians. According to Yuriy Afanas'yev:

everyone has known that theory and new knowledge in historical science are encouraged only provided that they do not diverge from "generally accepted" opinions. Departure from the "norm" has threatened a historian with many consequences—up to and including removal from the community of scholars. I will cite only the fates of the historians V. V. Adamov, E. N. Burdzhalov, and P. V. Volobuyev—one could continue on through the alphabet.[94]

The prominence now given such liberal and long-eclipsed historians as Volobuyev is in part designed to reassure cautious historians that "socialist pluralism" is

June 14, 1988; also, the numerous references in Nekrich, *Otreshis' ot strakha;* and Andrey Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom,* New York, Norton, 1968, pp. 56–67.

[85]*Pravyy uklon v VKP(b) i yego razgrom* (The Right Deviation in the RKP(b) and Its Defeat), 2nd ed., Moscow, Politizdat, 1977.

[86]Genrikh Volkov in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura,* July 4, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* 1987, p. R/15. For the conservatives' opposition to the use of new documentary evidence to reassess the past, see the letter of four party historians in *Moscow News,* No. 19, May 10, 1987. An extended treatment of this letter and of Yuriy Afanas'yev's response may be found in Wheatcroft, loc. cit.

[87]*Sovetskaya Kul'tura,* Mar. 21, 1987, trans. in *CDSP,* Apr. 22, 1987; and Afanas'yev in *Nauka i Zhizn',* No. 9, 1987, p. 59.

[88]*Izvestyia* editor Ivan Laptev's speech to a Journalists' Union plenum, published in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura,* June 20, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* June 30, 1987, p. R/28.

[89]Historian Yu. Polyakov in *Kommunist,* No. 12, August 1987, p. 74.

[90]Historian V. Z. Drobyzhev in ibid., p. 77.

[91]Historian Kozlov in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS,* No. 5, 1987, p. 118–22; see also John Keep, Ed., *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror,* New York, Praeger, 1964, pp. 21–23.

[92]In conversations with the author in August 1987, Soviet university students and teachers reported that the existing one-volume party history and most of the multivolume party history supervised by P. Pospelov had been withdrawn from use in Soviet schools. Only the second part of Pospelov's *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—Moscow, Politizdat, 1980) remained in circulation. It covers the period 1945–59.

[93]See historian Stanislav Tyutyukin in *Izvestia,* May 3, 1987.

[94]*Sovetskaya Kultura,* Mar. 21, 1987, trans. in *CDSP,* Apr. 22, 1987; also see Samsonov in *Nauka i Zhizn',* No. 6, 1987, p. 51.

Volobuyev was attacked and censured in 1972 for his views, particularly on the nature of the February 1917 revolution, and was later removed from his post as director of the Institute of USSR History. For one of the attacks on Volobuyev, see P. A. Golub, V. Ya. Laverychev, and P. N. Sobolev, "On the Book 'The Russian Proletariat: Profile, Struggle, Hegemony'," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS,* No. 9, 1972, pp. 120–32. E. Burdzhalov suffered a similar fate under Khrushchev for his departure from the "norm." See Heer, op. cit., pp. 87–88, 91–93, 195–97, and 200–01.

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the order of the day and that political criteria will no longer serve as the arbiter of professional opinions.[95] Yet, historians are acutely aware of the unstable political situation under Gorbachev, and remain uncertain as to how long the campaign for *glasnost'* in history will survive. It takes considerable personal courage to challenge previously accepted versions of Soviet history or to take on the power structure in the institutes.[96]

Several important factors and conditions do favor the process of change in the historical sciences. The first remains the reformist urge to re-open the past in order to delegitimate archaic institutions and behavior patterns viewed as retarding the process of reform.

The generally low prestige of most Soviet historians and the failure of Soviet historiography to fulfill its role as an inculcator of system values also exert pressure in the direction of a re-examination of the past.[97] By producing dull works whose contents obscure more than they reveal, and by repeatedly revising and manipulating history for political purposes, Soviet historians have alienated those with access to alternative sources of information about the past—through personal experience, word of mouth, *samizdat* (unsanctioned publications), or foreign broadcasts.[98] (Indeed, one of the goals of the policy of *glasnost'* in history seems to be to preempt such "outside" sources of information.)

The need to restore the legitimizing function of Soviet history has also become pressing due to the appearance under Gorbachev of numerous works, primarily fiction, that depict the Soviet past, particularly the Stalin era, in an entirely negative fashion. Unwilling to alienate the liberal intelligentsia by reasserting heavy censorship over the creative arts, the political reformers are placing increased pressure on historical science to offer credible responses to works of historical fiction that are seen by conservatives to "distort facts and damage historical education."[99]

Other political pressures are evident. Gorbachev's assumption of the role of official party historian in the process of re-examining the past, in his November 2, 1987, speech and in his book *Perestroika,* appears to have opened more doors to expanded research than it has closed. By stressing the bureaucratization of political and economic life under Stalin and its negative impact on Soviet society, Gorbachev has signaled Soviet writers and social scientists to examine controversial political and socio-economic phenomena.[100] Indeed, Gorbachev's refreshing comment that his views should not be considered the final word on the Stalin period should encourage further debate on sensitive historical issues.[101] Yet, his November speech—clearly the result of a political compromise—also sought to place limits on historical inquiry. Gorbachev emphatically rejected the "subjunctive mood" in history when he stated that the rapid industrialization of the late 1920's was essential—"no other course could have been taken"—primarily because of the threatening international environment. Bukharin and his followers were guilty of a "non-dialectical assessment of the situation," said the General Secretary.[102]

Historians will clearly feel the impact of reformers' efforts to "restructure," i.e., restaff, social science establishments. In an April 17, 1987, speech to social scientists of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Aleksandr Yakovlev condemned the existing state of affairs in academic institutions. According to Yakovlev, Soviet social scientists are split into two camps, those who engage in innovative research useful to society, and those who avoid productive debate, preferring to condemn the ideas of their creative colleagues. He stated that the Soviet political leadership was determined to end the abuses of the academic bureaucrats and exercise of "monopoly on the truth."[103]

Given such authoritative statements, it is probable that the academic V. A. Grigor'yev, brought in by Yakovlev to supervise the Central Committee's Department of Science and Educational Institutions, will apply further pressure to dislodge or weaken the conservatives. Yakovlev and Grigor'yev both attended an unusual conference on historical issues—in particular, those related to Stalinism—organized in April 1988 by the Academy of Sciences, the USSR Writers' Union, and the Central

[95]Volobuyev has figured prominently in news conferences organized by the government and has himself become outspoken in condemning Trapeznikov and his surviving clients. This is noted by Afanas'yev in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura,* Mar. 21, 1987, trans. in *CDSP,* Apr. 22, 1987.

[96]See, for example, comments of Samsonov in *Nauka i Zhizn',* No. 6, 1987, p. 51. As if to confirm these fears, *Moscow News,* No. 19, May 10, 1987, published a letter from four historians criticizing Afanas'yev's views and pointedly recalling Volobuyev's fate.

[97]Tyutyukin, loc. cit.

[98]See the comments by Mikhail Ulyanov, president of the board of the RSFSR Union of Theater Workers, in *Kommunist,* No. 5, March 1987, p. 54.

[99]See the address by Guriy Marchuk, President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, before the Academy's General Assembly, in *Izvestiya,* Mar. 16, 1988. The historian Viktor Danilov expressed similar views during a round table discussion sponsored by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (see *Voprosy Istorii KPSS,* No. 7, 1987, pp. 137–52).

[100]*Pravda* of Nov. 5, 1987, carried statements by liberal scholars who viewed Gorbachev's speech as encouraging greater freedom of inquiry.

[101]Gorbachev, "Report to Media Officials," in *Moscow News,* No. 4, Jan. 31–Feb. 7, 1988, Supplement. Also see *Perestroika,* op. cit., p. 124, where he stated: "You cannot have the role of social science and the creative forces in the party confined to commenting on the decisions or speeches of high-placed individuals."

[102]*October and Perestroika,* pp. 21–22.

[103]For Yakovlev's speech, see *Kommunist,* No. 8, May 1987, pp. 3–22. A fuller version appeared in *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* (Moscow), June 1987, pp. 51–80.

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Al'bert Vlasov, left, first deputy head of the CC Propaganda Department, and Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev, at a November 3, 1987, press conference explain the historical significance of the November 2 speech given by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian republic on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Committee's Academy of Social Sciences. Writers were evidently included in the hope that they would serve as a "beacon" for the historians, to prompt them to "offer honest and clear works for popular assessment."[104]

Although the political reformers have yet to make extensive use of the power of appointment to renovate historical science, there have been some important changes. The appointment of Yuriy Afanas'yev as rector of the History and Archives Institute in late 1986 gave the leading exponent of *glasnost'* in history an important organizational base. So did the appointment of Grigoriy Smirnov as head of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Of equal importance was the appointment, in late 1986, of Professor Nikolay Maslov as the new head of the Department of CPSU History at the Academy of Social Sciences in Moscow.[105]

Personnel turnover may not remain solely dependent on intervention "from above." There have been calls to make retirement more financially attractive for senior personnel in order to free up administrative and research positions for younger scholars.[106] Moreover, liberal historians have demanded that the practice of appointment of directors of Academy of Sciences institutes, as well as of their deputy directors and department heads, be replaced by the election of such officials by the memberships of the respective institutes.[107]

Some elections have been held, but, with one notable exception, they have left conservatives still deeply entrenched. The exception involved the leadership of *Voprosy Istorii,* the flagship of the historical journals. In

[104]For the remarks of Akhmed Iskenderov, the new chief editor of *Voprosy Istorii,* see the report on the meeting in *Pravda,* Apr. 29, 1988. Announcement of plans to publish the historical works of Roy Medvedev was timed to coincide with the conference. See Moscow radio broadcast of Apr. 28, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* Apr. 29, 1988, p. 34.

[105]For Afanas'yev's appointment, see Dev Murarka in *The Nation,* Oct. 24, 1987, p. 448; for Smirnov's, *Pravda,* Feb. 5, 1987; for Maslov's, Wheatcroft, loc. cit. Each of these figures have used their new positions to stage gatherings that have provided forums for liberal historians. See Murarka, loc. cit., p. 451; *Voprosy Isorii KPSS,* No. 7, 1987, pp. 137–52; and *Nauka i Zhizn',* No. 9, 1987.

[106]Tyutyukin, loc. cit.

[107]See, for example, an open letter published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* July 8, 1987, signed by historians K. F. Shatsilo, A. Gurevich, and S. B. Obolenskaya and by four philologists, which criticizes Academy of Sciences President Guriy Marchuk for rejecting (in a March 21, 1987, interview with *Izvestiya)* various proposals that employees of academic institutes elect their directors.

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July 1987, V. G. Trukhanovskiy, the journal's chief editor since 1960, was relegated to mere membership on the editorial board. In early 1988, it was announced that Akhmed Iskenderov had been elected editor-in-chief, and that 17 of the 21 members of old editorial board had been removed, including the conservatives Sergey Khromov (director of the Institute of USSR History) and Boris Rybakov (head of the Institute of Archaeology). They were replaced by several liberals who had been criticized in the past for "distortions of history"—these included Volobuyev, historian Viktor Danilov, and archaeologist Valentin Yanin.[108]

There has also apparently been some relaxation of conservative control over access to restricted archives since Gorbachev took office. On December 9, 1986, a joint session of the bureau of the Department of History of the Academy of Sciences and the collegium of the State Archives Administration underlined the problem of archival access and promised remedial measures.[109] On July 17, 1987, *Izvestiya* announced that 767,000 of the 1,109,000 documents in the central archives heretofore designated for restricted use would be made available to scholars. Military archives containing operational and combat documents, as well as political materials, are also apparently being opened to researchers.[110] The publication of the famous Decree No. 227 of World War II, which ordered no retreat and no surrender, is the most notable example.[111]

The publication of scholarly works that break new ground in terms of factual content and conceptual approach should also impart energy to the historical profession. Despite the relative scarcity of completed works that could be immediately published, some do exist, and their publication has been hinted at. One of the most interesting is the ninth volume of the *Istoriya SSSR s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney* (The History of the USSR from Ancient Times to the Present), which was prepared in 1964 under the auspices of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences and circulated in proofs for discussion among historians. This volume contains a frank examination of the purge trials of the 1930's and of Stalinism in general.[112] The official announcement that the works of Roy Medvedev will be published represents, of course, the most dramatic effort thus far by the reformers to renovate historical science, fill in the "blank pages" of Soviet history, and use historiography to delegitimate Stalinism's socio-economic and political structures.

Other works in the offing will also have their impact on the development of historical *glasnost'*. These are the projected new party history, an autobiography by Academician Samsonov, and a biography of Stalin.

It is virtually certain that the new party history under preparation will reflect Gorbachev's negative evaluation of Stalinism, further strengthening the hand of the liberal historians who seek to investigate previously forbidden topics. In mid-1986, the draft of a new (ninth) edition of the one-volume party history, prepared under the supervision of Boris Ponomarev, was rejected, presumably because it was too conservative. Shortly thereafter, historians Maslov and A. Zevelev called for a new text that would provide more information on "negative" phenomena in Soviet history, in particular the Stalinist cult.[113] A new board of editors was formed, and a competition for contributions was launched by the USSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education.[114]

Maslov, as head of the Department of CPSU History at the Academy of Social Sciences, is closely involved in supervising the compiling of the new history. At a Moscow City Party Committee seminar, he condemned previous party histories for dogmatism, scholasticism, "tendentiousness," and reducing the leaders of the party to anonymity. He singled out for particular condemnation Stalin's *Short Course* history, whose imposition on social scientists resulted in intellectual sterility.[115]

In his presentation, Maslov pointed to four dogmas informing past historical writing that had to be discarded in order to restore "scientific thought" to the examination of party history. The first is that of "nonconflicting" development of the party, according to which party history is depicted as an unbroken progression of achievements and victories. The second is the idea that any historical figure who made a political error is a "primordial" opponent of Leninism and socialism. By way of example,

[108]*Voprosy Istorii*, No. 2, 1988, p. 192; see also Vladimir Tol'ts, "*Voprosy Istorii* Restructures Itself," *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* (New York), May 11, 1988.

[109]*Voprosy Istorii*, No. 2, 1987, pp. 128–29.

[110]Interview with Lt. Col. I. Venkov of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Historical Archives Department, *Izvestiya*, July 20, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, July 23, 1987, pp. R/25–27.

[111]The decree was published in an article by A. Samsonov in *Moscow News*, No. 6, Feb. 14–21, 1988. Nevertheless, serious problems remain in terms of archival access. See the remarks made at the round table discussion in *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 4, 1988, p. 10.

[112]The historian V. A. Kozlov made a positive reference to the volume and its "preservation" in an article in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, No. 5, 1987, p. 120. For a brief description of the volume, see Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, p. 182.

[113]*Pravda*, July 8, 1986.

[114]Murarka, loc. cit., p. 450. The rules of the competition were published in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, No. 5, 1987, p. 158. It is unlikely that the history will appear before early 1989, since the deadline for submission of manuscripts is October 1, 1988. A new history of the Soviet Union will also appear in the near future. See Pierre Assouline and Barbara Nasaroff, "A Literary Thaw in the USSR?" *Lire* (Paris), September 1987, pp. 38–39.

[115]*Moscow News*, No. 29, July 19, 1987.

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Maslov pointed to the recent civic rehabilitation of the Old Bolshevik Smilga, who had been involved in the Trotskyist opposition of the 1920's, and noted that the positive contributions of such individuals far outweigh their political errors. The third dogma, somewhat related to the first, is that the "leading role" of the party in society has constantly grown stronger over the course of Soviet history. How could this be, asked Maslov, given that the January 1987 plenum revealed that the party and state leadership had committed the "gravest errors" in the political, social, and economic spheres? The last dogma is that all party documents are "100 percent" true, despite clear evidence to the contrary, for example, the flawed *Short Course* and the 1938 Central Committee resolution that established the text as the leading tool of party propaganda. According to Maslov, it is the duty of historians to examine critically party historical documents and the reasons for their adoption.

Although Maslov's remarks on the preparation of the new party history are encouraging, and Aleksandr Yakovlev has stated that the issue is not "yet another ['authoritative'] rewriting of the history of society, the state, and the party,"[116] it is quite likely that the finished product will fall short of the expectations of liberal scholars in many respects. This is implicit in Gorbachev's statement that the "help" of the Central Committee will be necessary in compiling the new history.

Academician Aleksandr Samsonov's *Pamyat' minuvshevo: sobytiya, lyudi, istoriya* (Remembrance of the Past: Events, People, History), slated for publication in 1988, is also expected to contribute to historical *glasnost'*. According to Samsonov, it will discuss, in part, his generation of historians and the problems and conflicts they encountered in pursuing their profession.[117]

Also awaited with interest is the first extensive Soviet biography of Stalin, by Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy Dmitriy Volkogonov, a doctor of philosophy. The biography, entitled *I. V. Stalin: Tragediya i triumf* (J. V. Stalin: Tragedy and Triumph), can be expected to respond to the demand of liberal historians and others for biographies that would treat Stalin and other historical figures as "living people, leaders of the party and state with all their doubts and mistakes, frustrations and emotions, achievements, victories and failures . . . ."[118]

As the re-examination of history progresses, it has begun to move into the area of Soviet foreign policy. It is now being argued that Stalin grossly exaggerated the danger of war in 1928–29 for personal political purposes.[119] It has also been suggested that the "social fascist" policy of the 1920's and early 1930's contributed to the very real danger of war in 1939 by splitting and weakening the German working class movement, thereby precluding any effective opposition to Hitler's election or subsequent seizure of power.[120]

Josef Stalin and Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop shake hands at the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact in August 1939.

—From the personal album of von Ribbentrop in the William R. Philp collection of the Hoover Institution Archives.

Appraisals of the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 that contradict the standard justification repeated in Gorbachev's November 2 speech have appeared. The Friendship and Boundary Treaty of September 1939, has been condemned as a cynical act, devoid of moral principle.[121] The behavior of the West before the signing of German-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty on August 23, 1939, is seen to have stemmed from "the democratic West's distrust for the USSR" as an ally against Hitler, a distrust conditioned by the great purge trials.[122] Of further interest is the fact that the terms of the secret protocol of the August 23, 1939, agreement—which led to the

[116]*Vestnik Akademii Nauk*, June 1987, p. 61.

[117]*Nauka i Zhizn'*, June 1987, p. 51. An excerpt appeared in *Moscow News*, No. 18, May 10–17, 1987. Comparisons with Alexandr Nekrich's recollections in *Otreshis' ot strakha* will be useful.

[118]*Kommunist*, No. 12, August 1987, pp. 74, 76.

[119]Vyacheslav Dashichev, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 19, 1988. Dashichev is head of a department at Oleg Bogomolov's Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System.

[120]Ernst Henri (pseudonym of the publicist and former diplomat Semen Rostovskiy), "Letter of an Historical Optimist," *Druzhba Narodov*, No. 3, 1988, pp. 231–39, at pp. 234–35.

[121]Volkogonov, *Pravda*, June 20, 1988. Probably the first published criticism of the Friendship Treaty was offered by Daniil Granin in his novel *Zubr*, in *Novyy Mir*, No. 1, 1987, p. 92.

Much of the current reassessment of Stalin's foreign policy closely follows the analysis of Medvedev in *Let History Judge*, Part 3, Ch. 3.

[122]Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, "The Poisonous Mist Disperses," *Moscow News*, No. 25, June 26–July 3, 1988. Dashichev makes a similar point about Western distrust, laying it to Stalin's "decapitation" of the Red Army (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, May 18, 1988).

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partition of Poland—have been revealed in the recently published memoirs of the late Konstantin Simonov.[123]

External Factors

Changing Soviet views of the international environment are also contributing to the broadening of the limits of what is permissible in the examination of history. International events and the world view of Soviet politicians have long influenced their willingness and ability to allow historians to conduct a more objective examination of the past, particularly the Stalin era. For example, Khrushchev maintained that he withheld the rehabilitation of the purge trial victims of the 1930's because the "representatives of the fraternal communist parties [had] testified . . . to the justness of the sentences" and he did not want to "discredit" them.[124] His de-Stalinization campaign was also dealt a set-back by the upheavals in Eastern Europe that followed his "secret speech" of 1956, and later, was cut short at least in part by the domestic and international uproar created by the Cuban missile crisis.[125]

Soviet perceptions of Western "ideological propaganda" and "bourgeois falsification" of Soviet history have also influenced historical inquiry. The fall of Khrushchev brought to power individuals who were deeply concerned with the restoration of political stability and ideological orthodoxy. The banning of anti-Stalin works in belles-lettres and the social sciences was justified in part as a measure to deprive the West of a potent propaganda weapon that could be used to undermine the legitimacy of the Soviet system, of its Eastern Europe satellites, and of Soviet leadership of the international communist movement. The historian Aleksandr Nekrich was attacked in the Central Committee journal *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* in 1967 for finding himself "in the ideological captivity of the bourgeois falsifiers of history."[126]

The campaign against "ideological deviation" was reinforced by the reaction to the "Prague Spring" in 1968. The Czechoslovak reform effort was branded as a direct descendant of the "right opportunism" of the 1920's, and as an ally of "imperialist reaction." Stringent new guidelines were issued on the research and teaching of history, and the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences was reorganized.[127]

The conservatives' fear of ideological contamination from the West grew with the advent of détente. Representative of the atmosphere under Brezhnev was a conference on "The Ideological Struggle in Historical Science," held at the Institute of History on June 14, 1973. Vladimir Yagodkin, the ideological secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, warned the historians present not to subject the Stalin period to critical analysis. According to Yagodkin, "All, I repeat, all stages in the development of Soviet society must be regarded as 'positive'." He termed any "revisionist" conception of Soviet history the work of foreign intelligence agencies, and maintained that any heterodoxy, whatever its origins, would inevitably strengthen anti-Soviet propaganda and should therefore be combatted.[128]

Yagodkin's views reflected the position of Sergey Trapeznikov, who from 1965 to 1983, was the powerful head of the Central Committee's Science and Educational Institutions Department. A bleak dogmatist, Trapeznikov placed considerable stress in his supervision of the social sciences on the need to strengthen ideological purity in the face of anti-communist propaganda from the West. In a series of lectures delivered to higher education establishments during the height of detente with the West, Trapeznikov warned of a "global assault" on communism and expressed the fear that "alien" concepts would invade the social sciences. Similar views were expressed by other high party officials.[129]

The return of cold war rhetoric under Ronald Reagan

[123]"Through the Eyes of a Man of My Generation," *Znamya*, No. 3, 1988, p. 36.

[124]*Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 353.

[125]See Heer, op. cit., Chap. 3; Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin*, New York, Viking, 1970, p. 249; Carl Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957–1964*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966, pp. 147, 158, 180; Roy Medvedev, *On Soviet Dissent. Interviews with Piero Ostellino*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1980, p. 57; and Keep, op. cit., pp. 25, 34.

[126]Nekrich's work *1941 iyunya 22* (June 22, 1941) was attacked in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, No. 9, 1967, pp. 127–40. Although the monograph was a rather unsensational account of Stalin's "errors and mistakes" at the beginning of World War II, it became the focal point of conservative opposition, particularly after a samizdat account of its discussion among academics reached the West. In interrogation at the Central Committee, Nekrich maintained that his book was favorably received in the foreign communist press precisely because it served to deflect "the propaganda of the reactionary bourgeois press, which maintained that there was supposedly a tendency in the USSR toward the restoration of the personality cult of Stalin . . . ." See Nekrich, *Otreshis' ot strakha*, pp. 273–74.

[127]Frederick Barghoorn, *Detente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR*, New York, Free Press, 1976, pp. 10–11; and Nekrich, *Otreshis' ot strakha*, pp. 317–18. On the Czech reform movement, see Vaganov, *Pravyy uklon. . . .*, p. 321; also, Stephen F. Cohen, *Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History since 1917*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1985.

[128]Yagodkin's speech circulated in samizdat. *Archiv samizdata*, No. 1461. Yagodkin's concerns were reflected in numerous works of fiction, including Vsevolod Kochetov's shrill neo-Stalinist novel "What Is It You Want Then?" (published in *Oktyabr'*, Nos. 9–11, 1969), in which a Western anti-Soviet agent is quoted: "A great wise man of our time . . . once said: 'De-Stalinization is a fulcrum which we could use to topple the communist world.' " (translated in Martin Crouch and Robert Porter, Eds., *Understanding Soviet Politics Through Literature*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1984, pp. 80–82).

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strengthened for a time the argument of conservative politicians and academics that orthodoxy in historiography and the social sciences in general should remain in place. For example, in March 1985, an extraordinary plenum of the party's Central Committee directed the History Department of the Academy of Sciences to increase its "ideological work" in response to "anti-Marxist conceptions of the global historical process" that were being promoted by the capitalist West. According to Academician Sergey Tikhvinskiy:

in conditions where imperialism, in its offensive against socialism, is trying to distort the essence of the processes at work in socialist society and to falsify human history, it is the duty of Soviet historians to give a timely and effective rebuff to anti-Marxist conceptions.[130]

"Counter-propaganda groups" formed by the department's institutes were authorized to produce publications that addressed the ideological concerns of the Central Committee.

Matters have changed dramatically under Gorbachev. The General Secretary's stress on *glasnost'* has clearly strengthened the arguments of intellectuals like Nekrich and Medvedev that refusal to engage in open examination of the Stalinist past only serves to "delight our enemies." In *Let History Judge* (pp. xxviii-xxix), Medvedev stated:

The longer we keep silent or vacillate, the more successfully will bourgeois propagandists use the cult of personality for their own ends . . . only resolute and honest communist self-criticism and resolute and honest correction of Stalinist perversions will cut the ground from under bourgeois propagandists, who have long used these perversions in their fight against socialism. By identifying the Stalinist regime with socialism in general, they have long tried (and not without success) to represent socialism as a system in which there is no respect for law, where the rights and freedoms of the individual are violated and suppressed. Silence and vacillation about Stalin's many crimes repel rather than attract friends abroad.

At a February 1987 meeting with heads of the media and propaganda organs convened at Central Committee headquarters, Gorbachev encountered the argument that critical analysis of Soviet history was like "indulging in a striptease for the whole world to see . . . ." Disagreeing, the General Secretary called for the removal of "blank spots" in Soviet history.[131] His renewed intervention at the end of 1987 further tilted the balance in favor of the liberals. Echoing the reforming intellectuals, Gorbachev railed against the "many" officials who still attempt to frighten authors of critical analyses by:

warning of the possible reaction on the part of the West. The West, they claim, is eager to hear our self-criticism in order to turn it against us, to discredit the socialist way of life. . . . I myself do not fear criticism. A critical review of our own experience is a sign of strength, not weakness. Such an approach accords with the principles of socialist ideology.[132]

In his handling of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl' and in the relatively open media coverage given to the Afghan war, Gorbachev has demonstrated a strikingly different approach to sensitive issues and events that generate Western criticism of Soviet policies.

Gorbachev's approach, designed in part to strengthen the renewed détente with the West, has led to increased contacts with Western academics. For example, the pages of Soviet newspapers have been opened to foreign scholars, including those who are considered to be the "ideological opponents" of the Soviet system. In early April 1987, a round table discussion was organized by the Novosti Press Agency to call for an international conference of historians to debate the "acute questions" of Soviet history. According to Dr. Andrey Sakharov, the director of the Institute for the Study of Soviet History, the conference would serve as a confidence-building measure to "help to establish trust between cultural scholars," thereby eroding the image of the Soviet Union "as the enemy."[133]

Thus, Gorbachev's pursuit of improved East-West relations may significantly enhance the ability of reforming historians and the creative intelligentsia to reassess the Soviet past with fewer party controls. It permits liberal historians to argue for increased access to archives and for freedom to conduct unrestricted research in order to offer documented, sophisticated responses to Western

[129]S. Trapeznikov, *At the Turning Points of History: Some Lessons of the Struggle Against Revisionism Within the Marxist-Leninist Movement*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1972, pp. 288, 293–94. See also the speech by Yuriy Andropov, *Izvestiya*, June 10, 1975; and Barghoorn, op. cit., pp. 8–9.

[130]*Voprosy Istorii*, No. 7, 1985, pp. 3, 10, as noted and translated by John Keep, *Moscow's Problems of History: A Select Critical Bibliography of the Soviet Journal "Voprosy Istorii"*, Ottawa, Carleton University, 1986, p. 6.

[131]See Yegor Yakovlev's report in *Moscow News*, No. 8, Feb. 22, 1987, p. 8. Gorbachev's speech was printed in *Pravda*, Feb. 15, 1987.

[132]Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, p. 80.

[133]*The Guardian* (Manchester), Apr. 8, 1987. This round table coincided roughly with Aleksandr Yakovlev's report to the Academy of Sciences criticizing Soviet historians' failure to promote a dialogue with Western historians. See *Vestnik Akademii Nauk*, June 1987, pp. 61, 68–70.

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historical conceptions of Soviet politics, society, and international relations.[134]

The opening to the West in terms of Soviet history was dramatically underlined by the announcement that Stephen Cohen's biography of Bukharin would be published in the Soviet Union.[135] Another manifestation was the article by historian Viktor Danilov evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of Western scholarship on the famine of the early 1930's.[136]

There are other, less dramatic, signs of the desire of Soviet liberal historians to join the international community of scholars. For example, the derogatory label of "bourgeois historiography" is being replaced in professional journals by the more neutral expression "non-Marxist historiography."[137]

Inherent Risks

In its quest for greater objectivity, the current surge of historical *glasnost'* carries with it serious political risk. Specifically, the exploration of the reasons for the emergence of Stalinism has led some writers and historians to examine the deficiencies in Russian political culture that permitted that development—from which it would be a short leap to question the dogma that the Revolution was foreordained by scientific laws of social development—and even to cast shadows on the sacred image of Lenin himself. It is "no accident" that conservative forces within the party are alarmed, and it is clear that many within the reformist wing of the leadership have their own reservations about how far *glasnost'* should be allowed to go.

Deficient political culture. The current wave of de-Stalinization in historical writings makes a serious effort to discern the conditions—in particular, Russian political culture—that facilitated Stalin's rise to power and the creation of the Stalinist political and socio-economic system. In this they differ markedly from the voluminous but largely descriptive anti-Stalinist works of the Khrushchev period.[138]

This is an important distinction. Since 1956, the standard explanation for the rise of Stalinism has pointed to international hostility ("capitalist encirclement") and domestic "enemies" and their interplay with Stalin's morbid suspiciousness.[139] As Italian communist leader Palmiro Togliatti observed, Khrushchev's avoidance of complex causality in explaining Stalinism left Soviet society ill-equipped to recognize and remove the remaining "vestiges" of that period:

> *First, all that was good was attributed to the superhuman, positive qualities of one man; now all that is evil is attributed to his equally exceptional and even astonishing faults. In the one case, as well as in the other, we are outside the criterion of judgment intrinsic in Marxism. The true problems are evaded, which are why and how Soviet society could reach and did reach certain forms alien to the democratic way and to the legality that it had set for itself, even to the point of degeneration.*[140]

Elsewhere, Togliatti stated that one of the most important questions was how there arose an atmosphere of "consent and connivance reaching as far as the co-responsibility of those who today denounce those errors."[141]

In the late Khrushchev and early Brezhnev periods, a few scholars briefly broached the politically sensitive issue of the origins of Stalinism. For example, during a February 1966 meeting of historians gathered to discuss Aleksandr Nekrich's controversial work about the German attack on the Soviet Union, *22 Iyunya 1941* (June 22, 1941), the author stated that "Stalinism began because of us, the small people. . . ." Historian V. M. Kulish argued at the meeting that the concentration in historiography on Stalin's personal guilt was obscuring larger questions, particularly the "process that allowed Stalin, who was not equal to his task, to become head of party and state, with unlimited powers."[142]

[134]The Institute of World History and the Institute of the History of the USSR have scheduled a large conference for 1989 on the topic "The Teaching of Russian and Soviet History Abroad." According to conference organizer Aleksandr Chubaryan, Soviet historians "have a lot to learn from Western historians about our own past." Cited in von Hagen, loc. cit.

[135]Von Hagen, loc. cit. Cohen's book is *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888–1938*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1980.

[136]*Voprosy Istorii*, No. 3, 1988, pp. 116–21. Danilov acknowledged that Soviet specialists in the past did not "and could not" collect and analyze data on demographic conditions in the 1930's and 1940's.

The most notable attempt to date to evaluate the 1937 census and demographic conditions in the 1930's is made by demographer Mark Tol'ts in his article "How Many of Us Were There Then," *Ogonek*, No. 51, 1987. I am grateful to Robert A. Lewis of Columbia University for drawing my attention to this article.

[137]Such a shift reflects a departure from the defensive insistence on the "innate superiority" of Soviet scholarship. See, for example, the round table discussion in *Istoriya SSSR* (Moscow), No. 1, 1988, pp. 172–202.

[138]Roy Medvedev, *On Soviet Dissent*, p. 63.

[139]See for example, Khrushchev's "secret speech," and the Central Committee Resolution of June 30, 1956, in *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1956, pp. 85, 284–90.

[140]Ibid., pp. 120–21.

[141]Ibid., p. 231.

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In the neo-Stalinist reaction in historiography that led to Nekrich's expulsion from the party and which was strengthened by the subsequent invasion of Czechoslovakia, further inquiries ceased, sought outlet in *samizdat* or publication abroad, or were consigned to the "drawer." The most notable such inquiry was Roy Medvedev's *Let History Judge,* which offers a complex, often contradictory, analysis of the conditions and processes that created the phenomenon of Stalinism. According to Medvedev, Stalin was supported by the majority of the population "not only because he was clever enough to deceive them, but also because they were backward enough to be deceived."[143] Other dissident social democrats were willing to intimate that the October Revolution was "premature" and that by overturning the Marxist pattern of historical development, it gave rise to Stalinist "bureaucratic despotism."[144] (We shall return to this critical point below.)

The Gorbachev-era re-examination of Stalinism has reflected to some extent the Khrushchevian focus on the deficiencies of the leader. For example, there has been a re-publication (with commentary) of Lenin's "testament," with its damning critique of Stalin's personality.[145] However, writers and historians have recently sought to look beyond such personal factors for more complex "reasons and conditions that led to the appearance of the Stalin cult."[146]

This broader exploration was apparently launched in an article in *Pravda* on March 13, 1987, in which Georgiy Smirnov said that Lenin saw the primary obstacle to mass participation in the management of social affairs to be "the workers' insufficient knowledge and low socio-political and cultural level, for politics are beyond the ken of an illiterate person . . . ." In July, the political scientist and close Gorbachev adviser Fedor Burlatskiy underlined the "contradictory tradition" of Russian and Soviet political culture, recalling the impact of 300 years of "Eastern enslavement" as well as of the stagnation of political participation under the tsars. This paucity of "general and political culture" was, according to Burlatskiy, a central factor in the decline of "management through the working people" after the October Revolution. In effect, the "personality cult" was a reflection of a political tradition of authoritarianism, a consequence of the low level of political culture of a largely peasant population.[147]

A round table of historians published in the "restructured" *Kommunist* in August 1987 continued discussion of the theme of political culture. Historian V. Z. Drobyzhev, in calling for extensive research on the little-known 1930's and the rise of Stalinism, observed:

The working class was altered in its composition as it was restocked by millions from the countryside. Who arrived from the countryside? How did the countryside influence the city? Shouldn't we search for the social roots of the cult of personality in this petty-bourgeois element which overwhelmed the city?[148]

Historian V. A. Kozlov, another participant in the round table discussion, also stressed the impact of a peasant-dominated social structure on Soviet post-revolutionary political development. He saw the fracturing of the unity of the "old party guard" during the political struggles of the 1920's as accompanied by pressures on the political structure from "petty-bourgeois elements—the bearers of the psychology of '*vozhdizm*' [attraction to a strong leader]."[149]

Similar conclusions were being drawn at this time by other historians. Thus, Vladlen Loginov wrote:

Telling the people the truth today means telling the truth about the people, too. And the truth about the people in 1917 is complex. Very complex. They were a comparatively dark, politically underdeveloped mass. A mass still retaining the servile habit of subordination.[150]

Still others pointed to the low level of the population's legal awareness, stemming from the denial of genuine civil rights under tsarism, which was reinforced by Russian's isolation from the "civilized world."[151]

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[142]For a samizdat report of the meeting, see *Survey* (London), April 1967, pp. 159–94, at pp. 177, 179; see also Nekrich, *Otreshis ot strakha,* pp. 232–38.

[143]*Let History Judge,* pp. 428, 541. According to émigré writer Aleksandr Zinoviev, the Soviet population willingly engaged in political denunciations and did not perceive them as such, but saw them as part of the "sharpening of the class struggle." See his "The Flight of Our Youth," *Kontinent* (Paris), No. 35, 1983, pp. 191–92.

[144]The publicist Len Karpinsky in Stephen Cohen, Ed., *An End to Silence,* New York, Norton, 1982, pp. 301–02.

[145]See *Moscow News,* No. 3, Jan. 25–Feb. 1, 1987.

[146]See, for example, military historian Vasiliy Polikarpov in *Ogonek,* No. 26, 1987.

[147]*Pravda,* July 18, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* July 23, 1987, p. R/21.

Succinctly defined, "political culture" is ". . . the attitudes and expectations of the people regarding political leaders, and the attitudes and expectations of those leaders as to what they might and should do in office." See Dina Spechler, *Permitted Dissent in the Soviet Union: Novy Mir and the Soviet Regime,* New York, Praeger, 1982, p. 44.

[148]*Kommunist,* No. 12, August 1987, p. 72. Drobyzhev also described how the democratic nature of the local soviets was gradually replaced by the influx of numerous members of the collegia of the people's commissariats (i.e., the Moscow bureaucracies).

[149]Ibid., p. 75.

[150]*Literaturnaya Gazeta,* Oct. 28, 1987. See also historian Yu. Borisov in *Nauka i Zhizn',* No. 9, 1987, p. 63; and Volobuyev in *Moscow News,* No. 51, Dec. 27–Jan. 3, 1987.

[151]Arkady Vaksberg in *Moscow News,* No. 46, Nov. 15, 1987.

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Yuriy Afanas'yev, rector and professor of the History and Archives Institute.

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To each of these authors, the unwillingness or inability of peasants and new industrial workers to take part in "management through the people" created a fertile soil for Stalinism. Within this social milieu, the consolidation of Stalin's power was inevitable after the "old party guard," that "thinnest of layers" bearing "high political culture," was destroyed in the purges.[152]

For the reformers, the tragedy of the Stalin era was that the system was not only nurtured by, but in turn deeply reinforced, political servility. According to Yuriy Afanas yev:

Until 1917, Russia was ruled by an autocracy; that is, there were no democratic traditions . . . . This lack has exerted an influence to this day. It was only in 1905 that the Russian people could begin to separate in themselves the national consciousness and the image of the tsar. However, a mere 30 years later, there arose in our society once again the image of the new leader of the people, which was propagated by the radio, mass communications, and literature, as well, with all their strength and with all possible coercion, engraving it into the consciousness of the people to an almost unbearable extent.[153]

Soviet authors have described how Stalinism planted social conformity, fear of expressing one's own opinion, and acceptance of hierarchical political relationships deep in the psyche of all strata of society, including the elite. The costs were great. For example, an article by the late Konstantin Simonov stressed the adverse psychological impact of the purges on Soviet military personnel both before and during World War II.[154] In like manner, economist Gavriil Popov, in a review of Aleksandr Bek's novel *Novoye naznacheniye* (The New Appointment), analyzes the erosion of independent thought on the part of managers in the face of Stalin's "administrative system" with its "subsystem of fear."[155]

Even after Stalin's death, Tatyana Zaslavskaya argues, there remained "the dark masses which could be ruled easily, whose minds could be controlled."[156] For Burlatskiy, Khrushchev's reforms failed because the leading strata were conditioned in their methods of governing by the Russian "patriarchal" culture, which stressed intolerance of differing opinions, the infallibility of the patriarch, and constant interference in the lives of subordinates.[157]

This extraordinary examination of Soviet political culture is largely driven by the exigencies of Gorbachev's reform program. The reformers seek to understand and alter submissive attitudes toward authority rooted in Russian and Soviet history in order to mobilize support for *perestroyka*, to undermine the power of entrenched bureaucracies, and to unleash social initiative. In

[152]See the jurist Yu. Baturin in *Pravda*, June 19, 1988. Baturin quotes Lenin's observation that " . . . we have to admit that the proletarian policy of the party is not determined by its membership but by. . . . that thinnest of layers . . . the old party guard."

[153]Interview on Radio Budapest, Nov. 7, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 9, 1987, p. 54. Although the interview as transcribed and translated in *FBIS-SOV* identified the interviewee as a *Yevgeniy* Afanas'yev, the views appear to be those of *Yuriy* Afanas'yev.

[154]"The Lessons of History and a Writer's Duty," *Nauka i Zhizn'*, No. 6, 1987, pp. 42–48.

[155]In ibid., No. 4, 1987, pp. 54–65. Other examples include Yuriy Trifonov's novel *Ischeznoveniyye* (Disappearance), which examines, in part, how Stalinism molded psychological conformity (printed in *Druzhba Narodov*, No. 1, 1987). Also see articles by A. Shcherbakov in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 16, 1987; by Yu. Orlik in *Izvestiya*, Aug. 16, 1987; and by I. Kon in *Kommunist*, No. 1, 1988, pp. 64–75.

[156]*The New York Times*, Aug. 28, 1987.

[157]In *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Feb. 24, 1988.

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the view of the Gorbachevtsy, popular apathy and fear of reprisals for innovative economic and political behavior, as well as widespread distrust of change in general, remain important impediments to "openly raising and solving difficult problems of socialist development . . . ."[158] In the words of Burlatskiy, the "single source" of the difficulties in democratizing Soviet society can be traced to the survival of an "authoritarian and patriarchal political culture."[159]

Taking on Lenin and Marxism-Leninism. The most remarkable aspect of the effort to uncover the roots of Stalinism has been the recent, tentative appearance of subtle as well as explicit indictments of Lenin and of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Both issues were first publicly broached in belles-lettres. In Grossman's *Zhizn' i sud'ba,* published in early 1988, the Menshevik Chernetsov condemns Lenin for destroying the Constituent Assembly and its promise of political pluralism, and describes Stalin as "Lenin today" because of the brutality that marked the policies of both leaders.[160]

Boris Pasternak's *Doktor Zhivago,* at long last published in the USSR, in early 1988, also examines the destructive impact of Bolshevik ideological dogma and teleological zeal on private life, universal moral standards, and individual conscience. To Pasternak, the New Economic Policy held little hope for altering the processes set in motion by the revolution of 1917. It was instead, the "most ambivalent and hypocritical of all Soviet periods."[161]

The critical examination of Lenin gained impetus in connection with Shatrov's play *Dal'she . . . Dal'she . . . Dal'she,* which employed various dramatic devices to attack and then absolve Lenin's ideas and activities of any connection with Stalinism. Echoing Togliatti, liberals criticized Shatrov for simplifying history by examining Stalinism only in terms of Stalin, thus evading a more complex understanding of the phenomenon. Shatrov was also criticized for failing to depart from the standard portrayal of Lenin in hagiographic terms. Such "reprehensible religiosity," it was argued, blocked a fundamental understanding of the historical process.[162]

The rout of Nina Andreyeva's March 1988 defense of Stalinism,[163] plus the mood of anticipation regarding the 19th CPSU Conference in late June, encouraged editors to more daring attacks on the past. The most interesting of these was the article in *Novyy Mir,* No. 5 of 1988, by economic journalist Vasiliy Selyunin. Unlike Burlatskiy, Selyunin examined the destructive role played by the ideas of Marx and Lenin.

Marxist-Leninist ideology, Selyunin argued, dictated that the Bolsheviks assault "shameful" profit and eradicate commodity production and private business. By rejecting the principle of economic self-interest, the Bolsheviks provoked the resistance of the peasantry, which in turn led to a spiral of "noneconomic" coercion. Famine and economic collapse inevitably resulted. The Bolshevik predilection for compulson also led to the creation of concentration camps to extract labor. At the 9th Party Conference, in early 1920, the Bolshevik leadership, including Lenin, supported Trotsky's program for the total militarization of the labor force, and not as a temporary measure.[164]

Selyunin praised Lenin, not for the October Revolution (which overturned the capitalist path of development and the promise of the Stolypin reforms), but for the New Economic Policy. Unfortunately, Lenin's new positive attitude toward economic self-interest was not shared by important segments within the party elite, and the great turn of 1929 soon returned the country to the philosophy of War Communism.

Selyunin also subtly indicted Lenin for the contraction of political freedom within the party that enhanced the power of the general secretary. Referring to the ban on factions at the 10th Party Congress, Selyunin notes that "many distinguished party members" vigorously protested that the ban had strangled party and public opinion and fostered the growth of a "hierarchy of secretaries" that reduced party congresses and conferences to "executive assemblies." He quoted Stalin's assertion in January 1924, the month that Lenin died, that the party was not a union of groups and factions, but a "monolithic organization hewn from a single block."[165] Selyunin concluded by stating that history will show little forgive-

[158]*October and Perestroika,* pp. 43, 45.

[159]From Burlatskiy meeting with journalists as reported by Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, Oct. 31, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* Nov. 5, 1987, p. 54.

[160]*Oktyabr',* No. 2, 1988, pp. 58–59.

[161]*Novyy Mir,* No. 3, 1988, pp. 126–27, 152, and 166; No. 4, 1988, p. 76.

[162]See, for example, L. Ovrutskiy review in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura,* Feb. 4, 1988. Afanas'yev expressed similar views (see Bill Keller in *The New York Times,* Jan. 15, 1988). See also the round table discussion of Shatrov's play in *Moscow News,* No. 10, Mar. 13–20, 1988.

[163]On March 13, 1988, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* printed a long letter by Leningrad chemistry teacher Nina Andreyeva, which criticized the de-Stalinization campaign under Gorbachev. Arguing that the attacks on the past were undermining *perestroyka,* the article was quickly publicized by conservatives in order to weaken the reform movement. According to Yuriy Afanas'yev, 30 oblast party committees presented the letter as a policy document. *Pravda* responded on April 5 with an editorial that castigated Andreyeva's article as an "anti-*perestroyka*" platform. See Afanas'yev in *Pravda,* July 26, 1988.

[164]Igor Klyamkin also treats this subject, if briefly, in "Which Street Leads to the Temple?" *Novyy Mir,* No. 11, 1987, p. 178.

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Soviet historian Roy Medvedev at work in 1979.

—The New York Times/David Shipler.

ness if society again lets slip the opportunity for genuine reform.

Historian Nikolay Popov also traced many of the preconditions for the "ideal totalitarian state" to the actions of Lenin. "Many of our political norms and habits took shape," Popov stated, "when V. I. Lenin headed the state." He observed that Lenin violated constitutional norms, concentrated unregulated power in his hands, and presided over the erosion of judicial autonomy. Still, Popov attributed these negative phenomena largely to the civil war, and he argued that Lenin's "wisdom" precluded any abuse of power. He described Lenin as increasingly preoccupied in his last years with the danger of the "uncontrolled power of the party and state organs."[166]

The planned publication in the Soviet Union of the works of Roy Medvedev will significantly expand the criticism of Lenin and of Bolshevik ideology. In *Let History Judge*, completed in the late 1960's, Medvedev for the most part refused to ascribe serious political "mistakes" to Lenin.[167] Nevertheless, Medvedev does argue that Stalinism was facilitated by the corporate identity of the party. Stalin's cult did not "spring up overnight"; it was conditioned by the cult of the party, which came to be viewed as an infallible institution, its members required to perform any service, commit any "cruelty," in response to the party's call. Gradually, the cult of the institution was transferred to its leaders. The orgy of praise for Stalin on the occasion of his 50th birthday, in 1929, marked the pinnacle of the "hierarchy of cults" already in existence. Thus, belief in the infallibility of the party, together with rigid party discipline and unquestioning revolutionary enthusiasm involved the party and society as a whole in Stalin's crimes.[168]

In the years since publication of *Let History Judge*, Medvedev's views on Lenin changed considerably. Although he continued to believe that Leninism and Stalinism were fundamentally different, he acknowledged some continuity between the two. In *On Stalin and Stalinism*, Medvedev described Lenin as introducing many of the restrictions on political activity and free speech that Stalin built upon. Lenin also approved the use of terror during the civil war on a scale that was "entirely unjustified." Even after the end of the civil war, Lenin advocated not only a broad definition of political crime and counter-revolution, but also the inclusion of a provision for political terror in the RSFSR Criminal Code. Medvedev traced much of this to Lenin's belief in the "relativity of all moral concepts . . . ," i.e., the concept that virtually any action is justifiable in the service of the proletarian struggle. Medvedev noted that few in the communist movement today would subscribe to Lenin's premise that "barbarous means are permissible in the struggle against barbarism."[169]

In *Leninism and Western Socialism*, Medvedev developed further this theme of moral relativism and offered an extended critique of Lenin's concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Lenin's categorical definition of proletarian rule as a dictatorship based on violence and free from legal constraints is said to have provided Stalin with the theoretical apparatus with which he justified his own rule and its terroristic methods.[170]

Implicit criticism of Lenin's moral relativism and its effect on party culture has already appeared in the Soviet press. The economist Yevgeniy Ambartsumov wrote that the humiliating confessions of the Old Bolsheviks at the Moscow trials of the 1930's were due partly to the complete erosion of "those unchanging values for all mankind that we are addressing today." Quoting the Old Bolshevik Georgiy Pyatakov that a genuine Bolshevik "lacked all limitations—moral, political, and even physical," Ambartsumov exclaimed: "How murderous

[165]Loc. cit., p. 175.
[166]"Is Anyone Above the Law?" *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Apr. 26, 1988.
[167]There are implicit and explicit critiques on pp. 379–80 and 397–98.
[168]Pp. 146–47, 365.
[169]Pp. 184–97.
[170]*Leninism and Western Socialism*, London, Verso Publications, 1981, pp. 29–53.

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and suicidal is the moral nihilism that was described as revolutionism.[171]

The writer and long-time party member Lev Razgon suggested in his recently published memoirs that many of Stalin's victims, through their earlier willingness to subjugate means to ends, actively participated in the creation of the system that eventually destroyed them. Razgon expressed his uncertainty over whether Stalin's victims drawn from the political elite ever grasped, even after their arrest, the consequences of their past behavior for the party and society as a whole.[172]

Implications. The conservatives' fear that open examination of the past could undermine system legitimacy by eroding ideological commitment is not without basis. The efforts by writers and historians to explain the rise of Stalinism and the survival of its core features to this day directly or indirectly challenge fundamental party dogma.

To take the most important example, the central axiom of Soviet ideology maintains that the Bolshevik revolution was due not to chance or to the superior leadership of the Bolsheviks per se, but to the communists' knowledge of the objective laws of social and historical development. Soviet propaganda has justified the preeminent role of the communist party in Soviet society by contending that the seizure of power in October 1917 was the only possible "scientific" application of Marxism to Russian conditions. However, the current emphasis on the low political culture of both elite and masses in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period, on the weakness of moral principles within the party, and on the rapid replacement of socialist democracy by Stalinist bureaucratic structures, raises questions about whether the October Revolution and Lenin's strategy actually were 'law-governed" (*zakonomernyy*). It suggests that the revolution was premature, as the Mensheviks and others argued, and that there were alternatives to exclusive Bolshevik rule. (Even more remarkable, *Kommunist* deputy editor Otto Latsis went a step further recently when he observed that personality "cults," although not a "law-governed" feature of socialism, are nevertheless a trait of socialist movements that depend on a "young" working class.[173] Such questions are, of course, closely tied to the issue of the appropriateness of the one-party system as a model for the construction of socialism.)

Commentator Aleksandr Bovin has referred to Friedrich Engels's expression, the "irony of history," to describe the failure of the party to discharge its historical role:

It's as if history can be sarcastic and smile ironically at people's inept attempts to change it. Having accomplished a revolution and changed the course of history, as it seemed to them . . . people suddenly notice with amazement that what they have accomplished differs greatly from what they had intended to achieve. For a long time we have thought that this expression of Engels has nothing to do with proletarian revolutions or communist parties. Now we see that we have been mistaken. . . . I hope that we have become mature enough that we're not afraid to call a spade a spade.[174]

Such challenges to the myth of the party's infallibility and its unique insight into the "laws of history" must be distressing not only to party conservatives. Although the reformist leaders may well have countenanced discussion of the "moral nihilism" of the Stalin epoch as a means of lending a moral imperative to reform efforts, the process is hazardous. When the enterprise begins to criticize Lenin and Marxism-Leninism, it weakens the central ideological support of the reform program, which is described as "a return to Leninism."

There is also a problem inherent in the desire of the reformers, particularly the more radical of them, to mobilize history as an effective lever of change. They feel that only a thorough denunciation of the values, norms, and institutions of Stalinism will suffice to ensure reform of the party, defeat of bureaucratic resistance, and reshaping of the relationship between the individual and the party-state. Yet, assessments of the past written with this end in mind are not likely to yield a truly balanced, objective view of Stalin and his role in history.

Moreover, such a "blackening" of Soviet history deeply insults many elements in Soviet society, who feel that the tendency to view the Stalin years only "through the eyes of the repressed" distorts what is the essence

[171]"The Poisonous Mist Disperses," loc. cit. Ambartsumov drew his account from the ex-Menshevik Nikolay Valentinov's recollection of a 1928 conversation with Pyatakov (see *Novyy Zhurnal* [New York], No. 52, 1958, pp. 140–61, at pp. 150–51). It is doubtful that many readers were unaware that Pyatakov was quoting Lenin's "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky." See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 3rd printing, 1981, pp. 235–36.

[172]Lev Razgon, "Nothing Invented," *Yunost'* (Moscow), No. 5, 1988, pp. 5–40, at p. 15. Ambartsumov (loc. cit.) implicitly criticized the behavior of Bukharin when referring in passing to Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* (that novel's chief character, Rubashov, is largely based on Bukharin). Among the explanations of the party members' confessions in the novel was the perception of the accused that their past behavior had denied them the right to judge Stalin. Interestingly, the journal *Neva* (Leningrad) began publication of Koestler's work in July 1988.

[173]"The Turning Point," *Znamya*, No. 6, 1988, p. 178.

[174]"Perestroika and Socialism's Future," *Moscow News*, No. 35, Sept. 6–13, 1987, Supplement.

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A Moscow parade on May 9, 1985, marks the 40th anniversary of the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

of the period.[175] Much of society still holds a positive image of Stalin as the leader of the party and state during a tumultuous period marked by ideological conviction, national purpose, extraordinary social and economic change, defense of the homeland, and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world power.[176] When Gorbachev mentioned Stalin's role as head of the State Defense Committee during the May 1985 commemoration of the war's end, his speech was interrupted by sustained applause.[177] Not surprisingly, members of the military, the police, and other institutions of the state and party apparatus, see a threat to their own prestige and roles in any full-blown historical assault on the Stalin epoch—after all, disruption of their entrenched positions is a central objective of the reform that historical *glasnost'* seeks to advance. Then, too, the excavation of the Stalinist past is resisted by those who participated in the purges and who, along with their families, often profited materially and professionally by engaging in denunciation of their co-workers and colleagues.

Finally, there is the question of the centrifugal effects of re-opening of the past on the Soviet multi-national state. This must be a cause of deep concern to reformers and conservatives alike.

Prospects

The reformers are aware of the corrosive effects that historical myth and historical silence have in an educated and socially complex society.[178] They seem convinced that a more truthful examination of the past will generate ideological renewal and restore the deeply eroded moral authority of the party among alienated or apathetic segments of the population. So, one can expect "historical *glasnost'* " to yield still other "unorthodox" treatments of the Soviet past, particularly as Gorbachev seeks to accelerate the process of political reform.

But historical *glasnost'* is a fragile blossom, and it is unclear whether the professional historians and their counterparts in the mass media and belles-lettres will really be able to join the "vast wandering enterprise" of objective historical analysis. For one thing, it remains an open question whether or not radical assaults on the historical image of the party will increase the party's authority or mobilize support for *perestroyka*. Moreover, innovative historical analysis has largely been confined to belles-lettres and the mass media. The struggle of liberal historians for professional autonomy is just beginning. Perhaps most important, the charged atmosphere of reform is not conducive to objective historical analysis. Doors to previously taboo topics have been opened, but others remain closed, being viewed as counterproductive to the reform program. Many within the reform movement value historical *glasnost'* for its instrumental aspects and do not view it as an end in itself.

At the same time, it would be unwise to underestimate the forces unleashed by the reformers. If the Gorbachevtsy remain in power, there is reason to expect the emergence, within the increasingly elastic limits of "socialist principles," of a stable culture of debate that ensures competing approaches to controversial topics in Soviet history. Such a development would be convincing evidence that the reformers, perhaps beyond their intentions, have succeeded to some degree in reforming the relationship between state and society in the Soviet Union.

[175]On this view, see Aleksandr Zinoviev, loc. cit., p. 193.

[176]See, for example, historian Yu. Borisov in *Nauka i Zhizn'*, No. 9, 1987, p. 63.

[177]Wolfgang Leonhard, *The Kremlin and the West,* New York, Norton, 1986, p. 175.

[178]Soviet surveys have revealed the weak attraction of Marxist-Leninist ideology for much of the population, particularly the young. See *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* (Moscow), No. 4, 1987; and *Sobesednik* (Moscow), No. 39, 1987. It is not accidental, then; that much of the anti-Stalinist literature has appeared in publications such as *Yunost'* and *Sobesednik*, which are aimed at Soviet youth.

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Crisis and Political Ritual in Postwar Poland

Andrzej Flis

On January 30, 1968, the National Theater in Warsaw (*Teatr Narodowy*) was ordered by Polish authorities to close its production of "Forefathers' Eve" (*Dziady*), a play by Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855), one of Poland's greatest writers. Written at the time of the partitions of Poland, the play depicted the Poles' struggle against oppression by tsarist Russia—a struggle in which the preservation of the Polish national identity was at stake.

The decision of the authorities to close Mickiewicz's play sparked a lively reaction among Warsaw University students, who sent a protest letter to the Sejm[1] signed by 3,145 people. On February 29, 1968, the Warsaw Section of the Union of Polish Writers convened an extraordinary meeting and voted to support the students' protest. Several days later, the Rector of Warsaw University moved to expel two students, Adam Michnik and Henryk Szlajfer, from the university for collecting signatures for the letter of protest. In response, on March 8th, the students held a protest meeting in the courtyard of Warsaw University. They demanded that their expelled colleagues be allowed to return to the university and that performances of "Forefathers' Eve" be resumed in the National Theater. Their peaceful protest meeting was broken up by units of the militia and communist paramilitary squads. This led to further demonstrations on March 9th and 11th, and to further encounters with the militia. In the end, the use of massive physical force against a few thousand students expressing modest and understandable demands merely increased tension in the country. In the space of a few days, student demonstrations spread to all principal academic institutions of Poland.

The reaction of Poland's political authorities to the March events deserves particular attention. Besides resorting to the use of the militia and to terror tactics, the authorities also initiated administrative harassment. The mass media, operating on instructions from above, undertook a broadly conceived campaign of slander and libel directed against writers and members of the academic staff who dared to side with the protesters. The Ministry of Science and Higher Education closed down the faculties of economics, philosophy, sociology, and psychology at the University of Warsaw. The Sejm passed a law that abolished the autonomy of institutions of higher learning. Party leaders invoked the threat of "the external enemy," and unleashed a campaign of racial hatred against the Jews, whom they singled out as being responsible for provoking unrest among the youth. All these repressive acts were accompanied by a huge propaganda campaign aimed at neutralizing ideologically the student protests.

From a sociological point of view, the Polish authorities' "creation" of a fictional reality conforming with communist ideology constitutes the most interesting aspect of the March events. It also serves as an excellent point of departure for broader theoretical generalizations concerning the functioning of the communist system as a whole. Before examining this phenomenon, however, let us turn to a brief discussion of ideology and its functions in communist systems.

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[1]The Sejm, a body almost entirely controlled by the communist party leadership, is the parliament of the Polish People's Republic.

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A student protest sign at the main entrance to Warsaw University in early 1968 reads: "Security Forces Get Honest Work! Journalists, Where Is Your Honor?"

—Photo from The Pilsudski Institute of America.

Functions of Communist Ideology

If we define ideology in general to be composed of a structured set of values, a corresponding axiological (or crypto-axiological) vision of reality, and a more or less specific program of action derived from these values, then all ideological systems may be divided into two basic types, namely, radical and conservative ideologies. The former proclaim the necessity of reconstructing the world, the latter favor a continuation of the existing state of affairs. The ideology of communism is a special case which does not fit this dichotomy, being ultra-radical when operating in capitalist society and intensely conservative in a system of real existing socialism. This dual, and exceptional, character of communist ideology is the logical consequence of its theosophical or gnostic nature—as Alain Besançon terms it.[2]

According to the orthodox communist conception of the world, history is a purposeful process, which develops according to a straightforward schematic scenario. This process is aimed at the ultimate liberation of man—at rescuing him from the slavery of class relations, abolishing private interests, conquering alienation, and, in general, establishing a rational social system that allows for unlimited development of human creative abilities. Since it promises so much, communist ideology makes considerable demands, namely, it calls for ruthless consistency in destroying the existing world. At the same time—since it promises so much—it sanctifies the classless society. According to communism's updated Manichean worldview, the capitalist system is tormented by an accumulation of strife and social conflict unprecedented in history, while the socialist system contains institutions that are exceptional, that allow for the reconciliation of the particular with the general, of the interests of individuals and groups with the interests of society as a whole. Anyone accepting this world view can reach only one conclusion: in keeping with the logic of history and the requirements of ethics, the first system

[2]See, A. Besançon, *Les origines intellectuelles du Léninisme* (The Intellectual Origins of Leninism), Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1977, pp. 15–16.

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must be destroyed and the second one established and defended in its entirety by all available means—regardless of cost. (In this way, communist ideology, together with the nationalization of all means of production, is transformed from a radical and revolutionary doctrine into an ultra-conservative, self-maintaining program, which rejects all spontaneous processes and changes of a structural nature.)

In the light of orthodox communist doctrine, the socialist system appears to be a *societas perfecta*. The capriciousness of the market economy so characteristic of capitalism is replaced with the rationality of the planned economy. Unemployment, alienation, and labor exploitation cease to exist thanks to the abolition of classes, and society as a whole is transformed into a community of free and equal people. For decades this vision of socialism has constituted an alluring, irresistible political program. It has also provided the justification for the huge amount of destruction and violence that has followed communism wherever it appears triumphant.

In general, this vision legitimized, and still legitimizes, the legal and administrative systems of the countries of Eastern Europe. To the question "Why did socialism defeat capitalism in 1917, and then again after the World War II?" official propaganda replies: "Because socialism was obedient to history"—or more specifically to progress, for in history the progressive is always victorious, the regressive always defeated. The answer to the question "Why must socialism be defended against external and internal enemies?" is similar: "Because it is a progressive system, and unlike any other it serves the interests of every segment of society." Whereas the feudal system derived its justification from religion, and capitalism is legitimized by its achievements in economics and civilization, its respect for the rights of the individual, and its democratic political institutions in general, the socialist system is validated by historical rationality, by its ideologically decreed perfection. From this feature of socialism come inevitably all the other permanent attributes of the system. As we will see later, this alleged perfection is also responsible for the unprecedented sanctification of socialist institutions.

Communist ideology constitutes not only the sole possible legitimation of the socialist system, but also—thanks to its internal logic—of the monopoly on power of each successive communist leadership. A dictatorship of the first secretary of the party and members of the Politburo over the masses, which are deprived of civil rights, may be justified only on the basis of ideology and only in the language of ideology. The communist elite, which claims to be the "guiding force of the people" (to quote the constitution of the Polish People's Republic), cannot appeal to tradition, which it must destroy, nor to the socially recognized attributes of its leaders, who do not possess any, nor to universally accepted procedures for running governments—elections, for example—since compliance with such procedures would soon bring about the downfall of the whole political system. Hence, to use Max Weber's categories, the rule of the party elites in the countries of Eastern Europe is neither a traditional rule, nor a charismatic one, nor even a legitimate one. The communist elite can only base its right to rule on reasons of history. Anyone wishing to comprehend these reasons must first acquire gnosis, the only correct knowledge of reality, which is provided by "scientific socialism," or to put it more clearly, by ideology. In this sense the rule of the communist party, like that of the fascists, is an ideological rule *par excellence*, whose sole justification for existence lies in the normative-descriptive image of the world that is proclaimed by the party and that is peculiar to it.

The basis on which communist ideology builds its arguments for legitimizing the communist dictatorship and its power is the concept of the historic mission of the proletariat as it was first formulated by Marx and then elaborated by Lenin. According to this concept, the laws of history dictate that the working class—being the most disadvantaged social group under capitalism—is to be the collective subject entrusted with the task of building the first society ever to be based on equality, liberty, and justice.

On this concept rests the first of four theses concerning the communist party: "The communist party aims at overthrowing capitalism and constructing a socialist system, therefore it is the political avant-garde of the working class and the one true spokesman for its interests." This ideological construction, and the abolition of private ownership of the means of production within the socialist system, provide the basis for the second crucial thesis: "In a socialist system the objective interests of the proletariat are identical with those of the peasantry and the intelligentsia, and as a result, the communist party is transformed into a political organization representing the interests of the whole of society." Once the significance of the party has been universalized, it is only logical that there follow a third thesis rationalizing the party's monopoly of power: "The communist party represents the interests of all of society, therefore it is the only organization authorized to wield political power." The fourth and final thesis, which follows logically from the third, unites the whole construction and legitimizes communist dictatorship: "As a conscious society that understands its own objective interests, the socialist society fully accepts the communist party's monopoly of political power."

In light of the four theses, let us examine how the politi-

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cal authorities used them to "create" reality with respect to the events of 1968 in Poland.

Creating Reality

The official view of the events of March 1968 presented by the Polish mass media was that these events represented a conspiracy hatched by "international Zionism, imperialism and West German revisionism."[3] According to the media, these retrogressive forces had activated their "agents" in Poland, who in turn "perfidiously deceived" the naive young students. Just where these "agents" came from was not very clear. On the one hand, there was talk of the "crystallization of the union between Polish Zionists, the remnants of reaction, revisionists, and stateless intellectuals,"[4] and, on the other hand, of "a mixture . . . dominated by dogma obdurately retained from the Stalinist period, specially seasoned with apotheosized liberalism."[5] Alongside these elaborate descriptions there were shorter and more direct ones. The leaders of the March protests were described in some instances as "Zionist lackeys," "political degenerates," "trouble-makers," "stirrers," "bankrupts," "anti-socialist and anti-national forces," in others as "anarchists," "revisionists," "reactionaries," "saboteurs," and "subversives," and in still others, as "isolated, politically blind circles," or as "cosmopolitans in nylons."

If, as the media were saying, students participated

[3] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Mar. 23, 1968.
[4] *Kamena* (Warsaw), No. 12, 1968.
[5] *Kultura* (Warsaw), No. 12, 1968.

A meeting addressed by party chief Władysław Gomulka on March 19, 1968, in the Congress Hall of Warsaw's Palace of Culture and Science, discusses the causes of the recent student demonstrations in Poland; the banner on the balcony reads: "Down with the agents of imperialism—with reactionary Zionism!"

—Eastfoto.

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only incidentally in the demonstrations, then the question that followed logically was who really took part in them. The specialized party sections quickly found an answer to this question. "The vast majority," reported *Żołnierz Wolności* on March 12, 1968, "consists of the hooligan element, those without permanent employment, many newcomers from outside Warsaw." Ryszard Niedzwiecki, the head of one of the Warsaw propaganda centers, went into more detail. Addressing a party meeting, he stated: "We arrested many very young people, 11, 12 or 13 years old, who had come at the summons of the students—certain students, schoolchildren, often from outside of Warsaw, and long-haired hooligans, these are the people that the student-reformers turned to for help."[6]

Thus, according to the party analysis of the events: (1) the actual participants of the demonstrations of March 1968 were 11-, 12-, and 13-year-old children "often from outside of Warsaw," "long-haired hooligans," and "those without permanent employment," and (2) the student demonstrations in Warsaw were in no way connected with young people or even with inhabitants of Warsaw. Furthermore, the party analysis maintained that it was not the militia or the communist paramilitary squads that attacked the demonstrators, but, on the contrary, the demonstrators that attacked the militia and the squads. "Forces hostile to socialism," announced Władysław Gomułka, first secretary of the party, "encouraged encounters in the street and the spilling of blood."[7] The already mentioned Niedzwiecki, head of the Propaganda Center of the Wola District Regional Committee in Warsaw, was able to fill out this sparse statement with a dramatic description. "At 4:30 in the afternoon," he stated, "a gang of about 600 hooligans attacked us. We were forced to use our batons. We dispersed the hooligans several times. They threw bottles and stones. Twenty of the workers, who had come at the request of the party, had to be taken to the hospital."[8]

As the events of 1968 show, political authorities in East European states create their own reality in a socialist system that is internally arranged so as to adhere to the logic of the communist doctrine which justifies the party's dictatorship. They are aided in their efforts by communist propaganda whose surreal nature is generally accepted as an inevitable consequence of having an information policy that is determined by what the leadership needs and demands in terms of legitimizing its power. Thus, on March 19, 1968, when Gomułka said: "We pay tribute to the Polish working class, to the millions of people who stood by the party and at a thousand meetings declared their support for its position," he was reinforcing the fiction contained in the first thesis concerning the communist party, i.e., that the party has a proletarian class character. "The attitude of the factory work forces," asserted Gomułka, "was the principal power that barred the way to the disturbers of the peace and put a stop to irresponsible activity."[9] Hence, in the final analysis, it was not the batons of the militia that "barred the way" to the student protests, but "the attitude of the factory work forces," who "put a stop to irresponsible activity."

Irresponsible activity? Exactly! For if the communist elite represents the interests of the whole of society—which is clearly articulated in the second thesis—then any questioning of policies instituted by the party must necessarily be ruinous and irresponsible. Nor can there exist, on the basis of the third thesis, any other social force authorized to wield power, for it is impossible even to conceive of a sensible political program that differs from that of the party. "During the student demonstrations," announced the official government propaganda in 1968, "among the many slogans, proposals, and words of abuse there was not, for there could not have been, any sensible alternative to Władysław Gomułka's policies, the policies of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). This single fact eloquently bears witness to the rashness and anarchistic nature of those responsible for the events. This single fact shows them to be desperadoes who, for their own personal interests, in order to gain power, are prepared to sacrifice the interests of the Polish people."[10]

According to the media, Poland's socialist society did not, however, allow itself to be misled, but acted as a conscious society which understands its own interests—in other words, as the society described in thesis four. As the party newspaper reported: "Workers, academics, engineers, young people and workers in the arts are rising together with the entire party against those who hinder peaceful and constructive work. They demand that the enemies of socialism—Zionists and revisionists—be removed completely from political life."[11]

The Role of Political Ritual

In light of communist ideology, the socialist system seems to be a *societas perfecta*, the first society in history based on rational and ethical principles. This picture of socialism combined with the negative presentation of capitalism as an irrational and unethical system clearly

[6] *Trybuna Ludu*, Mar. 14, 1968.
[7] Ibid., Mar. 20, 1968.
[8] Ibid., Mar. 14, 1968.
[9] *Trybuna Ludu*, Mar. 20, 1968.
[10] *Życie Warszawy* (Warsaw), Mar. 21, 1968.
[11] *Trybuna Ludu*, Mar. 16 and 26, 1968.

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leads to accepting communist political institutions as *sacrum*. For if a society becomes a *societas perfecta*, then naturally there is not, and cannot be, any alternative to the institutions existing in it, and any change in this system must inevitably be for the worse since, logically speaking, something perfect cannot be improved. *Sacrum* can only be altered by *profanus*—someone who, at best, is not initiated into communist gnosis (someone "naive," "led astray," "deceived"), or worse, someone who is dishonorable, evil, and degenerate ("hooligans," "agents," "enemies of the system"). Thus, the simple distinction between *sacrum* and *profanum* illuminates the basic structure of communist thinking: the party monopoly of power is *sacrum*, the questioning of that monopoly *profanum*, and those responsible for that questioning (be it the students in 1968, the workers of Płock, Radom and Ursus in 1976, and more recently the Solidarity union) are *profanus*.

The *sacrum* vs. *profanum* formula not only explains the logic behind the ideological categorization of the world that is typical of communist doctrine, but it also demonstrates the structure of the political ritual set in motion by a crisis situation.[12] This ritual comprises two fundamental elements: paying of homage and demonstrating hostility—in other words, the affirmation of *sacrum* and the negation of *profanum*. Let us examine the role of this ritual during the events of 1968.

The main significance of the March 1968 demonstrations in Poland is the fact that they actually took place. After all, in a certain sense, they constituted a threat to both socialism and the legitimacy of the political authorities in Poland. What was threatening to the totalitarian communist leadership was not the fact that the students demanded something, but that they had clearly rejected decisions that should have been regarded as final and unquestionable. Demanding something of the party or, even worse, doubting the rightness of party policies is tantamount to questioning the party's monopoly on power and constitutes an open attack on the basic principles of the socialist constitution. But more than just infringing on the communist elite's exclusive right of decision-making, the student demonstrations also destroyed the carefully nurtured fiction that society accepts this right enthusiastically and unanimously. In doing so, they gravely threatened the ideological legitimacy of Gomułka's government. It is not surprising, therefore, that official Polish propaganda maintained that the students' actions in 1968 represented "an attempt to overthrow" and "an attack on socialism and on the People's Poland."[13]

In an effort to restore the ideological myth that the party's monopoly on power was rational and met with the approval of society, and to prove that, despite what had happened, the policies of Gomułka's government enjoyed unconditional mass support, the communist elite launched a campaign of hostility against the protesters aimed at picturing them as marginal and sick elements (at negating *profanus)*. After all, in a system where the communist party claims to represent the interests of the whole of society and to have, therefore, the exclusive right to make political decisions, no other group (e.g., students) can be allowed to appear as a legitimate representative of its own interests or those of some other part of society. Therefore, the official propaganda maintained that participants in the 1968 demonstrations were troublemakers, teenagers, parasites, "long-haired hooligans," and in general that part of the student body that was "deceived and led astray by anti-Socialist forces."[14] Clearly the message sent by the authorities was that such elements could not possibly represent the interests of the Polish youth or those of any other part of society and, therefore, they did not deserve to have any voice or power.

Labelling those who opposed the policies of the government as social marginals not only served to validate the party's monopoly on power, but to justify the authorities' use of force and administrative harassment against the protesters. The party could not have sent militia units and armed squads against the students if it was generally seen that the students were exercising their constitutional right of freedom of assembly. However, the most drastic means could be used against them if they were seen as "encouraging bloodshed" and "allying themselves with the enemies of the fatherland" in order to "achieve aims harmful to the building of a better future."

A further means by which the communist leadership hoped to reestablish the credibility of the party's monopoly on power and to demonstrate that that monopoly had the approval of society was through centrally controlled meetings and demonstrations in support of the party, duplicated according to a set pattern, and staged in various cities and towns. For almost three weeks, these demonstrations took place and were given coverage in the various morning and evening editions of the press, and on radio and television newscasts, which cited the names of towns and institutions (factories, agricultural concerns, hospitals, schools, army units, and

[12]This opposition, referring to gnostic intuitions, differs to a considerable degree from the similar dichotomy that occurs in the works of Emile Durkheim or Mircea Eliade. *Sacrum* here refers to that which is sacred, that is perfect; *profanum* to that which is evil, which is impure. See, E. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. London, Allen & Unwin, 1915; M. Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*. New York, Sheed & Ward, 1958; M. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*. New York, Harper and Row, 1959.

[13]*Trybuna Ludu*, Mar. 16 and 26, 1968.

[14]Ibid., Mar. 20, 1968.

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Workers at an automobile factory in Warsaw hold a meeting on March 11, 1968, to protest student demonstrations at Warsaw University; the signs read "Work, Study, Peacefulness," "Peacefulness for Warsaw," "Students to Their Studies."

—Eastfoto.

cultural institutions) where these "spontaneous" demonstrations of solidarity with the party had occurred; quoted the speeches made there, the slogans used, and the similar resolutions adopted; and in general spoke of the "exalted," and "intense atmosphere," and the tens of thousands of people present at each particular meeting.

The essential structure of these ritual demonstrations, codified by the leadership, was clearly founded on the simple formula of *sacrum* vs. *profanum*. Once hostility had been demonstrated toward the protestors a process was set into motion designed to demonstrate homage or affirmation of the *sacrum*. Let us examine this process of affirmation more closely.

The party newspaper, *Trybuna Ludu*, reporting on a party meeting on March 19, 1968, which was attended by Gomułka, described the scene as follows:

Long before the appointed time of meeting, the Congress Hall was packed full. From the loudspeakers there came the sound of revolutionary songs and recordings of the poetry of Mickiewicz, Broniewski, and Mayakovski. On the podium, against a background of red and red-and-white flags, the standards of the Warsaw Committee and the District Committees of the Polish Workers' Party and the Warsaw organizations of the Union of Socialist Youth. A lengthy storm of applause greets comrade Gomułka and members of the leadership of the Polish Workers' Party, the United Peasants' Party and the Democratic Party as they enter the hall. The delegates stand in their place and for a few minutes shout "Wiesław, Wiesław."[15] *The traditional "hundred years"*

[15]During the Nazi occupation of Poland, Gomułka was active in the communist underground movement and used the pseudonym "Wiesław."

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(sto lat) is heard. Overhead are hung huge banners: "Long live Comrade Gomułka," "We honor the 5th Congress of the PZPR with a productive act," "We believe in you, Wiesław," "For Poland, for Gomułka." Once more a heated ovation rings out in tribute to the party, to People's Poland, to comrade Wiesław. Comrade Wiesław Gomułka steps onto the rostrum and gives a speech lasting more than two hours. The delegates listen with great attention to the words of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of PZPR, which have been eagerly awaited both by members of the party and by society as a whole. Comrade Gomułka's words, received with heated applause, are time and again accompanied with stormy clapping. Shouts frequently ring out: "Long live the party," "Long live the working class," "Long live Polish-Soviet friendship," "Down with Zionism, the agent of imperialism," "Down with bigotry and reaction," "The working people support the policies of the party," "Long live youth."[16]

To see how codified this communist political ritual is, one may compare this report with the description of a similar meeting held eight years later and attended by Edward Gierek, then first secretary of the party:

In the hall, an exalted, strained atmosphere. Over the committee table, at which there are sitting the leading representatives of all professional and social milieux and of the key places of work in the Katowice voivodeship, the white eagle on a red background. Next to it a banner reading: "With the people for the people," a synthesis of the party's principle and its method of operation. Those gathered greet the party and state leaders with enthusiastic and lengthy applause. Everyone stands and togther sings the Polish national anthem. In the great hall there is applause in tribute to the party, to the party leaders, and to the state. Shouts are heard: "Long live comrade Gierek!" Again everyone rises to their feet. Amid the roars of applause the ceiling echoes with repeated chants: "Gie-rek, Gie-rek, Gie-rek!" The last words of comrade Gierek's speech bring renewed applause. Those present chant: "Party-Gierek, Party-Gierek." At the end of the meeting applause again breaks out. Everyone sings the "International." Above the heads of those present is a forest of hands raised with clenched fists—the old, symbolic gesture of proletarian solidarity and struggle.[17]

As clearly evidenced above, a political crisis in a socialist system automatically sets into motion an ideological interpretation of reality based on the *sacrum-profanum* dichotomy, on a ritual negation of *profanum* and ritual affirmation of *sacrum*. The aim of the former is to prove the rationality of the party monopoly of power; the latter, to enhance its social mandate. This process can best be illustrated with the help of a diagram (see Figure 1).

As shown in the diagram, if one focuses on a specifically defined sphere of power and anti-power, the structure of communist political ritual mirrors considerably the structure of communist ideology (point c). Thanks to this isomorphic quality, political ritual is able to summon into existence a makeshift reality that is consistent with the ideological image of the world (point d), and through this to legitimize the entire social system (point e), including that part of it which is constituted by the current ruling elite (point a). It thus allows each government to be associated once again with the sphere of *sacrum* (point b).

For example, in October 1956, toward the end of the lengthy political crisis that brought him to power, Gomułka criticized the Stalinist system in these terms:

The cult of personality cannot be restricted only to the person of Stalin. The cult of personality is a certain system which held sway in the Soviet Union and which spread, I dare say, to all communist parties and countries in the socialist camp, including Poland. The essence of this system depended on the creation of a hierarchical scale of cults. Each of these cults had a given area in which to function. In the socialist bloc, at the head of this hierarchical scale stood Stalin. Not only did the other leaders of the Soviet Communist Party and the leaders of the Soviet Union bow down before him, but so did the leaders of the communist parties and the workers' states of the socialist camp. The latter, that is the first secretaries of the central committees of the separate countries, took their place in the second rank of the scale of the cult of personality and were also clad in the lordly robes of infallibility and wisdom. Their cult, however, radiated only throughout their own countries, where each stood at the top of the national scale of cults. And thus, in each country, the scale of cults extended from top to bottom.[18]

Gomułka, who shortly after this speech stood "at the top of the national scale of cults," portrayed as degeneration what in fact is the quintessence of socialism: the sanctification of power, which is, on the one hand, the inevitable consequence of the party's absolute control over production, policy, ideology, and information, and on the other hand, an indispensable functional require-

[16] *Trybuna Ludu*, Mar. 20, 1968.
[17] Ibid., July 3–4, 1976.
[18] Ibid., Oct. 22, 1956.

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Figure 1



ment. The party's monopoly on power can only be maintained in the long run by a religious or quasi-religious form of legitimation.

Ritualization of Political Behavior

Communist social doctrine calls for the founding of a classless system and is also based on the formula *sacrum* vs. *profanum*. It radically criticizes capitalism, contrasting it with socialism, a system credited with providing society with justice, equality, and general well-being. The *sacrum-profanum* dichotomy is also found in communism's extreme, uncompromising opposition of *that which is* with *that which ought to be*. This opposition has produced a political program justifying a revolutionary movement aimed at the annihilation of the capitalist system. Only the vision of a future *societas perfecta* can act, according to the law of contrasts, as a motivating force capable of radicalizing the masses; only it can validate the limitless terror and coercion that the "proletarian revolution" carries with it.

Despite the undeniable attractiveness it has had from the very beginning, communist social doctrine has suffered from a serious setback, namely, that it originated as a utopian ethical construction. However, this ethical ideal was presented as objective analysis of the trend of history, as not just "socialism" but "scientific socialism."[19] It did not take long before this mystification became evident. Nor did it take long for it to become evident that nationalization of the means of production and seizure of power by revolutionaries prepared to use any means to achieve these ends meant neither the permanent eradication of evil, nor even the political realization of socialist values. On the contrary, it soon became clear that the communist regimes established one after the other were a negation of socialist ideals to a much greater extent than democratic capitalist states; that instead of the promised freedom, equality, and well-being, the

[19]For example, Friedrich Engels entitled his 1880 brochure: *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*.

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totalitarian institutions formed were bringing subjugation on a scale unknown in the contemporary world together with drastic social inequality and bureaucratic exploitation. The theoretical *societas perfecta* was coming into being empirically as its own opposite, as a *societas mala*.

Since political power in communist countries is legitimized only by ideology, the ruling elites of these countries, despite the obvious failures to achieve the goals of the revolution, are obliged to maintain that the ideals of socialism have an institutional character and institutional guarantees. In other words, to justify their rule, the communist leaders have had to present fiction as if it were reality, and where there is even a lack of fiction, have had to create some in order to present it subsequently as fact. Thus, in 1968, the party organized a series of meetings, marches, and demonstrations throughout Poland, first, in order to artificially summon into being a reality consistent with ideology; second, to portray this makeshift reality, through the mass media, as real; and finally, with the aid of an ably administered dose of terror, to force people to treat the ideological order as the real order.

Taking this into consideration, one can argue that the East European communist system has an internal contradiction: ideologically, it is a *societas perfecta*, while empirically, it is a *societas mala*—in other words a highly class-bound totalitarian system. Because there exists an unbridgable chasm between what actually constitutes the everyday life of millions of people and what is presented by official propaganda, the principal function of communist political ritual depends on the meciation, linking, and reconciliation of these two opposing spheres through the "building" of a makeshift reality. This "reality" can only exist as long as the ritual behavior that creates it continues to be played out. The necessity of mediation between the spheres of fiction and empirical reality leads to a further ritualization of the communist system.

Moreover, it is possible to argue that the all-embracing ritualization of political behavior becomes the only way by which the communist system can exist. That is because: (1) the codified political ritual enables the individual members of society to pass smoothly and undisturbed from genuine reality, comprising the area of the empirical life of individuals, to the ideological reality presented to them in the sphere of public life; (2) the ideological legitimation of power, if deprived of ritual, inevitably loses its credibility, for the only reality in which communist ideology is fulfilled is the makeshift reality that appears and is perpetuated in acts of codified ritual. For this reason, too, the immutable foundation of East European socialist systems remains a legal-doctrinal exclusion of any kind of political opposition from official life. Any political opposition that agrees freely to operate within the sphere of constitutional law, in other words, to recognize the exclusive right of the communist elite to represent society, agrees also to treat fiction as reality and, in consequence, ceases to be an opposition, and begins to function as an appendage of the party. Any opposition that wishes to act as a true opposition and therefore refuses to take part in political ritual, places itself beyond the sphere of public life. Thus, a collective subject that refuses to participate in political ritual (e.g., the students in 1968 or the Solidarity union in 1980–81), automatically creates a mortal threat to the communist system, which, according to its ideology, exists as pure ritual. A collective subject that rejects that ritual, at the same time rejects socialism, and becomes *nolens volens* an enemy of the system, and thus the object of legitimized terror; in other words, it ceases to exist as political opposition.

Clearly, communist rule is an ideological rule *par excellence*. It cannot be justified by other means than by the normative-descriptive image of the world that is proclaimed by the party and that is peculiar to the party.

Political Ritual As Rite of Passage

The gnostic discontinuity in the conception of reality that exists in communist systems—a discontinuity which is described here by the dichotomy *sacrum* vs. *profanum*—explains the removal of any political opposition beyond the pale of the communist system; it explains the party authorities' deep links with ideological symbols, songs, banners, poetry, flags, slogans, marches, meetings, etc., for they represent the only socialist reality in communist states; and it also explains how the constitutional system of these states prevails over the political breakdowns that occur cyclically.

In 1976, there occurred the fourth major political crisis in Poland's postwar history. On June 24, the Sejm passed a bill authorizing considerable price rises, both for foodstuffs and industrial products. The following day, the workers of three towns, Radom, Ursus, and Płock took to the streets to protest this decision. As is usual in such cases, the "workers' power" sent militia units against the "disturbers of the peace," while at hundreds of meetings and rallies over the following weeks the "true working class" demonstrated its "unconditional support" for the economic policies of the party and of its first secretary, Edward Gierek.

Just as in March 1968, so too in 1976, a collective subject that dared to infringe the party's monopoly of power was ideologically labelled socially marginal, in other

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

First Secretary Władysław Gomułka opens the 5th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party on November 11, 1968, in the symbolic presence of Lenin.

—Pictorial Parade.

words as *profanus*. Those protesting against Gierek's policies, according to the version presented by official propaganda, were "hostile elements and panic-mongers," "trouble-makers and hooligans," "irresponsible people, devoid of feelings of national awareness and patriotism," and generally "parasitic, criminal, and anti-socialist elements." At the same time, the necessity of using force against the demonstrators was justified by Gierek's propaganda in exactly the same way as it had been by Gomułka. "We ask," wrote the employees of the Academy of Medicine in Lublin in an open letter to the authorities, "that the arm of justice should reach those who dared to turn against the people's democratic power."[20] A resolution adopted at a meeting in Radom read: "We offer our full support to comrade Edward Gierek for his limitless devotion to the affairs of the people, for his profound patriotism, for the distinction with which he represents the interests of Poland, for the democratic way he governs the country, and for the sincere bond of confidence he has forged with the people."[21]

The common denominator between the events of 1968 and 1976 was the fact that, due to their limited scale, both the student group in the 1968 demonstrations and the workers of the three small towns involved in the 1976 protests could be controlled relatively easily by tactics combining terror and ritual meetings. By contrast, the situation in Poland in 1956 and 1970 looked quite different. Social discontent had spread so widely that the functioning of the entire country was seriously impaired. In these cases the party employed a different plan to overcome the crisis. First, it recognized the social protests as proper and justified and the policies of the leadership as presumptuous and erroneous; thus, in 1956, Gomułka condemned his predecessor Edward Ochab and, in 1970, Gierek tore Gomułka's leadership to shreds. Second, each new ruling elite presented the previous leadership's interpretation of the existing crisis as false. Thus, in 1956 Gomułka, who had risen to power as a result of social protest, had this to say about earlier propaganda: "The ineffectual attempt to present the painful tragedy of Poznan as the work of imperialist agents and provocateurs was an example of great political naivety."[22] Third, as a rule, once the new leadership assumed power as a result of a crisis situation, it invariably asserted that the mass social protests were directed only at the previous leadership, not against the party as such or against the existing institutions of the system. "The workers of Poznan," maintained Gomułka in October 1956, "were not protesting against socialism when they took to the streets of their city. They were protesting against the evil which had spread in our social system and which affected them painfully; they were protesting against distortion of the principles of the socialism that is their ideal."[23] The argument that the Polish workers had not acted against socialism but against "a distortion of socialism," and that it was high time to return to "Leninist norms of party life," was stated again by Gierek in 1970 when Gomułka was toppled, and in 1981 by Jaruzelski as well when he gained power.

The two methods of overcoming a political crisis illustrated above fit in with Arnold van Gennep's concept of "the rites of passage." Gennep wrote that situations of emergency or crisis set in motion codified ceremonial patterns of behavior, the function of which is to lead individuals or groups back to a state of affairs as defined by routine. He divided these patterns of behavior into three categories: the rite of separation, the rite of transition, and the rite of incorporation. He stressed that the three are not developed to an equal extent in all ceremonial patterns. Thus, the rite of separation is dominant in funeral ceremonies, whereas the rite of incorporation prevails in weddings. The transition rite, in turn, constitutes the most important element in the case of betrothal, although it may be reduced to a minimum, as occurs at a

[20]Ibid., June 28, 1976.
[21]Ibid., Aug. 1, 1976.
[22]Ibid., Oct. 22, 1956.
[23]Ibid., Oct. 22, 1956.

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second marriage.[24] In analyzing the reactions of the party apparatus to the events of 1968 and 1976 and to the mass protests of 1956 and 1970, it can be easily shown that they constituted two different versions of the rites of passage. In the first case, this rite assumed the simplest character possible and resolved itself entirely into a rite of separation. In the second, it comprised two components of equal weight, a rite of separation and a rite of incorporation, or to use Erich Neumann's terminology, a "from" phase and a "to" phase.[25]

In 1968 and 1976, the entire effort of the authorities and the whole strategy for overcoming the crisis involved the censure of those responsible for the anti-government protests, the symbolic exclusion of them from society, and their removal beyond the pale of that society. This characteristic rite of separation, on the one hand, made possible the preservation of the fiction that the party represents the whole of society, and, on the other hand, legitimized the state terror employed against the protesters.

The general political crises of 1956 and 1970 set in motion a different, more complex scenario. The workers' protests in these years were on too large a scale to be neutralized by the acts of a rite of separation. In these situations, the higher party apparatus removed one ruling elite and replaced it with another. What the previous leadership had treated as "the work of agents" (1956) or as "hooligan-like excesses" (1970), the new elite saw unhesitantly as "society's legitimate dissent" and blamed all ills on the previous ruling group.

The ritual actions of the new elite fall into two categories: acts of condemnation directed at the previous leadership, and acts of self-affirmation. The first, comprising a rite of separation, lead to a symbolic dissociation of the authorities from the political system as a whole; the second, constituting a rite of incorporation, to its reincarnation. In the rite of separation, the new leadership presents the previous ruling elite as being alienated from the political system, as a segment that was transgressing the principles of internal party democracy and distorting the ideals of socialism. In the rite of incorporation, on the other hand, it presents itself as an integral component of that system, as an emanation of the will of the party and the guarantor of socialist values. This allows it: (1) to maintain an ideological vision of the socialist system as the political system of the *societas perfecta*; (2) to acquire (at least temporarily) the necessary social support for overcoming the crisis; and, (3) to preserve intact all principal political institutions.

The significance of the rite of separation and the rite of incorporation in masking the continuity in power cannot be overestimated. Let us take as an example the strikes on the Baltic coast in December 1970, which resulted in the deaths of several hundred workers who were shot by the army and the police. As a consequence of these events, the then first secretary of the party, Gomułka, fell from power. The Central Committee supposedly appointed a "new" party leadership, headed by Edward Gierek; but Gierek had been a close associate of Gomułka for over 14 years, and the majority of pre-December 1970 Politburo members kept their seats after the "change" in leadership.

1980 saw the fifth and by far the most serious political crisis in postwar Poland. It led to the appearance of "Solidarity," a 10-million-strong workers' organization independent of the government. In reaction to the August strikes, the higher party apparatus brought about the downfall of Gierek's leadership, just as it had removed Ochab's coterie in 1956 and Gomułka's in 1970. However, the rite of passage which set this last crisis into motion was, in view of the exceptional nature of the situation, different from the analogous rites of 1956 or 1970.

In August, for the first time, the party met with an organized opposition representing millions of people demanding fundamental political changes. In this situation an official condemnation of Gierek's government could not have the same effect on society as similar rites of separation had had in 1956 or 1970. An ineffectual rite of separation, in turn, could not act as a point of departure for a rite of incorporation, an essential element in overcoming the crisis of power. Hence, in latest crisis, the transition rite became the fundamental element of the rite of passage. It lasted more than 10 months—from the overthrow of Gierek at the 7th Plenum of the party on September 5, 1980, to the 9th Party Congress on July 14–21, 1981. During this period, public discussions about the causes of the August protests continued, but above all, there began the process of the so-called reform of the party and the purging of "ideologically alien members." The end of the transition rite and the beginning of the rite of incorporation was marked by the 9th Congress, at which "democratically" elected delegates approved "in a democratic fashion" the party leadership, which had already been appointed previously.

At that moment, the rite of passage had entered its final stage. Several months later, in December 1981, the party leadership, incorporated symbolically into the political system of the *societas perfecta* and institutionally reintegrated with it, would declare martial law in the country, and would fill its prisons and detention camps with "Solidarity" members.

[24]See: A. van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977, pp. 10–11.

[25]See: E. Neumann," On the Psychological Meaning of Ritual," in *Eranos Jahrbüch* (Zurich), Vol. 19, 1950.

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East-West Relations and Eastern Europe

(An American-Soviet Dialogue)

* * *

An unusual if not unprecedented conference took place in Alexandria, Virginia, on July 6-8, 1988: a group of American and Soviet specialists discussed the role of Eastern Europe in the evolution of East-West relations. The title and subject of the conference was "The Place and Role of Eastern Europe in the Relaxation of Tensions between the USA and the USSR."

The conference was sponsored by the US-USSR Commission on the Humanities and Social Sciences of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. It was organized by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). Substantive direction was assigned to the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System (Moscow) and to Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change (New York). The Soviet delegation was led by Academician Oleg T. Bogomolov, Director of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System. The American delegation was headed by Charles Gati, Professor of Political Science at Union College and Senior Research Fellow at Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change.

In addition to Dr. Bogomolov, the Soviet delegation included Dr. Leonid S. Yagodovsky, Dr. Vyacheslav I. Dashichev, Dr. Aleksandr D. Nekipelov, Dr. Liliya F. Shevtsova, Dr. Stanislav I. Simanovsky, Dr. Ruslan S. Grinberg, Dr. Andrey Y. Lipsky, and Dr. Elena D. Volkova. With the exception of Dr. Volkova of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (Moscow), the Soviet delegation was made up of specialists on the politics and economics of Eastern Europe and on East-West relations from Dr. Bogomolov's institute.

The American delegation consisted of Professor Seweryn Bialer (Columbia University), Dr. James F. Brown (RAND Corporation), Dr. John C. Campbell (Council on Foreign Relations, Emeritus), Professor Gati, Professor William E. Griffith (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Professor Andrzej Korbonski (University of California Los Angeles), Professor Ronald H. Linden (University of Pittsburgh), Ambassador William E. Luers (New York Metropolitan Museum of Art), Professor Paul Marer (Indiana University), Ambassador Mark Palmer (US Department of State, participating in a private capacity), Professor Angela Stent (Georgetown University), and Professor Sarah M. Terry (Tufts University).

By prior agreement, two papers were presented for discussion at the conference, both on "The Place and Role of Eastern Europe in the Relaxation of Tensions between the USA and the USSR." The American paper was written by James F. Brown, while the Soviet paper—drafted primarily by Dr. Dashichev—was a collective effort. Two of the five panel discussions focused on the papers themselves. The third panel, entitled "The Role of Intra-European Trade in Strengthening European Security," began with brief presentations by Professor Marer and Dr. Bogomolov. The fourth panel dealt with "US Policy Goals toward Eastern Europe," with Dr. Volkova starting the discussion, while the fifth panel, entitled "Soviet Policy Goals toward Eastern Europe," began with a presentation by Professor Bialer.

The conference, which was off the record, was held in an atmosphere of mutual concern about the potential effect of East European developments on East-West relations. It was completely free of recriminations. There were areas of agreement and disagreement, the latter mainly between members of the two delegations, but disagreements among members of each delegation also were voiced.

Following a special luncheon address by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski on July 7, 1988, to which the Soviet and American press corps in Washington was invited, there was a brief question-and-answer period. Reporting on what was said, The Washington Times *(July 8, 1988) quoted Dr. Bogomolov as follows: "Everyone has to follow very strictly the principles of sovereignty, non-interference and mutual respect. The Brezhnev Doctrine is completely unacceptable and unthinkable. . . . We gave too much advice before to our partners, and it was actually very damaging to them. It's time to keep our*

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advice to ourselves. We cannot take responsibility for all of Stalin's mistakes, [but] we are responsible to change our performance now."

In the Los Angeles Times *(July 10, 1988), Robert C. Toth reported: "The Soviet delegates did not dispute the American view that Stalin imposed communist hegemony on East Europe in the postwar period. . . . [But] they adamantly refused to take the next logical step. They refused to admit that the legitimacy of those communist regimes in East Europe is in question if those governments were not freely chosen by the people. This issue produced the most heated argument between US and Soviet delegates to the conference."*

The two papers, together with the text of Dr. Brzezinski's address, were prepared for publication by the Editors of Problems of Communism. *By agreement with Dr. Bogomolov, Charles Gati reviewed and cleared the Soviet text for publication. It is expected that the two conference papers will be published in the Russian language in the Soviet Union.*

The next conference is scheduled to be held in the Soviet Union in July 1989. The specific agenda for that meeting has not yet been determined.

— *Charles Gati*

* * *

. . . A Western Overview

J. F. Brown

IT IS as well to begin with a truism, a truism whose relevance is easily neglected in general discussions. "Eastern Europe" may be a convenient enough expression, but in all senses except perhaps the geographical it is without meaning. Worse still, it can convey a very misleading impression: that of a monolithic entity. Eastern Europe is, of course, nothing of the sort. It contains over 120 million people, grouped into over 20 nations and incorporated into eight states.[1] And however similar the governing systems of these states may appear—both to each other and to that of the Soviet Union—the historical distinctiveness of each of these states has strongly affected the workings of those systems. So much so, that what is salient about Eastern Europe today is not its uniformity but its diversity. Rather than national differences being eroded by the socialist system, it is the socialist system that has been shaped, adapted, and diluted by national differences.

Factors Affecting Eastern Europe

The factors most affecting developments in Eastern Europe can be grouped under three headings:

1. Internal factors originating in and directly relating to the East European countries themselves.
2. Soviet policy, that is, the Soviet ability and will to influence (even to determine) East European developments and to react to (or against) them.
3. The status of international relations, particularly East-West relations, and their political, economic, cultural, and psychological impact at any particular time on both ruling elites and societies in Eastern Europe. American-Soviet relations are the most crucial in this regard since they can determine the status of East-West relations as a whole.

These factors are never compartmentalized; they are interacting. Nor, obviously, are they of equal importance at all times. Generally, the interaction of the internal and the Soviet factors has determined the course of developments in Eastern Europe in the past. But, more recently, the international factor has increased in importance and will probably continue to do so, without, however, ever attaining the importance of the other two factors.

[1]They are the "Warsaw Pact Six" (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) plus Yugoslavia and Albania. My remarks concentrate on "the Six."

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The Prospects for Change

Today it would seem that the interaction of these three factors could result in the most significant and comprehensive change in the politics and the economies of the East European countries since the second half of the 1940's for a number of reasons, and especially the following:

1. The crisis in most East European countries and the pressure for reform from many members of the ruling elites, as well as from articulate sections of society.
2. The emergence of a reformist leadership in the Soviet Union itself.
3. The probability of a marked improvement in East-West relations, promoting international relaxation and confidence.

The East European Crisis

Opinions may differ on how profound the crisis is in Eastern Europe. In this context, the dangers of generalizations about "Eastern Europe" become particularly apparent. The situation in East Germany, for example, is nowhere near as critical as that in Romania; in fact, many would argue (particularly the Honecker leadership) that the East German situation is relatively satisfactory. Nor, for example, is the consumer supply situation in Hungary nearly as bad as that in Poland. But, allowing for obvious and significant variations, few would deny the validity of the term "crisis" as applied to most parts of Eastern Europe and to most aspects of East European public life.

What is unprecedented about the present crisis is that it seems to have gone beyond the economic and/or the political dimension and to have seriously eroded some of the fundamental assumptions on which socialist rule has been based. One of these assumptions (perhaps the most fundamental of all) was that the "socialist system" should and could provide its citizens with the basic material essentials of life. These included adequate income, purchasing power, housing, consumer supplies, social welfare amenities, professional mobility, job security, and education. These were among the "human rights" associated with the socialist system. The overt assumption was that the socialist system was uniquely fitted to grant and protect these rights; the covert assumption was that if it did, then a large majority of citizens would be content with them and tolerate the curtailment of some of those personal and political freedoms which in the West are often considered to be the sum total of "human rights."

This, therefore, was the system's unspoken and unwritten "social contract." Despite the occasional, spectacular, upheavals in East European history over the last 40 years, this "social contract" has, with Soviet power as its ultimate guarantor, helped to create a considerable degree of social and political stability. But now the system's ability to ensure these "human rights," to fulfill its "side of the bargain" in the "social contract," is very much open to question. Therefore this last "thin red line" of legitimacy seems to be breached in many places. In several East European countries the economic situation has so deteriorated that living standards are steadily falling. Neither full employment nor stable prices can be guaranteed any longer. In fact, it is "untouchables" like these that must be jettisoned if the economy is to be saved. Professional mobility, once an important safety valve for worker discontent, has been slowing down for at least a decade. Finally, the whole welfare system in several countries is in a state of acute disrepair, with several parts of it threatening to collapse.

Such a situation could soon become intolerable. It could involve societal discontent and subsequent governmental repression on a scale unprecedented since Stalin. The "progression of governance" that has applied so far in Eastern Europe—from control, to stability, and then on toward legitimacy—could be checked and even reversed. In the type of situation envisaged above, the attainment of legitimacy would be indefinitely postponed. The maintenance of stability would become the exclusive and imperative necessity.

Reform in Eastern Europe

It is this fearful prospect that has made reform the paramount concern in most East European countries. The most pressing and immediate aspect of the current crisis is, of course, economic, and in several countries economic reform measures are already being implemented. The various aspects of economic reform in socialist states are by now so familiar that they need not be enumerated here. Hungary is leading the field in terms of the depth and comprehensiveness of its reform program. Bulgaria in the course of 1987 announced several spectacular proposals that probably need further consideration and refinement. Poland, too, seems prepared to initiate an ambitious program. Even Czechoslovakia has enacted some important, if limited measures. Only East Germany and Romania have so far shown no inclination toward economic reform—as distinct from economic reorganization.

Economic reform, therefore, is now firmly on the agenda of most states. But there is also considerable agreement that economic reform alone is no longer enough. Systemic reform, it is argued, should go further and now

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includes some degree of political reform also. Political reform is considered necessary to ensure the following:

1. More public access to information.
2. Fuller discussion of public issues.
3. Greater societal participation in public life.
4. A greater role for citizens in the public decision-making process.

Most reformers, however relatively conservative, would agree on the desirability of these objectives. The differences arise over the means to achieve them. Since political reform (unlike economic reform) is a comparatively new issue in socialist systems, it is worth discussing the various proposals that are being advanced in some detail. Roughly speaking, three main contentions appear to have emerged. They can be classified as conservative, moderate, and radical, and their points of view can be summarized as follows:

Conservative. The existing party and state institutions can ensure the necessary reforms if they are "democratized"; if they interact properly; and, if they are each allocated the type of responsibility for which they are most suited.

Moderate. Some "institutional pluralism" is necessary, involving the devolution of some power and responsibility to autonomous bodies like the legislature, trade unions, national unity organizations, as well as cultural and professional organizations, but under the umbrella of the party and/or the state.

Radical. Institutional pluralism should extend to the establishment of a competitive multi-party system similar to that operating in the West.

Generally speaking, among reformers *inside* the East European political elites, it is the conservative contention that is most favored. Most of the societal critics of the present structure appear to support the moderate contention, although many party members and even officials also support it, notably in Hungary and probably in Poland also. As for the radical proposal of a competitive party system, this is supported openly only on the dissident periphery. It would probably get more support closer to the center of public life, however, were it not considered impractical because of geopolitical constraints. Moreover, though many reformers might ideally favor a more radical solution, they argue that the more moderate solution should probably suffice to smooth the progress of economic reform. Economic reform, they argue, must get top priority and no controversial political proposals should be allowed to deflect attention from it.

The different proposals and proponents of reform in Eastern Europe have their Soviet counterparts also, although some of the more radical proposals have yet to be publicly articulated in the Soviet Union. By the same token, the opponents of reform, even of the most conservative type of reform, are similar in both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They include not only bureaucrats and econocrats fearful for their privileges and positions, but also a very large number of working people in every country who are threatened with both unemployment and inflation, and who also fear—probably wrongly—that many other features of the welfare state would be sacrificed as well on the altar of greater economic efficiency. The opposition to change is formidable enough everywhere, and it could become yet more formidable if bureaucrats and workers were to make opportunistic common cause under a leadership capable of forging their alliance into an effective political instrument.

The Soviet and the International Factors

Assuming that the Gorbachev leadership can overcome the obstacles to reform in the Soviet Union itself, then one can expect they will be overcome in Eastern Europe also. The new Soviet leadership may be quite sincere in its assurances about the East Europeans' freedom to choose, but even if the character of the Soviet-East European relationship were to change radically the force of the Soviet example would continue to be a very powerful internal dynamic in East European affairs. Thus, though there was reform in Eastern Europe prior to Gorbachev, it was the new Soviet leader's militant espousal of it that gave it the decisive spur in Eastern Europe as well as in his own country. Gorbachev may not have made reform mandatory for Eastern Europe's ruling elites, but he has made it "forcefully" modish. Nor has his impact been confined to elites. For a Soviet leader, he has aroused quite extraordinary interest and even enthusiasm among large sections of the populations of all the East European countries, nowhere more so than in East Germany and Romania, whose governments are resisting the calls for change.

Just as the Soviet situation, therefore, seems favorable for change in Eastern Europe, so does the international situation. As already mentioned, the winds seem set fair for a marked improvement in East-West relations. Taken as a whole, the experience of the last 40 years has shown that Eastern Europe has benefited from a friendlier international setting, not only economically, but politically, culturally, and psychologically as well. This was the case in the mid-1950's after Stalin's

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death, in the mid-1960's after the Cuban missile crisis, and during the "decade of détente" in the 1970's. There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization. Some countries certainly benefited less than others and here, once again, it is worth remembering that Eastern Europe is not a gray blanket but a patchwork quilt. But the generalization remains valid; and the relationship between relaxation and reform must thus be more than coincidental. Détente tends to be conducive to greater societal confidence, on the one side, and to greater official flexibility, on the other.

What is to be done?

Neither the West nor the Soviet Union should presume to prescribe what is good for Eastern Europe. That must be left to the East Europeans themselves. But both the West and the Soviet Union, in their capacity as external factors, have the opportunity (and the obligation) to assist the East European states and societies in coping with their difficulties.

The biggest single form of help the West and the Soviet Union can render is something to which they can dedicate themselves jointly: the preservation of peace and the continuance of international relaxation. Beyond this, there are several ways in which they can, acting separately but nevertheless complementarily, help the East Europeans to help themselves. What follows, then, are some tentative suggestions of what the West and the Soviet Union might do—and should not do—in order to help effectively.

Western Role. The West's real opportunity is in providing economic assistance in sufficient volume and, unlike during the 1970's, in a way that makes its proficient use likely. This assistance could include:

1. The liberalization of European Community regulations giving East European exports greater access to West European markets.
2. The liberalization of American tariff regulations, by, inter alia, extending Most Favored Nation status (MFN) to East European countries that request it.
3. The provision of governmental credits and government-guaranteed credits (on the West German model) to East European countries for specific and mutually agreed on projects relating to the economy or the economic infrastructure. For example, credits could be channeled to small private or cooperative enterprises (which are encouraged under the current economic reform measures) to help them generate investment. In this effort the West Europeans (especially the West Germans) could play a more important role than the United States, where the legislative process would seem to present insuperable obstacles to effective action.
4. Encouragement by private institutions, foundations, and so forth, to help repair Eastern Europe's educational and social services. Some form of help is also desperately needed to combat the ecological crisis in Eastern Europe. (Indeed, unless this crisis is tackled effectively, any discussion about Eastern Europe's future will be little else than an academic irrelevance.) Here the American role might be greater than the West European. But the West as a whole could assume one big task: the education and training of East European economic and technical cadres.

Obviously, what the West—or, more correctly, certain Western circles—should not do (or should cease doing) is to regard Eastern Europe's plight in the zero-sum terms of East-West rivalry—as a welcome development weakening international communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular. East Europeans are justifiably suspicious of being treated as the objects of international relations.

Soviet Role. The Soviet Union can help the East European economies by:

1. Ensuring for Eastern Europe adequate supplies of energy and of other raw materials at prices that are not burdensome.
2. Enacting reforms in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) in harmony with the principles of economic reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Ensuring cooperation within CEMA does not preclude expanded economic relations between Eastern Europe and the West.
3. Resisting mounting demands within the Soviet Union itself for a "tougher" Soviet attitude in economic relations with Eastern Europe. However understandable—or even justified—these demands may be, a "tougher" attitude at this time would ruin any chance of Eastern Europe's economic recovery and could lead to serious political and social instability. In the political realm, the Soviet Union should:

1. Unequivocally renounce the "Brezhnev Doctrine."
2. Accept the notion that the system in Eastern Europe can regenerate itself in a variety of ways and that "multiplicity" rather than artificial cohesion can best serve regeneration.
3. Encourage the East European states to cooperate more—economically and even politically—with each other without the constant, and inevitably dominating, participation of the Soviet Union.

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It should be recognized in the West that such changes are genuinely difficult to make for the Soviet Union. It is difficult to renounce the habits of 40 years. But it is precisely the unsatisfactory results of these 40 years that appear to have convinced a growing number of the Soviet elite that viability might be achieved in Eastern Europe, and Soviet interests still safeguarded, if East European national aspirations had more scope for fulfillment. Gorbachev and the group around him might now consider it time for a genuine reappraisal of the Soviet role in Eastern Europe. Such a reappraisal would be greatly assisted by Western restraint and even cooperation.

As for Eastern Europe, it is quite likely that in a situation of change involving greater freedom and "permissiveness" there would be incidents or behavior regarded as highly provocative by the Soviet Union. In the past, reform movements in Eastern Europe have, whatever the original intentions, inescapably taken on an anti-Soviet character. This has mainly been because the system, or at least its guardians, have been seen as impervious to change and the Soviet Union has been seen as stifling national aspirations. Once these widely held perceptions have reason to be eradicated, or even weakened, then reform in Eastern Europe might lose the gravitation that has previously alarmed the Soviet Union.

Finally, the East European nations would surely benefit if they could, without inhibition or restriction, join (or rejoin) the European cultural comity of nations. Gorbachev himself has referred to "our common house, Europe," and the Soviet Union certainly has its place in Europe. But it is only partly European and, like the United States, has interests far beyond the confines of Europe. The East European states are wholly European and should not be barred from it.

* * *

. . . The Soviet Perspective

Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System

THE countries of Eastern Europe constitute an international and political community of states marked by contradictions. Not only are they heterogeneous ethnically and linguistically, and in their levels of cultural, economic, and political development, but they lie within a region that has historically been in the magnetic fields of different major powers. This circumstance has imparted particular features to the policies of the East European countries. Over the centuries, they maneuvered between different power centers and blocs and exerted tremendous influence on the destiny of Europe.

After World War II, the East European countries were united by the path of socialist development. But even socialism was incapable of eliminating the region's historical and new interstate contradictions, especially those regarding territorial and national questions. Thus, the administrative-state model of socialism, established in the majority of East European countries during the 1950's under the influence of the Soviet Union, has not withstood the test of time, thereby showing its socio-political and economic inefficiency. Moreover, the Soviet model erected serious barriers to direct communication among the nations of these states, impeding the intertwining of their political, economic, scientific, and cultural interests. The process of reform and renewal of socialism in East European countries was further hindered for a long time by the stagnation of the Soviet system and the related conceptual inertia and dogmatism of Soviet policy in the 1960's and 1970's. As a result, internal socio-political and economic contradictions accumulated in many countries of Eastern Europe and were not resolved in time. This only aggravated previous interstate controversies and domestic problems.

Today, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe are at a turning point in their development—a turning point characterized by societal understanding of the compelling necessity to change radically the political and economic structures, and to undertake profound reforms in all spheres of public life.

The scope of work to be done is enormous indeed. It ranges from the recovery of an economy distorted by the administrative-command methods of the past, to the democratization of a society emerging with difficulty from the suppression of the Stalinist period, to the im-

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provement of cooperation among socialist countries—a cooperation based on true partnership and mutual respect. Not only present-day problems, but those inherited from the past, must be solved.

The profound socio-political and economic reforms that have been started in a number of East European countries are intended to create radically new conditions for economic, social, and scientific-technological progress, and for the free development of the individual. The aim is to create in these countries a qualitatively new model of socialism that would be truly humane in nature. This would lead to drastic changes in the role of these countries in the all-European process and in the system of East-West relations that, in turn, would substantially enhance their importance and influence on international politics.

The USSR and the East European Socialist Countries

The establishment and development of relations between the Soviet Union and its neighbors in Eastern Europe have been complicated and contradictory. The conditions for good-neighborly relations were, frankly speaking, very unfavorable. As is well known, after World War I, the sponsors of the Versailles Treaty system tried to erect a "cordon sanitaire" around the young Soviet Russian state, and the system's bulwark in Eastern Europe was the Little Entente. The anti-Soviet orientation of the ruling circles of the countries of Eastern Europe in the interwar period caused considerable damage to the security of the Soviet Union. Serious collisions and conflicts also took place among the East European countries over national, territorial, and other issues.

A new situation arose in Europe after World War II as a result of the defeat of the Axis powers and the downfall of the pro-fascist regimes in Eastern Europe, creating favorable conditions for a radical reorganization of relations between the Soviet Union and the East European states on the basis of neighborly and mutually beneficial cooperation. The course of events in Europe had been such that conservative bourgeois circles and the capitalist order were seriously discredited. At the same time, there was the unprecedented rise of a mass movement for social renewal, which had its origins in the context of wartime resistance. These two developments placed revolutionary transformations of the socio-economic system of the East European countries on the agenda. Clearly, the sympathy and support of the Soviet Union were with the mass movement; this led at first to the formation of the people's democracy regime, and then to the victory of the socialist system in the countries of Eastern Europe.

Once socialism moved beyond the borders of one country, the issue of the theoretical and practical foundations on which international relations among socialist countries were to rest became a pressing one. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries faced a number of new and complicated problems which the international workers' movement and Marxist-Leninist theory had not previously encountered. The primary issue was how to align the specific national features and the ensuing political and economic interests of independent sovereign states with the international interests of the community of socialist states as a whole—in other words, how to synchronize the specific interests of individual socialist countries that differed from one another in territorial size; in endowment with natural resources; in national habits, traditions, and historical experience; in the level of development of productive forces, as well as in production relations, social structures, forms of political organization, extent of democratic experience, etc.

In dealing with these problems, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries embarked on an uncharted path in a difficult "cold war" climate marked by military, economic, and propaganda pressures from the West. It is quite understandable that everything did not turn out well immediately. There were illusions that had to be overcome, and mistakes, sometimes grave ones, were made which had serious consequences. For example, great damage was caused by the naive concepts prevailing in the 1950's and 1960's about the noncontradictory and conflictless character both of the socio-political and economic development of socialist states and of relations among them. The theory of "non-conflict" made it impossible to understand the nature and sources of contradictions and crises in the socialist community, and to elaborate mechanisms and procedures for their timely detection, prevention, and elimination. This, in turn, led to incorrect decisions that brought on deformations in the mutual relations of socialist states.

Still greater difficulties and problems arose in applying the principles of equal partnership among socialist states. For objective reasons, the Soviet Union, as the first socialist state in the world, was in a special position relative to other socialist countries. When the Third International was in existence, solidarity with the Soviet Union and acceptance of its leading role in the world communist movement was regarded by communist parties as natural. But even at that time, this view hindered the realization of the principle of independence on the part of working-class parties and prevented the understanding of their role as a national force in their own countries. Moreover, it was inadmissible to extend

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the postulate of the primary role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to relations among socialist states. The urge of the Stalin leadership to do so resulted in a conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (as well as other socialist states) and affected the entire system of links among socialist countries and communist parties. Closely related to this erroneous policy was the practice of thoughtlessly copying and mechanically transferring the Soviet experience to the different social and historic situations of the East European countries.

The period of the 1940's and 1950's, when relations between the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe were being established, was unfortunately marked by many of the above-mentioned mistakes and distortions of the principles of socialism, a process aggravated by the voluntaristic practices and violations of law by Stalin. After his death, a process of eliminating deformations and purging the mutual relations of the socialist countries of unhealthy phenomena commenced. The need to observe strictly the principles of full equality, good will, respect for national sovereignty, and consideration for specific national features was acknowledged. The recognition that different roads of socialist development were rightful was also of great significance.

However, the process of "rejecting evil" initiated after the 20th CPSU Congress was of a contradictory nature. It was influenced by a desire to overcome past inertia, by rigid stereotypes, by a dogmatic incomprehension of change and the new requirements for social development. Moreover, this process was interrupted after 1964, when the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Suslov came to power and the era of stagnant neo-Stalinism began. Even reversion to the past, to Stalinist practices, became noticeable. Major deformations of socialism in East European countries, major mistakes in their internal policies, together with the hegemonic aspirations of the Soviet leadership of that period, were among the main reasons for the deep political crises in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1956, 1970, and 1980. These crises acquired an international dimension and seriously tested military and political stability in Europe. The negative consequences of Stalinist distortions in the domestic policies of the socialist countries and in the system of relations among them are being felt even today.

The *perestroyka* initiated in the Soviet Union when the Gorbachev leadership came to power marked not only a drastic turn in Soviet internal policy away from the Stalinist model of state-bureaucratic socialism in the direction of a qualitatively new model of democratic socialism; it also introduced profound changes in the system of political and economic relations among the socialist countries belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). New thinking, free of outlived stereotypes and dogma, underlies the policy of the Soviet Union with respect to the countries of Eastern Europe. The policy is directed toward a harmonious development of true good-neighborliness with these countries; toward a relationship free from dictate, pressure, and interference in each other's internal affairs; and toward strict observance of the principles of equal partnership, independence, and attentive respect for the national interests and the national forms of socialist development of each country. The countries of Eastern Europe now have broad opportunities to realize unhindered their national interests both within the framework of the socialist community and in relations with the West.

Political *Perestroyka* of the Socialist System and its Effect on East-West Relations

In many countries of Eastern Europe, *perestroyka* of the system of political power has begun. The model for the existing system was created in the Soviet Union during the 1930's and 1940's. This model was profoundly influenced by Stalin's perverted concepts of the character of political mechanisms in socialism, as well as by the insufficient political maturity on the part of Soviet society and a lack of democractic traditions and political culture. The administrative-command system of power started in the USSR was replicated in other socialist countries. It was characterized by hyper-centralism, an absolute monopoly on decision-making, monolithic thinking, a disdain for the masses (who were seen as "small crews" and as objects of management), and isolation from the outside world. Political institutions aimed at securing political stability primarily through suppression and the leveling of diversity. This system, which demanded servile obedience, undermined the foundations of societal dynamism and viability.

The pyramidal, monocentric model of power could not help but affect the behavior of socialist states in the sphere of international relations. A similar hierarchic structure, based on subordination of everybody to a "single center," long prevailed in relations among the socialist countries. Development in these countries was undertaken according to the same model; that is, national specificity was ignored. In relations with the West, the administrative-command system of power was oriented first of all toward its own preservation, and toward counteraction and self-isolation. The existence of interests of civilization common to the two systems and requiring their cooperation and interaction was rejected. Dialogue as a form and means of international coexis-

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tence was neglected. The principle of *kto kogo* ("who bests whom") was mechanically applied to the external sphere.

The image of the capitalist "enemy" impressed itself on the public psyche. To some extent, this image was used as a means to effect the internal consolidation and mobilization of the masses in individual socialist countries. However, its utilization as the motive force for vital actions undermined the creative stimuli, and the economic and democratic regulators, of socialism. The defensive reaction of the political system long delayed the formation of a civil society in socialist countries, the growth of the political maturity of the masses, and their creative progress. It should be noted, however, that this behavior was due largely to external reasons, to the constant pressure exerted by the West, a genuine external menace to socialism. The perpetuation of the administrative system of socialism was thus, in part, a consequence of the policies of some Western circles and their blatant anticommunism.

The essence of the new model of power can be defined as the delegation of considerable responsibility to the local level, to labor and territorial collectives; the expansion of pluralism in public life; and the democratization of all institutions, including the vanguard party. The aim is to create more effective guarantees against the power monopoly of the layer of managers and professional politicians—against the bureaucratic apparatus.

The process of *perestroyka* is already shaping a new multifaceted political reality, one full of contradictions and conflicts, of collisions of interests of individuals and social groups. The renewal is just beginning, and there is a long road ahead before a new political system will be formed. The resistance of old, but still unbroken mechanisms is quite strong, and the force of inertia is quite great both "at the top" and "at the bottom." But the process of *perestroyka* has been started, and there are signs that it is becoming irreversible, and that a return to Stalinist methods is becoming impossible.

The formation of a qualitatively new political system of socialism is occurring to some extent under the influence of international realities, of the general progress of civilization and technology. In the socialist countries, there is enhanced understanding that it is necessary to promote East-West cooperation to ensure the survival of humanity, and that such cooperation requires mutual confidence between the two systems. This, in turn, calls for a new quality in foreign policy, for a reconsideration of its priorities. This reappraisal is directly linked to the *perestroyka* of the entire system of power. The shift to the new model is intended to bring about not only greater efficiency and effectiveness in political decision-making; it is intended also to create conditions for the democratization of the foreign policy process, its control by society, so as to prevent a repetition of the past, namely, the taking of voluntaristic and, in many cases, quite risky steps in international relations. Legislative and institutional guarantees of public control over foreign policy must be elaborated.

The results of political reform ought to include a more comprehensive evaluation by the socialist countries of the diversity of interests existing in the international arena, of different "balances of forces," and a renunciation of attemps at their equalization so as to preclude the development of hegemonistic intentions on the part of anyone. This stimulates greater flexibility, openness, and tolerance, which also result directly from the new atmosphere in individual countries. A country that rids itself of the command methods of management is unlikely to impose its position on others. This, however, does not mean renouncing one's own ideal values.

In the socialist countries, the formation of a new political thinking is now under way—in particular, the view of the West as a hostile force is being revised. This is reflected in a gradual retreat from the stress on autarky, on the defensive function in exercising power inside the country. Opportunities for exchange of ideas and experience are opening up, and justification of unpredictable actions in both domestic and foreign affairs is being eliminated. If society becomes more transparent, more democratic, if power is controllable, then a basis will be formed for greater mutual understanding in the international sphere as well.

It should be noted, however, that the processes of renovation occurring in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries need suitable international conditions. Pressure, blackmail, derailment of agreements by the Western side can work in favor of the adversaries of *perestroyka,* may lead to restoration of the former order. This would also mean the aggravation of international tensions. For this reason, the successful renovation of socialism is one of the guarantees for the establishment of new international relations, and above all, of a qualitatively new East-West relationship.

Perestroyka of the Economic Cooperation Mechanism and East-West Economic Relations

All the shortcomings and difficulties in the development of cooperation among the East European countries within the CEMA framework, as well as in economic relations with the West, stem from the old mechanism of managing the national economy. With slight variations, the mechanism was copied from the Soviet model created in the 1930's and 1940's. Its specific features were rigid centralism; administrative methods of manage-

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ment; arbitrary methods of price formation; the ignoring of the role of the market, of the intimate link between production and consumption, and of economic methods of management; and a primitive and simplified understanding of the character and functions of ownership under socialism.

These features determined the nature of integrational cooperation among CEMA countries. Cooperation was based on macro-economic decisions made by higher power echelons and, accordingly, on the basis of administrative methods of regulating the integrational processes and economic interaction. This doomed to inertia, passivity, and lack of entrepreneurship the micro-economic units of the economies of socialist countries, that is, the overwhelming majority of working people directly engaged in industry, agriculture, science, and services. This led to an abnormal situation, whereby there existed no direct contacts and business relations between cooperating collectives of enterprises and organizations of the CEMA countries. As a result, there was no real interest in the progress of economic cooperation and in deriving benefits from it. Integration in CEMA took an administrative-bureaucratic route. Instead of working for a true economic partnership leading to the extensive interweaving of genuine economic interests and the creation of cooperative links among basic units of the national economy and the entire social organism of socialist countries, spurious and pretentious measures and projects were substituted by the higher power echelons. The process of integration was reduced to one of bureaucratic organization of economic interaction among the state systems of self-contained individual countries which were separated from one another by virtually insurmountable administrative, financial, economic, legal, and other barriers. With time, these barriers grew even higher. The swollen bureaucratic apparatus could not keep up with, let alone regulate, the growing and increasingly complicated economic ties between individual enterprises, associations, and organizations of the CEMA countries. This led to reduced effectiveness in economic, scientific, and technological cooperation, to growing dissatisfaction with existing economic relations, and to the collapse of CEMA's prestige. In terms of the scale and depth of integration processes and the intensity of the interweaving of economic, scientific, and technological interests and relations, the CEMA countries turned out to be far behind the countries of the European Economic Community.

The main imperative at the present stage of mutual economic cooperation among CEMA countries is to shift from interstate barter to direct commercial links between enterprises as economic entities. In fact, the process of transforming the directive-distributive model of labor division within the CEMA framework into a qualitatively new model of a market type, including the indispensable "rehabilitation" of price and currency tools, has begun. In this process, the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance should turn into a body maximizing favorable conditions for the realization of direct cooperative relations among enterprises, associations, and organizations in the national economies of the socialist countries. It is necessary to create in all CEMA countries favorable legal, administrative, financial, and other conditions and prerequisites for economic, scientific, and technological contacts at the micro-economic level to match the national economic mechanisms. CEMA should also be sure to remove existing or emerging obstacles and barriers to setting up and realizing direct cooperative links. Special emphasis should be placed on the unimpeded movement across borders of all factors of production, including manpower, commodities, capital, and information.

According to the new model of cooperation, the principals in economic interactions would be the producers and consumers of the supplied products; they would enter into contracts not because of a command from "the top," but because of the mutual expectation of economic benefits. The partners would naturally become the real "subjects" of price formation, setting prices according to contractual principles. The contract price itself, being part of an actual deal, would acquire a structure-forming function that is now lacking, i.e., it would contribute in practice to the formation of a progressive structure of mutual exchanges. Since the contract price would be governed by demand-and-supply relations, this would ensure that only those products that meet real public needs and are manufactured at the lowest possible cost would be involved in mutual trade. The process of forming foreign trade prices would no longer be performed according to a predetermined rigid scheme but would allow for considerable freedom of maneuver.

To ensure the viability of the new price-formation mechanism, the CEMA countries have to introduce radical changes in the monetary sphere of cooperation. First of all, it is essential to introduce mutual convertibility (though limited in the initial stages) of the currencies of the countries concerned, at exchange rates reflecting their real purchasing power. In practice, this will mean the use of national currencies in mutual accounting and in setting mutual trade prices. Under such conditions, a truly unified market of the CEMA countries will begin to take shape with mechanisms for ensuring multilateral (not just bilateral, as things now stand) balancing of commodity deliveries. The need for genuine convertibility of the currencies of the CEMA countries, including

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convertibility into hard currencies, will grow as their internal domestic mechanisms are rearranged to foster the proliferation of market relations.

The step-by-step implementation of the concept of a CEMA common market should not be seen as economic isolation of its members from the rest of the world. On the contrary, the course of forming such a market and, in the long run, a monetary and customs union of the CEMA countries is related to a considerable extent to the need to involve their economies more effectively in world economic relations. A successful implementation of the commodity-money model of economic interaction among the socialist countries will surely give a powerful impetus to the growth of East-West economic relations.

This model will make it possible to overcome the isolation of the economies of the CEMA countries not only from one another but from the West as well. It will make possible more joint East-West economic ventures. The creation of a market setting in which the actual subjects of external economic activity become the enterprises themselves creates favorable conditions for them to carry out various mutually beneficial transactions with foreign medium- and small-size firms, thus providing truly unlimited opportunities for East-West economic cooperation.

Reform of the economic cooperation mechanism by the CEMA countries will hinge directly on the success of the *perestroyka* of the political and economic system in the USSR and other CEMA members.

The United States and Eastern Europe

The policy of the United States toward the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, both conceptually and in practice, is characterized by a certain contradictoriness. To a considerable extent, this stems from the inconsistent general methodological approach the United States takes to these countries. On the one hand, for nearly three decades, American scholars and politicians have been declaring that diversity and differences are inherent in the countries of Eastern Europe and, hence, that the US approach to each of them should be differentiated. On the other hand, there is an impression that in practice matters are quite different, that Washington takes the same approach to all the East European countries. Since Eastern Europe is, in fact, internationally one political region despite the considerable specificity of each East European country, it objectively forms one sphere for implementing a particular line in the foreign political strategy and tactics of the United States. In this context, it may be noted that there does exist a regional—East European—area in US foreign policy whose specific features are determined by common goals and interests in the approach to all the countries of the region, by an overall policy conception, and by the general doctrinal setup. This does not exclude differentiation in US foreign policy, which naturally occurs in relations with the East European countries. Indeed, to a great extent, it explains the differences that exist in the US approach to the Soviet Union and to other countries of the socialist community.

As is known, the core of the most extensively elaborated, tested, and still operational US foreign policy doctrine of "building bridges" to Eastern Europe is a differentiated, long-term policy whose goal is to develop varied relations of differing intensity with individual states in this region so as to gradually and carefully weaken the ties of the socialist community. This would, first of all, enfeeble the position of the Soviet Union by creating a situation in the East European community that would fully preoccupy the Soviet Union with maintaining its coherence and prevent the Soviet Union from competing with the United States in other parts of the world.

It is frequently alleged in American scholarly literature and the press that the United States has but limited possibilities for exerting influence in Eastern Europe. Hence, the conclusion is reached that it would be advisable to encourage European countries allied to the United States through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to utilize their long-established and broad contacts with the East European states to exercise influence. Such reliance on Western Europe is hardly warranted. Although the interests of the allies on both sides of the Atlantic do coincide to some extent in this region, there are also significant differences between them. These differences are revealed in the general assessments of both sides concerning the importance of relations with socialist countries (out of security considerations and in terms of economic cooperation), and of such problems of particular importance to Europe as the German issue, the "legacy of Yalta," the varied and contradictory ideas about the restoration on the political map of the European continent of some sort of neutral interstate formation called "Central Europe," the further development of the all-European process and of disarmament, and so forth.

There is a desire on the part of the United States to use the fact that Eastern Europe is, on the one hand, an integral part of the socialist community, and on the other, a part of a European system of ties. The desire is to obtain political advantages in relations with the Soviet Union, which reflects the obsolete stereotype of a bipolar evaluation of global politics. This oversimplified understanding of East-West relations does not correspond to today's complicated international realities.

This US approach is also improper in the sense that it

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assigns to the states of Eastern Europe the function of serving as a means to exert influence on the main rival of the United States—the Soviet Union. It unilaterally seeks to define the national and state interests of the East European countries, and thereby artificially narrows their positions and restricts their sovereign role in global relations, especially in the socialist community and the all-European process. This approach to Eastern Europe is especially dangerous today, since the present stage of the development of these countries is characterized by considerable difficulties in connection with reforms, aggravation of conflict regarding reform, and, in a number of countries, even crisis tendencies.

In today's era of growing interdependence, no region, and especially not Eastern Europe, should be the arena of interstate rivalry of the two systems, of the two great powers—the USA and the USSR. After all, in Eastern Europe—as in all of Europe—their basic interests coincide, regardless of the acuteness of the contradictions existing between America and the Soviet Union. This confluence of interests derives above all from the need to prevent conflictual processes in international affairs, to maintain stability, and to strengthen international security.

Crises in Socialist Countries and East-West Relations

The experience of recent decades clearly shows that crises in the countries of Eastern Europe have never been confined within the borders of the country in which they originated. Rather, they have quickly drawn into their orbit a whole number of actors on the international scene—first of all, the USSR and the other East European allies who wanted to prevent the military-political, ideological, and economic destabilization of the socialist community. Crises in Eastern Europe also affected the Western powers, especially the United States, which has traditionally viewed the dramatic collisions inside the "Soviet bloc" in terms of the potential damage they might do to the bloc's consolidation and of the opportunities they offered for weakening Soviet positions in this region and/or Soviet control over its East European allies, thus negatively affecting the interests of socialism in Eastern Europe. The clash between the main objectives of the two sides has its origins in the acute military-political, ideological, and economic rivalry of the two social systems that has existed throughout the entire postwar period. This clash was intensified by the nuclear confrontation between the USA and USSR, and by the division of Europe into opposing military and political groupings. Inevitably, this meant that a crisis situation in any East European country was globalized and aggravated, and that it seriously destabilized East-West relations irrespective of whether the international political barometer registered calm or storm when the crisis erupted.

Two vitally important circumstances require that East and West, and the USSR and the USA above all, must thoroughly rethink both the history of past East European crises and their response to present and future crises. First, unfortunately there is no reason to believe that crises in East European countries are a thing of the past. The present period in socialist countries—where the new coexists with the old and the cumbersome but ingrained forms and methods of political and economic activity are still being overcome—is pregnant with crises. Even the reforms as such, which aim at the eventual recovery of society and the improvement of socialism, might become in the course of their implementation new sources of public discontent and conflict.

Second, not the USSR, not the USA, nor any other country can afford to make the success of normalization of East-West relations, dictated as it is by the nuclear imperative, dependent on crisis phenomena in any country—including a socialist one. The stakes are too high. This necessitates an open-minded revision by each side of many aspects of traditional policy behavior during crisis situations in Eastern Europe.

What particular traits of the "crisis" policy of the USA and USSR (as the most representative and influential powers in the two systems) appear from past experience to be most dangerous and destructive for a normal development of relations between the two systems? First, and this applies to both sides, is a tendency toward the excessive globalization and ideologization of any given crisis situation. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have tended in recent years to regard every crisis in the context of their global policies, from the perspective of an inter-bloc confrontation, from the perspective of American-Soviet rivalry. (For justice's sake, it should be noted that in earlier stages of the existence of the world socialist system, the United States did not exclude the possibility of restoring capitalism in the countries where crises took place.) In their analyses of crisis situations in East European countries, American official circles placed the main responsibility for their origin on the USSR and explained them mainly as a rejection by these countries of the Soviet model of socialism "imposed" on them; they made much less effort to understand the domestic reasons for the crises.

Soviet policy also frequently demonized the "subversive activity" of the opposite side to the detriment of a sober-minded analysis of the reasons for certain conflicts and crises in the allied countries. A dogmatic understanding of the essence of socialism and the fear in

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the USSR of novel solutions in the course of building socialism prevented the socialist countries from eliminating in time the causes of ripening crises. Once a crisis developed, the role played by the Western powers, above all the USA, in the situation was exaggerated. The more so when Western countries provided pretexts for doing so.

A specific feature of American policy toward East European crises was not to try to normalize the situation but to maintain a so-called "controlled tension" in close vicinity to the Soviet Union's borders for an extended period. As the situation became aggravated during crises, a more realistic US policy came to the fore; in the initial stages of crises, however, propagandistic activities of a provocative character were generally carried out (which, by the way, were often resumed when the crises de-escalated). Under present circumstances, such a policy could have a destabilizing effect on the development of Eastern Europe and on the European continent as a whole. It could also result in undesirable complications—for the United States as well—in East-West relations, including in the field of arms control and arms reduction. Such diplomacy also does not correspond to the moral principles and political ethical norms espoused by the United States.

The risks this policy posed for stability in Europe during recent years was well understood by the European allies of the United States. This was clearly evidenced by their markedly different approach to the Polish crisis of the early 1980's. Today, it is quite clear that Central and Eastern Europe, and Europe as a whole, is not the place for experimenting with maintaining a state of tension, especially when this involves countries belonging to different systems and military-political groupings.

Interest in preserving peace, a prerequisite for which is the positive development of relations between the two systems, necessitates that new political thinking guide the policies of the great powers with respect to crisis situations in the whole world, including those in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. First, it is inadmissible that either side interfere in the internal problems of a country finding itself in a difficult position. Second, it is necessary to avoid globalizing crises, or attempting to use them to damage the interests of the opposite side and promote one's own interests.

Should crisis situations develop, they should under no circumstances be allowed to deter progress in East-West relations. On the contrary, improvement of these relations should be the factor that facilitates the quick localization of the crisis. Moreover, cooperation between the USSR and the USA is possible in rendering assistance to East European countries that find themselves in difficult straits. Should this happen, everyone wins: a focal point of potential destabilization in Europe is eliminated, the country more easily comes out of the crisis, and the USSR and the USA expand the sphere of their cooperation—so much needed for the improvement of international relations and the strengthening of peace.

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Special Address

Zbigniew Brzezinski

I WISH to congratulate Professor Gati and Academician Bogomolov on this meeting. It is devoted to a very important issue and its joint discussion is a very welcome development. It tells us something about the state of our relations and about the state of the world. It indicates that even very difficult, very sensitive issues can be addressed in a constructive vein. This meeting, I think, is a reflection of that. Indeed, in some ways it is symbolic that this meeting is being held in the shadow of the Pentagon which is just a mile or so away from here. And I think it also symbolic that right now a Marshal of the Soviet Union is in the Pentagon visiting the leaders of the American military establishment. That symbolism speaks for itself.

I will also add that I see in the discussion here a reflection to some extent of what has been taking place in the Soviet Union, and particularly of *glasnost'*—a term that most Americans know well by now. I think *glasnost'* is an important aspect of our contemporary reality because it means that painful issues can be openly discussed. Anyone who follows Soviet writings in the Soviet mass media must be conscious of the fact that issues truly

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painful, in the deepest human sense, are being openly vented and discussed there. I have particularly in mind the very difficult legacy of Stalinism and what it has meant not only for the Soviet Union as a state but for countless individuals in terms of their families, in terms of their lives, in terms of their hopes. *Glasnost'* between us is also a tribute to the new Soviet reality and it contributes to the prospects of a dialogue such as this.

In addition, for those of us who have been working on questions of international relations and of Soviet politics, there is an additional source of satisfaction in the current Soviet discussions and in the *glasnost'* that dominates them, since many of the things that we have written and said about the Soviet Union and that were for many years classified as anti-Soviet propaganda have now been confirmed as fact. I have particularly in mind the detailed studies by Western scholars of the Stalinist era which had earlier been repudiated as false but which now are implicitly acknowledged by the Soviet side to represent an important statement about contemporary reality.

All this, I think, indicates that there is growing agreement between us regarding important facts. There is obviously bound to be disagreement regarding their implications. While reducing the scope of factual disagreement, we are still faced with the task of reconciling significant differences in the interpretations that we draw from the facts. I sense that this meeting also reflects this reality.

I have read carefully the Soviet paper that was prepared as a basis for the discussion here, and I must say that I am in agreement with a great many things in that paper. Certainly, the statement about the inability of the systems imposed in Eastern Europe to stand the test of time in terms of social, political, and economic adequacy is a judgment that I would be inclined very much to share. I certainly agree with the view that there is now a degree of humanization and democratization in these systems. I would certainly not dispute the proposition that notions about the mechanical copying of external models are totally irrelevant in our time.

So we do have the basis for some common judgments and for a common discussion. But obviously, in any endeavor of this sort, there are bound to be significant disagreements regarding what even a shared diagnosis implies for the past, for the present, and for the future. Perhaps I will contribute somewhat to the disagreements by my own remarks, but I wish to stress that I do so as part of a dialogue designed with the hope of eventually yielding a constructive result.

Basically, I would like to make six points. *First,* the role of Eastern Europe is important because disagreement over Eastern Europe was the source of the Cold War. The Cold War, of course, had many roots—ideological, historical, political. But, ultimately, it was the initial clash in the wake of World War II between former allies over the fate of Eastern Europe that contributed dynamically to the development of the relationship that has come to be called the Cold War.

It is important to register here, especially in view of *glasnost',* that what happened in Eastern Europe after World War II did not entail the fulfillment of the commitments made in the Yalta agreement. The key principle of the Yalta agreement was that free elections would be held in Eastern Europe. I doubt that today—with the Soviet Union itself engaged in the process of democratizing its own electoral arrangements—anyone would argue that elections dominated by Stalin and Beria were truly free. The fact, the historical fact, is that they were not free, and that the element of coercion was very important in the establishment of the systems that are continuing to operate in Eastern Europe.

The question of the legitimacy of these regimes has already arisen in the course of the discussions here, and it is, in my judgment, a centrally important issue. Incidentally, today there is a growing inclination among the East European governments, at least in some cases, to confirm the proposition that I have articulated, namely, that their origins were rooted in coercion and imposition, and did *not* reflect the free choice of the peoples involved. This has already been stated in a variety of ways in such countries as Hungary and Poland, and I suspect that in the months and years to come this view will spread.

The *second* proposition is that the Soviet-type systems which exist in Eastern Europe have not performed well in terms of their socio-economic record. Massive evidence on this subject is available. And indeed, the Soviet paper submitted for this conference in effect says just as much. The fact is that by any standard of comparison the East European economies and societies have performed poorly. If one takes economic and social indices and compares systematically the postwar performance of, for example, Hungary or Czechoslovakia with Austria's, one is struck by enormous negative disparities. If one compares Poland to Spain, countries at a similar level of socio-economic development in 1945–47, one again is struck by the extremely negative Polish record. If one compares Bulgaria and Romania with Portugal and Italy, one is also struck by the poor showing of the first two.

Moreover, by and large, today the people of Eastern Europe know that their systems have not performed well, and they voice this. They realize that the systems are not economically efficient, that they are wasteful in terms of such key indices as energy, that they do not sat-

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isfy most human needs, and that they do not produce a better standard of living. All this contributes to a crisis of ideology that, over the years, has stimulated the rise of revisionism among the communist party elites and social unrest in the countries of Eastern Europe.

Indeed, in many respects communist revisionism was historically anticipatory. I was struck by the fact that when Mr. Gorbachev visited Prague a year or so ago and a Soviet spokesman, Mr. Gennadiy Gerasimov, was asked, "What is the principal difference between the policies of Mr. Gorbachev and the policies of Mr. Dubček?" his response was just two words—"19 years." In effect, his answer acknowledged that Dubček's program was historically too early; it was certainly not an ideological condemnation.

My *third* point is that economic reforms by themselves will not work as a remedy for the existing situation. I think that, to some extent, this too is hinted at in the Soviet paper which suggests toward the end, if I read it correctly, that Western economic cooperation or economic assistance is in fact desirable to deal with the problems of Eastern Europe. But that of course begs the question of what happened to the massive inflow of Western capital in the course of the 1970's. That inflow was very substantial indeed, being on the scale of some 70 billion US dollars. There is, I believe, cause to suspect that the reason why these funds were not used effectively to modernize the economies and to make them more competitive has something to do not only with the economic structure but also with the political structure in Eastern Europe.

That is to say, these funds were essentially wasted because the existing rigid decision-making systems were unresponsive to social stimuli and could not create economies that would be truly competitive on the world market. Today Singapore—just Singapore alone—exports more machinery to the countries belonging the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development than all of Eastern Europe together. And that is just one index of the extent to which the East European systems have become stagnant and anachronistic. Political reforms, therefore, are needed in order to deal with just the economic dimension of the problem.

But a question remains: "What ought to be their scale?" I think it is quite evident that a desire for political reform exists in Eastern Europe. This has been intensified by the example set and the bold reforms advocated by Mikhail Gorbachev. But the East European countries are socially more pluralistic than Soviet society, and democratization in Eastern Europe has to involve more latitude for the expression of political views. Only if there is in fact significant political pluralism in Eastern Europe is it likely that the socio-economic difficulties now facing Eastern Europe can be contained and remedied.

The *fourth* point that I wish to make is that existing trends in Eastern Europe are potentially dangerous for the stability of East-West relations. This again, I believe, is consistent with the diagnosis in the Soviet paper, which hints at the possibility of significant difficulties in Eastern Europe. My own view is very similar. I see Eastern Europe as gradually sliding into a potentially classic pre-revolutionary situation. That is to say, on the one hand, economic conditions are deteriorating; and, on the other hand, the political situation is becoming more volatile. The gap between the two trend lines is opening very wide and this creates a potentially massive revolutionary situation. One cannot dogmatically predict a revolutionary upheaval, but one can postulate that the objective and subjective conditions for it are present. The people are restless and the ruling bureaucratic elites are by and large demoralized and fearful.

In many respects, the situation in Eastern Europe today fits the classic concepts of the revolutionary process advanced by the great Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci argued that the first phase of true significance in the revolutionary process is the battle of ideas, and once the battle of ideas has been won by the revolutionary forces, the state is placed under siege. We can see that process working against the East European "socialist" system. By and large the systems in Eastern Europe do not have ideological attraction. Their political doctrines, by and large, are widely discredited. By and large, the battle of ideas has been lost and the state has, in fact, become increasingly beleaguered.

This leads me to my *fifth* point, which is that a revolutionary explosion in Eastern Europe is not in anyone's interest. I believe that its consequences, while unpredictable, would in all probability be highly negative for the stability of East-West relations. Such an explosion would have the most negative effect on the American-Soviet relationship. But it would also have a very negative impact on East-West relations in Europe.

A Soviet intervention—a military intervention—to crush a revolutionary upheaval that seemed to be on the brink of political success could also have significantly negative implications for political change within the Soviet Union itself. It is certainly open to question whether a Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe could be prevented by political means from having internal repercussions in the Soviet Union.

I understand that Soviet participants at this conference—and also elsewhere—have said that a Soviet military intervention would be most unlikely. My own judgment is that, for a variety of reasons, an intervention would be likely. I would also add that if the viewpoint that a Soviet military intervention is in fact unlikely becomes

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more widespread, this perception might make a revolutionary upheaval more probable. This is a disturbing paradox in the situation. I do not believe that a revolutionary upheaval in Eastern Europe would represent a constructive element in East-West relations.

This brings me to my *sixth* and last point, namely, that it would be in the interests of the region and East-West relations in general, as well as of US-Soviet relations and internal change in the Soviet Union in particular, that peaceful but also comprehensive change be accepted in Eastern Europe. That change should not be geopolitically destabilizing; therefore, it should not be focused on some of the goals inherent in the positions of both sides in recent years, that is, on the assumption that the abolition of alliances would advance East-West reconciliation in Europe.

My judgment is quite the contrary. The continuity of the alliances would provide a stable framework for significant political change. The alliances—and specifically the Warsaw Pact—should not by definition be ideological alliances, however; rather, they should be geopolitical alliances reflecting the shared interests of the parties concerned in the continued territorial and geopolitical stability in Europe and in other existing arrangements. The same, incidentally, is and ought to be true of NATO.

Within the context, therefore, of stable and enduring external arrangements, internal political change should be propagated and enhanced. Past injustices should be corrected. Present arrangements should be adjusted. I am struck that, as some Soviet sources have told me, Mr. Gorbachev will finally erase the bitter memory of the Katyn forest massacre when he visits Poland in a week or so, by acknowledging explicitly Soviet responsibility for it and placing that responsibility where it belongs, on the shoulders of Stalin, Beria, and the NKVD. This would certainly help to dilute the deeply felt resentment against the Soviet Union in one particular East European country.

Beyond this, it does seem to be consistent with the spirit of the times and with the diversity of the human condition that political systems should evolve in Eastern Europe which are genuinely different from the one that now prevails (and is changing) in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Some form of political pluralism—and elections based on that reality—is a necessary precondition for a genuine acceptance of the system by East Europeans. I do not see how, in the long run, this can be viewed as incompatible with Soviet interests.

A legitimate, a completely legitimate, Soviet interest is that Eastern Europe not be geopolitically hostile to the Soviet Union. But an Eastern Europe which is not geopolitically hostile to the Soviet Union need not be an Eastern Europe that is ideologically servile, that is systemically imitative and, as a consequence, is politically and socially restless.

It seems to me that, as a contribution to East-West stability, the East Europeans should have the right to define socialism as they wish, and to replace it if they so desire. Ultimately, the legitimacy of any regime is based on the voluntary exercise of popular will—and coercive socialism, in brief, is but another word for Stalinism. A freely chosen socialism in Eastern Europe may in some respects be quite different from what has existed there over the last several decades, and from what may be evolving in the Soviet Union. But differences would not be—and should not be viewed as being—by definition hostile to the Soviet Union.

Security arrangements could be deliberately contrived by the East and the West to take advantage of the emerging and changing political scene. It seems to me that the time has come for the strategic arms control talks to be matched by conventional arms reduction talks that aim as well at the progressive dilution of the division of Europe into two blocs. I believe that change is in fact inevitable. The only question in my mind is whether change will be deliberately facilitated by the powers that are in a position to enhance this process, or whether it will be inhibited and obstructed, and therefore take place through revolutionary upheavals. One way or another, it does seem to me that Eastern Europe will undergo a process of change and, as a consequence of that change it could cease being a major source of contention in the American-Soviet relationship.

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Notes

China's America Watchers

David L. Shambaugh

WHEN PRESIDENT Richard Nixon arrived at the Beijing airport on a cold February day in 1972, waiting on the tarmac to meet him was an entourage of Chinese officials. Among them was a small group of senior America specialists from the Foreign Ministry, including Huang Hua, Han Xu, Ji Chaozhu, Zhang Wenjin, and other more junior staff.

China's America policy has been guided by this core group since the early 1970's. While the evidence strongly suggests that the decision for rapprochement with the United States was made by Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai, they had long drawn on the expertise of a coterie of advisers in dealing with the United States. Beginning in Yan'an, continuing during the Chongqing and Nanjing negotiations, the Korean armistice negotiations, the Taiwan Straits crises, the Geneva Conference, the Warsaw ambassadorial talks, and the war in Vietnam, this small group of "America hands" has dealt with representatives of the United States government. This group remains largely intact today. As one of them stated on the eve of President Reagan's 1984 state visit to China, "Many of us went to meet Dr. Kissinger at the airport when he arrived on his secret mission, the next year we met President Nixon, later Presidents Ford and Carter, and now we will go meet Reagan."[1]

The continuity over time of this elite group which guides China's America policy is indeed impressive, even though to some degree it has been diluted through diplomatic postings elsewhere. For its part, the United States has drawn upon the expertise of a similar group of China hands during this period. Arthur Hummel, Jr., John Holdridge, William Gleysteen, J. Stapleton Roy, Roger Sullivan, Alan Romberg, Michael Armacost, Winston Lord, Chas Freeman, Paul Kreisberg, James Lilley, Hary Thayer, Richard Williams, William Rope, Richard Solomon, Michel Oksenberg, Douglas Paal, Charles T. Cross, David Dean, Morton Abramowitz, and others have all contributed significantly to shaping America's China policy during the last four administrations. Yet, the "revolving door" and Foreign Service rotational schedules have made this group of Americans less cohesive than their Chinese counterparts.

While the elite corps of China's America hands has remained remarkably intact since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), their numbers have grown dramatically over the last 15 years. The institutionalization of Sino-American relations during the last decade has been the impetus for this growth. Today, China's leaders have at their disposal multiple sources of information and intelligence about the United States emanating from a sprawling community of Americanists spread throughout a complex bureaucracy. This community is institutionally portrayed in Figure I. To be sure, China's top leadership only taps a small portion of the total written product of this community, but the point is that America watching has become a growth industry in China since the normalization of relations and, concomitantly, the institutional loci of concerned organizations have expanded significantly.[2] Virtually all central gov-

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[1]Interview with Foreign Ministry official, March 28, 1984.

[2]For a Chinese view of the growth of American studies in China see Zi Zhongyun, "China's American Studies," *Meiguo Yanjiu* (Beijing), No. 1, Spring 1987, pp. 7–20.

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Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, arrives in Beijing in July 1971; greeting him, from left to right, are translators Nancy T'ang and Ji Chaozhu, Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission Ye Jianying, ambassador to Canada Huang Hua, and Zhang Wenjin, then head of the West European and American Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

—White House photo.

ernment ministries and professional research institutes now have sections responsible for the United States. In 1981, the Academy of Social Sciences established an institute devoted exclusively to the study of the United States; many universities have set up American studies centers; national research associations which focus on aspects of American studies have been formed, and the New China News Agency (NCNA) now posts its correspondents across the United States. Chinese newspapers and periodicals regularly feature stories on the US, and since 1977, nearly 800 books about America have been published in China—of which, approximately 90 percent are translations.[3]

I would estimate that China's America watching community now totals approximately 500 individuals in 30 separate institutions in the central government bureaucracy, professional research institutes, universities, and the NCNA. It is important, however, to distinguish between different types of Americanists in China. In this article, the entire community is referred to as "America watchers." An America watcher is someone whose full-

[3]For an analysis of Chinese periodical coverage of the US, see David Shambaugh, *Coverage of the United States in Key Chinese Periodicals During 1984*, Washington, DC, United States Information Agency, December 1985. For an analysis of Chinese book publishing about America (with a comprehensive bibliography), see David Shambaugh, *Books About America in the People's Republic of China, 1977–1987*, Washington, DC, United States Information Agency, August 1988.

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time, professional occupation is to study the United States and interpret it for China's concerned elite and/or mass public. Thus, by this definition, those individuals working in the foreign affairs offices (*waiban*) of various government agencies, universities, etc., who oversee visits of Americans and escort them during trips to China are not included because it is not their job to interpret the United States. Nor are the large number of interlocutors with whom Americans come in contact during negotiations defined as America watchers. Within the community of America watchers one can further distinguish "America hands," those in the central government—particularly officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)—who handle diplomatic dealings and oversee the entire relationship with the United States. These individuals perform the multiple roles of policymakers, policy implementers, and policy advisers. Many have lengthy experience in dealing with the US and their knowledge of America is deep and sophisticated. They can therefore also be accurately referred to as "America experts" or "America specialists."

Since both the Chinese elite and public have limited—albeit increasing—exposure to America and Americans, to a large extent they must rely on the America watchers to interpret the United States for them. Information about America thus reaches the Chinese leadership and populace filtered through the America watchers' interpretive lenses. The America watchers are therefore most important in determining what broader "Chinese" images of the US exist, and hence what national images help to shape China's America policies.[4] The America watchers inform the leadership by means of oral briefings and classified government channels. They inform the intelligentsia about America through specialized professional publications, including both periodicals and books, and the mass public through the print media. The discussion here is designed to portray China's America watching community and how it has taken shape, but it also considers, where relevant, these individuals' input into the policy process.

The Structure of America Watching

America watching in China takes place in a sprawling and complex institutional structure. As Figure 1 indicates, this structure can be divided into four tiers: central government ministries, research institutes, universities, and professional associations.

America watching in first-tier institutions takes place within subunits specifically charged with following events in, and managing bilateral relations with, the United States in their particular functional bailiwick. These are generally departments or sections (*si* or *chu*) concerned with the United States under ministries (*bu*) whose mandate is to shape and manage China's overall foreign relations. Primary among these are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense. Also important are economic organizations such as the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and the Bank of China. Also included among first-tier institutions is the New China News Agency, which is affiliated with the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the International Studies Research Center under the State Council.

America watching in second-tier institutions takes place within America sections of research institutes charged with studying the totality of international relations. The exception to this rule is the America Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). While other second-tier institutions are functionally specific and are internally configured along regional and country lines, the America Institute is the opposite. Thus, while such institutes as the Institute of International Studies or Institute of Contemporary International Relations have America research offices (*Meiguo yanjiushi*), the CASS America Institute is subdivided into functional research groups (*yanjiuzu*) covering different aspects of the United States.

America watching in third-tier institutions (universities) takes place both in discipline-specific departments and affiliated research institutes devoted to the study of the US in whole or in part. For example, some universities have American studies centers, but in most of them America watching takes place in departments and research institutes of a specific discipline such as world economics, international politics, or history.

The fourth tier of America watching institutions consists of professional academic associations which operate on a nationwide basis. They are a relatively new phenomenon in Chinese academic circles, the majority

[4]It should be stressed that this article is not about Chinese images of America per se. For studies of contemporary Chinese images of the United States see David Shambaugh, "China's America Watchers' Images of the United States, 1972–1986," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, The University of Michigan, 1988; David Shambaugh, "Anti-Americanism in China," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Beverly Hills, CA), May 1988, pp. 142–156; David Shambaugh, "Conflicting Chinese Images of America During the People's Republic of China," and Michael Hunt, "Themes in Traditional and Modern Chinese Images of America," in *Mutual Images and US-China Relations*, Occasional Paper No. 32 of the Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, June 1988; Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, *Chinese Estimates of the US-Soviet Balance of Power*, Occasional Paper No. 33, of the Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, July 1988; Tu Wei-ming, "Chinese Perceptions of America," in Robert B. Oxnam and Michel C. Oksenberg, Eds., *Dragon and Eagle*, New York, The Free Press, 1978. See also Michael Hunt, *The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1983.

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Figure 1: The Structure of China's America Watching Community



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

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having been established between 1978 and 1982. They are generally designated either research associations (*yanjiuhui*) or scholarly societies (*xuehui*). These organizations perform an extremely important role by creating a horizontal mechanism that breaks through the rigid vertical, institutional compartmentalization that characterizes the Chinese research scene. Colleagues who share similar research interests now have previously unavailable opportunities to meet each other. The annual or semi-annual meetings of these associations have also become forums for lively intellectual exchange and presentation of scholarly findings. For America watchers, the American Economy Research Association, the American History Research Association, and the American Literature Research Association are the most relevant in terms of area studies, although several other discipline-specific societies also consider developments in American history, politics, economics, and foreign relations.

The distinctions among these four tiers are further elucidated in the institutional survey below. This survey is comprehensive in scope insofar as it includes all relevant America watching institutions and, to the best of my knowledge, all data presented are accurate as of spring 1988. It is, however, undoubtedly incomplete in its account of the internal structure of these institutions inasmuch as they are subject to frequent reorganization, and information about such reorganizations is often classified. Finally, while attention is paid to the America watching subunits of these institutions, the parent institutions are not covered in any great detail.[5]

The First Tier

The most important central government ministry involved in America watching is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within it, five levels of America watchers can be identified.

The first level is the office of the vice foreign minister charged with functional responsibility for the United States. Equivalent in status to an US assistant secretary of state, the vice foreign minister reports directly to the foreign minister (and sometimes higher authorities), is involved in planning for most high-level visits,[6] and plays a major role in shaping China's overall policy toward the United States. He or she is assisted by one or two assistant foreign ministers who have different areas of responsibility within the Americas; one is usually responsible for North America and the other for Central and South America.

The second level is the American and Oceanian Affairs Department (*Mei da si*), which has overall responsibility for relations with the Americas. Its director and vice director are senior officials who usually have expertise on the United States.

The third level is the North American Affairs Division (*Bei-Mei shi*). Many of its staff members have been sent for advanced training to the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Its staff also serves in the Chinese embassy and consulates in the United States. This regular rotation through the US has given the "America hands" of the Foreign Ministry a first-hand feel for the United States not as evident in other America-watching institutions. The Asia Foundation, Ford Foundation, and Henry Luce Foundation have played a major role in facilitating this exchange.

Under the North American Affairs Division is the fourth level, the United States Section (*Meiguo chu*). This is the country desk responsible for formulating, implementing, and monitoring the mechanics of the bilateral relationship with America. A small research group within the US Section prepares intelligence analyses and briefing papers for higher-level policy-makers. On occasion it will task the Institute of International Studies (the Foreign Ministry's think tank) with writing studies on aspects of US-Chinese relations, but the vast majority of such studies are written "in-house."[7] The staff of the US Section and this research group rely heavily for information on the fifth level—the Chinese embassy in Washington and the consulates in New York, Chicago, Houston, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.

The embassy and consulates have large staffs which represent all branches of the Chinese government involved with aspects of American affairs, including trade, defense matters, political consultation, news re-

[5]For a detailed discussion of the parent institutions see David Shambaugh, "China's National Security Research Bureaucracy," *The China Quarterly* (London), No. 110, June 1987, pp. 276–304; David Shambaugh, "A Profile of International Relations on Chinese Campuses and IR Associations and Publishing in the PRC," *China Exchange News* (Washington, DC), Vol. 13, No. 2, June 1985, pp. 11–17; David Shambaugh and Wang Jisi, "Research on International Studies in the People's Republic of China," *PS* (Washington, DC), Vol. XVII, No. 4, Fall 1984, pp. 758–64; A. Doak Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985; Douglas P. Murray, *International Relations Research and Training in the People's Republic of China*, Stanford, CA, Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Security Policy of Stanford University, 1982; Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, *American Studies in China: Report of a Delegation Visit, October 1984*, Washington, DC, National Academy Press, 1985.

[6]There does, however, appear to be a division of responsibility between ministries. For example, in 1983 the vice foreign minister in charge of American affairs indicated that the pending visit by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was being handled entirely by the Ministry of National Defense. Author's interview, September 10, 1983.

[7]Interview with Foreign Ministry official, March 25, 1983.

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porting, cultural exchange, and intelligence collection. Much staff time is devoted to reading the American press, attending hearings on Capitol Hill, and meeting with Americans from many walks of life.

As might be expected, the Foreign Ministry has developed a cadre of America specialists of exceptional expertise,[8] although interviews reveal that their central function is to monitor events in the United States which bear specifically upon Sino-American relations rather than undertake more comprehensive analyses of American affairs.[9] The core of this senior contingent of America specialists includes former Foreign Minister Huang Hua, former US ambassador Zhang Wenjin, current ambassador Han Xu, current ambassador to Canada Zhang Zai, current ambassador to Austria Cao Guisheng, current ambassador to Great Britain Ji Chaozhu, current ambassador to Zaire Xue Mouhong, current vice foreign minister Zhu Qizhen, current director of the American and Oceanian Affairs Department Zhang Wenpu, current consul general in Houston Ni Yaoli, and former first secretary in the PRC embassy in Washington Wang Li. Beneath these senior officials is a secondary group which includes Zha Peixin, Xu Shangwei, Hou Zhitong, Lin Renjie, Fei Fei, Wang Hongbao, Wang Guangsheng, Xiao Houde, Li Baocheng, Shen Yun'ao, Guo Maogong, Wang Xuanzhong, Chen Yongcheng, Gu Pin'e, Liu Xiaoming, and others. In addition, many promising younger officials comprise a third echelon of MFA America specialists.

Many of the more senior officials had been America hands well before diplomatic relations were established in 1979. A few were aides to Zhou Enlai dating back to pre-liberation days, and several were classmates at Yenching University or at the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute (*Beiwai*). The Yenching graduates must be considered part of a larger "Yenching clique" which extends throughout China's America watching community; those from Shanghai can be said to belong to a larger "Shanghai clique" in the Foreign Ministry. In the absence of diplomatic relations many served together in the Protocol Department of the Foreign Ministry. Many were "sent down" to the same May Seventh Cadre Schools in Hunan and Hebei provinces during the Cultural Revolution. As mentioned above, many of them served together as interlocutors for Americans at every major negotiation from the pre-1949 period to the present.

As a group, they possess unusual sophistication and understanding of the United States, generally do not display ideological preconceptions, and tend to take a long-term view of the potential for development in Sino-American relations (even though their days are filled with managing short-term events). They are tough and resolute negotiators on issues of importance to Chinese national interests, but are quite capable of compromise. In short, they are more than mere America watchers; they are China's top America specialists. On the whole, the understanding of the United States possessed by these officials is the best in China. Nonetheless, I am in complete agreement with a former US official with extensive experience with these specialists who, referring to them, said: "None of these individuals can put themselves in the place of a US decision-maker; they lack the sociological-anthropological training necessary for them to transcend their own system and view the US as an American would."[10]

For the purpose of illustrating the key roles that some of these more senior MFA America specialists have played in Sino-American relations over time, let us look more closely at some of their careers. Clearly Huang

[8]For a journalist's account of this group see Michael Weisskopf, "Seasoned 'America Watchers' Advise Peking's Rulers," *The Washington Post*, Feb. 6, 1983.

[9]Interviews with Foreign Ministry officials, April 1, 1983, October 21, 1983, March 25, 1984, June 26, 1985, January 30, 1986.

[10]Interview, March 29, 1985.

The 1936 graduation photo of Huang Hua at Yenching University.

—From the author's private collection.

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

Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang welcomes President Ronald Reagan to talks in Beijing: at the far left, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, and beyond Zhao, China's ambassador to the US Han Xu.

—White House/Pete Souza.

Hua, now retired from diplomatic service, was the most senior America hand. Like many others, Huang gained his first sustained exposure to things American while attending the missionary-run Yenching University.[11] It was at Yenching in 1936 that Huang Hua forged his lifelong friendship with American journalist Edgar Snow. Huang later was his interpreter when Snow met with Mao and other revolutionaries in Yan'an. After the Communists came to power, Huang Hua entered diplomatic service and enjoyed a distinguished career culminating in being named ambassador to Canada, China's first permanent representative to the United Nations, and later foreign minister. Huang Hua was the only Chinese ambassador abroad not recalled during the chaotic and isolationist Cultural Revolution, a fact probably due to his close ties to Premier Zhou Enlai. Huang Hua's role in Sino-American relations thus dates to the late 1930's. It was Huang who (along with Han Xu and Ji Chaozhu) was on the tarmac to welcome Henry Kissinger on his secret mission in July 1971.[12]

Another Yenching University graduate and key player has been Zhang Wenjin. Zhang, in fact, headed the team of four that escorted Kissinger on the secret flight from Islamabad to Beijing. In his memoirs, Kissinger described his impressions of meeting his first-ever "Chinese Communist":

Looking like a Spanish cardinal in an El Greco painting—though of course in Mao uniform—Zhang combined austere elegance and understated intelligence. His command of English was awe-inspiring . . . . He greeted us as if it was the most natural thing in the world for a senior Chinese diplomat to travel twenty-five hundred miles to accompany a capitalist official to the seat of a government that proclaimed itself the fountainhead of world revolution.[13]

[11]For an excellent account of this school see Philip West, *Yenching University and Sino-Western Relations, 1916–1952*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1976.

[12]Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1979, p. 43.

[13]Ibid., p. 741.

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Zhang Wenjin sat in on all of Kissinger's and, seven months later, Nixon's talks with Mao and Zhou. He also played a central role on the Chinese side in drafting the delicate language of the Shanghai Communiqué. Zhang's competence in American affairs and his distinguished diplomatic career qualified him to be named as the PRC's second ambassador to the United States, succeeding Chai Zemin in 1983. Like Huang Hua, Zhang's ties to the US date to his college days; he was also a member of the small group of close advisers to Zhou Enlai. Zhang, in fact, acted as Zhou's personal secretary during General George C. Marshall's 1946 mission to China.

Perhaps the third most influential MFA America specialist has been Han Xu. Currently ambassador to the United States, Han succeeded Zhang Wenjin when the latter retired. Ambassador Han is a seasoned America hand. Since the Nixon opening, he has spent more time in America than in China. As Kissinger has noted, "He has the longest experience in the United States of any Chinese official. He's highly professional, very charming, totally dedicated, tough, and pursues China's policy line with great skill."[14] Like his predecessor Zhang Wenjin, Han Xu is highly respected and liked in Washington. After being involved in the Kissinger and Nixon visits to China, Han Xu was dispatched to Washington as head of the advance team to establish the Liaison Office in 1973. As deputy chief of mission to two ambassadors who were not specialists on the United States, Han Xu played a central role in the secret negotiations leading up to the normalization of relations in 1979.[15] Back in Beijing, he was China's point man for negotiating the 1982 Joint Communiqué concerning US arms sales to Taiwan. Ambassador Han's expertise in American affairs also pre-dates 1949. His links with Americans date from his days in a Red Army guerrilla unit in north China when he rescued American pilots downed by the Japanese. A Yenching University graduate and a member of Zhou Enlai's team of advisers, he also dealt with Americans trying to mediate a cease-fire between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist Government during the 1940's. Indeed, it was Han Xu who delivered the official notification of the establishment of the People's Republic of China to the US Consulate on October 1, 1949.

Another central member of the MFA's core group of America specialists is Ji Chaozhu. Unlike ambassadors Huang, Zhang, and Han, Ji was not schooled on the battlefield or at Yenching University. He grew up in New York City from the age of eight, and later was an honor student in chemistry at Harvard University. Ji returned to China following the outbreak of the Korean War. The first evidence of Ji's diplomatic dealings with Americans came in 1953 when he served as interpreter at a Military Armistice Commission meeting in Panmunjom. He subsequently joined the Foreign Ministry, where he has played an important role in Sino-American relations for more than three decades. Because of his fluency in English, Ji has served as interpreter for Mao, Zhou, Deng Xiaoping, and other senior leaders in their meetings with American presidents and officials. During President Nixon's historic visit in 1972, Ji was plucked from a labor camp to interpret for Mao, only to be dispatched back to the countryside following Nixon's departure. It was also

[14] "An Old America Hand," *The New York Times*, Sept. 4, 1986.

[15] See the memoirs of Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith*, New York, NY, Bantam Books, 1982; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, New York, NY, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983; and Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices*, New York, NY, Simon and Schuster, 1983. Also Michel Oksenberg, "A Decade of Sino-American Relations," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Fall 1982, p. 186.

US President Richard Nixon meets with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in Beijing in February 1972: from left to right, Zhou, translator Nancy T'ang, Mao, Nixon, and Henry Kissinger.

—White House photo.

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Ji who flanked Edgar Snow and Mao atop Tiananmen in the famous 1970 photograph that was intended to signal to the Nixon administration China's readiness to talk. Ji was also a member of the Liaison Office advance team and served two tours in Washington. He is presently ambassador to Great Britain.

In addition to these four central players, other MFA America specialists have played important roles. Zhu Qizhen, Zhang Zai, and Zhang Wenpu have been instrumental in formulating America policy and implementing a variety of bilateral programs growing out of normalization. Cao Guisheng, Ni Yaoli, Qian Yongnian, Wang Li, Ma Yuzhen and others have served as key representatives in Washington and other US cities.

Without mention of T'ang Wensheng, certainly no discussion of China's America hands would be complete. Nancy T'ang—as she is more widely known—was a key player (along with her colleague and Mao's niece Wang Hairong) during the 1970's. Born in New York City, raised in Brooklyn and California, she returned to China in 1955. She was the second-ranking member of the four-person team to accompany Kissinger on his secret mission from Pakistan. Although she fell into political disfavor after Mao's death and the downfall of the Gang of Four, T'ang Wensheng interpreted for Presidents Nixon and Ford, as well as a range of other influential Americans throughout the 1970's. Evidently her language skills were not enough to sustain her role in the Foreign Ministry (where by 1974 she had risen to be deputy director of the American and Oceanian Affairs Department). Here, Henry Kissinger's memoirs are revealing: "... her intelligence and vivacity for a long time obscured her fanatical ideological dedication. She considered herself more than an interpreter; on several occasions she did not hesitate to argue with Zhou Enlai in our presence."[16]

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) also contains America watchers, although information about their names and functions is sketchy. In the case of the MND, the American and Oceanian Affairs Division of the Foreign Affairs Bureau is more than a "barbarian handler"; it appears to have an input into the ministry's America policy as well as contacts with the American military. In many ways, it serves as a front organ for the General Staff Department—particularly Deputy Chief of Staff Xu Xin, who is very experienced in dealing with foreigners and something of an America hand in his own right. Song Wenzhong is director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the MND. In addition, all three service arms maintain research organs that monitor US force deployments in the Asia-Pacific theater. The Academy of Military Sciences, the Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies (BIISS), and the Strategic Research Institute of the National Defense University are all concerned with more general issues related to US military strategy and weapons procurement. BIISS has been particularly active in cultivating American contacts and developing an indigenous research capability on American strategic, defense, and foreign policy matters.

All of these organizations closely monitor US-Soviet arms control negotiations and pay particular attention to new weapons programs such as the American Strategic Defense Initiative.[17] The National Defense Science and Technology Commission has been involved in negotiations for the purchase of US technologies with potential military application, while a host of front corporations (notably Poly Technologies) act on behalf of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for the purchase of American weapons systems. The "second division" (G-2) of the General Staff Department is responsible for collecting military intelligence; it is active in Washington and other foreign capitals. In addition, the military attaché and his staff in the Chinese embassy in Washington maintain close liaison with their American counterparts. However, because of the obviously sensitive nature of the MND's work, little else is publicly known about its America watching contingent.

In addition to the MFA and the MND, several other organs under the State Council have staff members who analyze America with respect to their particular organization's function. The Ministry of State Security literally watches Americans in China as part of its counter-intelligence mandate. The Ministry of Culture follows developments in the arts in America and arranges for exchanges. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) and its International Trade Research Institute monitor trends in the American economy and Sino-American trade. The Third Bureau in MOFERT is responsible for the United States. Some of the key America watchers in MOFERT are Liu Zepu, Shen Jueren, Chen Shibiao, and Zhu Youlan. The Bank of China watches the US Federal Reserve Board, American interest rates, and so on.

Also under the State Council is the International Studies Research Center, which acts as a coordinating unit for transmitting documents related to foreign policy from other segments of the bureaucracy to the top leadership (particularly the premier). It also performs decision-making functions on important foreign policy matters. Given these roles it might be considered

[16]Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 741.

[17]See Alastair I. Johnston, *China and Arms Control: Emerging Issues and Interests in the 1980's*, Ottawa, Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1986.

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equivalent to the US National Security Council. The center, for example, was responsible for writing the policy paper in 1983 that advocated that China open a dialogue with the Soviet Union and, at the same time, distance itself somewhat from the United States.[18] This recommendation was accepted by Premier Zhao Ziyang and adopted as policy, namely, China's "independent" foreign policy stance. The center, which has a small staff, is headed by Huan Xiang, a former diplomat, international affairs specialist, and veteran American watcher.

The final first-tier America watching institution is not attached to the State Council, but is an organ of the CCP Central Committee. The New China News Agency, which is attached to the Propaganda Department of the party (but is also under the operational control of the State Council), plays an extremely important role in watching America and interpreting it for the Chinese leadership and the population as a whole. It maintains a translation staff of several thousand whose full-time job is to translate the American press. These translations are carried in *Reference Materials* (*cankao ziliao*) for a limited number of high cadres, and in *Reference News* (*cankao xiaoxi*) for a more general readership, even though it too is restricted in circulation. NCNA has posted its foreign correspondents in the United States since 1979 (and earlier at the United Nations), and its reports appear regularly in the Chinese print and broadcast media. This is the single most important source of information for the general public about the US. Many NCNA correspondents are newcomers to America watching, but several senior correspondents and editors are old America hands. In fact, NCNA became something of a haven for these individuals during periods of domestic turmoil and political persecution. Senior America hands such as Li Shenzhi, Peng Di, Li Miao, Chen Youwei, Li Yanning, and Zhang Haitao all took refuge at NCNA for long periods of time and, as a result, developed bona fide careers as journalists while their previous careers were suspended.

The Second Tier

Second-tier America watching institutions include professional research institutes that pursue largely independent research on international relations—including the United States—but whose analytical product is used by first-tier organizations. As such, these institutes perform a consultative, advisory role for the central (and in two cases local) government and are, in fact, under the direction of first-tier units. Seven such institutes can be identified: the America Institute, the World Economics and Politics Institute, the World History Institute (all part of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), the Institute of International Studies, the Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, and the World Economics Institute of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.

As might be expected, the CASS America Institute (*Meiguo yanjiusuo*) is the single most important organization carrying out research on the United States. The institute was founded in 1981 at the direction of then-CASS president Hu Qiaomu, and has since enjoyed the strong support of Huan Xiang, director of the State Council's International Studies Research Center and key foreign policy adviser to the top Chinese leadership.[19] Li Shenzhi, a former aide to Zhou Enlai, has been the institute's director since its creation. Li is known abroad as "China's Arbatov." Wu Zhan, Li Shouqi, and Zi Zhongyun have served as deputy directors.

[18]Interview with America watcher, October 19, 1984.

[19]Interviews with America Institute personnel, October 1, 1982, and May 25, 1985.

Professor Zhang Jingyi of the America Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

—From the author's private collection.

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Starting with an initial staff of 10, the institute has built a staff of nearly 40 full-time researchers. The dozen or so junior staff members were recruited through a highly competitive examination and interview process. This group includes individuals such as Zhu Hongqian, He Di, Zhang Yi, Ren Yue, Wen Yang, Gu Ning, and Jia Aimei. The remainder of the staff were recruited—by the director's admission—on the basis of *guanxi*.[20] Several had previously been Li's classmates at Yenching University in the late 1940's. Li said he did not want to recruit from outside of Beijing "because of the *hukou* problem," i.e., the problem of changing residence permits.

While most of these staff members had some previous background in American studies, they had not been working on America. Li recruited senior staff from such disparate units as the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building (Wu Zhan), the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (Li Daokui), the New China News Agency (Cao Deqian and Yang Dazhou), the Chinese Academy of Space Technology (Hua Di), the People's Liberation Army (Zhang Jingyi), the All-China Youth Federation (Li Shouqi), the Ministry of Finance (Chen Baosen), the Committee for Cultural Exchange with Foreign Countries (Li Miao), the State Science and Technology Commission (Huo Shiliang), People's Literature Publishing House (Shi Xianrong), the Commission for Legal Affairs of the National People's Congress (Li Guoyou), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chen Hao), the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (Yao Zhong), the China Academy of Railway Sciences (Mao Yushi), the Institute of International Studies (Zi Zhongyun), and *People's Daily* (Chen Youwei).

Thus, Li Shenzhi's search for the "best and the brightest" took him to many organizations where one would not expect to find America specialists. Li himself had spent most of his career as an English-language editor with the international department of the New China News Agency. Like many other top America hands, Li's exposure to things American began at Yenching University. This background was enough to make him an early target of the 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign—which cast a shadow over Li's career for 20 years. Prior to that time, he was on a fast track to the top as a member of Zhou Enlai's inner circle of aides. Li accompanied Premier Zhou as secretary of the Chinese delegation to the 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina and to the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia. Like other of China's leading America hands today, he also served as a member of the Chinese delegation to the Korean armistice talks at Panmunjom in 1953.

Li Shenzhi has assembled a very respectable research staff. Virtually all have spent at least one year in the United States since 1981, and several of the junior staff are pursuing longer-term graduate studies in American universities. Their individual expertise varies considerably, but the staff is divided into four divisions: government and politics, economy, foreign policy and strategic studies, and society and culture. The specific subjects of research within these four areas are wide-ranging, but the institute describes them as follows.[21]

The American Government and Politics Division, first under the direction of Li Daokui and now under Li Miao, "studies the political system, government organizations, and domestic politics and policies of the United States. Short-term research projects include the American presidential election system, and local government and administrative reform of the federal government since the 1930's." It has at least six research personnel (Li Miao, Li Daokui, Yang Dazhou, Zhu Hongqian, Ren Yue, and Zhang Yi).

The American Economy Division, under the direction of Chen Baosen, "studies the trends, major problems, theory, and history of the US economy. Short-term research projects include the economic policies of postwar American presidents and the contemporary US economy." It draws on the work of at least four research personnel (Chen Baosen, Li Guoyou, Mao Yushi, and Zhou Yan).

The American Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies Division, under the direction of Zhang Jingyi and Zhang Yebai, "studies the global and regional strategies and foreign policies of the US. Short-term research projects include current American foreign policy, with emphasis on Sino-American and Soviet-American relations, and contrasts between Soviet and American military strength and strategic influence." It has six research personnel (Zhang Jingyi, He Di, Zhang Yebai, Yao Zhong, Huo Shiliang, and Jiang Zhenghao).

The American Society and Culture Division, under the direction of Dong Leshan, "studies the social structure, social ideological trends, social problems, and the workers' movement in the United States. Short-term research projects include the influence of technological and scientific development on American society, new ideological trends in American society, and contemporary literature." It has ten researchers (Dong Leshan, Shi Xianrong, Li Yuanliang, Gu Ning, Wen Yang, Zhu Chunyi, Jia Aimei, Zhong Zhiping, Yao Zhong, and Wang Benzhou).

These general research priorities are reflected in the institute's highly classified journal *America Research*

[20]Interview with Li Shenzhi, May 25, 1985.

[21]As described in *Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan* (The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), Beijing, n. p., 1983, pp. 111–13.

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Reference Materials (*Meiguo yanjiu cankao ziliao*). Beginning in 1987, the institute began to publish an unclassified version *America Research (Meiguo yanjiu)*. These journals are the best of their genre in China. Published monthly, they carry articles on numerous specialized topics.

The America Institute's primary purpose is to be "a scholarly research center."[22] According to director Li Shenzhi, the institute's "policy influence is minimal," but this may be an understatement since some staff members do prepare, or are commissioned to prepare, papers on particular topics for the leadership. Director Li has said: "We did prepare some papers for Zhao Ziyang's state visit in 1984, and I personally accompanied Premier Zhao as I did Deng Xiaoping in 1979."[23] Another staff member basically concurred with Li's assessment that the institute has:

. . . negligible direct policy influence on the making of America policy, but we do have indirect influence through Huan Xiang and others . . . . In order to have something read by the premier or other leaders you must have a good sense of timing, i.e., when the leader is focusing on a particular issue: the way to ascertain this is to know an assistant to a leader. Also, if you know the disposition of a leader on a particular issue you can slant your report so that it will be well-received. Otherwise, under normal circumstances, the only time we write for high policy-makers is for briefing materials surrounding a state visit or conference. Normally our research reports are circulated among members of the institute, sometimes to other institutes in CASS, but never to universities. Our interaction with universities is virtually nonexistent.[24]

The CASS World Economics and Politics Institute (*Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi yanjiusuo*) also contains America watchers who analyze developments in foreign relations and the US economy. The institute's director is Pu Shan, who holds a B.A. from Carleton College and a doctorate in economics from Harvard University. He is one of China's top America specialists (one of Pu Shan's brothers, Pu Shouchang, has also served as a leading America hand in the MFA over the years). Pu Shan is joined by America watchers Li Zong, Wang Shouhai, Wei Lin, Wang Huaining, Chen Dezhao, Lin Ke, Fan Kang, Luo Chengxi, Lu Wei, Zheng Weimin, Li Siti, Wang Shuzhong, Cheng Bifan, Shi Min, Shi Yuxing, Cao Meiyi, Yang Deming, Zhang Yunling, Hu You'er, Liu Xihan, and others. Altogether, Pu Shan heads a staff of more than 200, of which 120-odd are researchers. The latter work in nine research divisions, seven of which consider the US to be in their purview.[25]

The World Politics Division studies the US-Soviet "contest for hegemony" in all its facets. The Asia-Pacific Division studies "the Soviet-American struggle in the Asian-Pacific basin" and the role of the United States in the Pacific community. The International Economic Relations Division studies the US in the context of both East-West and North-South economic relations. The Comprehensive Division studies the US in the context of "post-World War II economic changes in developed capitalist countries, state monopoly capitalism, and economic cycles." The Theoretical Research Division studies the US in the context of "Marxist world economics." The Integrated Statistics Division compiles statistics on the US economy, both domestic and international. The World Economic History Division studies American economic history as part of the development of international capitalism.

As these self-descriptions make clear, many of the America watchers in the World Economics and Politics Institute demonstrate a strong Marxist-Leninist theoretical orientation in their writings. Researchers in this institute and the CASS World Economics Institute represent the strongest contingent of political economists in the Marxist-Leninist tradition in China, but they have also written some of the most revisionist interpretations in this genre of scholarship during the post-Mao era. At the same time, the institute publishes some of the most objective, scholarly, and non-Marxist interpretations of the American economy in China.[26] This dichotomy very much reflects the diversified training of the institute's senior staff, which divides fairly evenly between Soviet- and American-trained personnel. Several of the institute's staff hold doctorates from institutions such as Harvard University and the University of Chicago as well as Moscow State University and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Former students of Joseph Schumpeter and Milton Friedman literally work side by side with former students of Eugen Varga and S. A. Dallin. The influence of these mentors upon their pupils has not dissipated.

The institute publishes books, yearbooks, and professional journals. *World Economics* (*Shijie jingji*) and *Internal Reference Materials on World Economics and Politics* (*Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi neican*) are probably the finest of their kind in China. *World Economics* runs

[22]Interview with Li Shenzhi, May 25, 1985.
[23]Ibid.
[24]Interview with CASS America Institute staff member, October 1, 1982.
[25]See *Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan*, pp. 101–07.
[26]See Shambaugh, *Coverage of the United States in Key Chinese Periodicals During 1984*, pp. 46–48.

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approximately 25 articles annually on aspects of the US economy, and every year, one issue is devoted exclusively to the United States. "We try to include predictive articles and introduce our readers to new aspects of the American economy. We try to emphasize US structural analysis, science and technology, and cyclical trends to our readers," stated a *World Economics* editor in a 1985 interview.[27] *Internal Reference Materials on World Economics and Politics* is one of the three best international relations journals in China; because it is restricted to internal circulation (*neibu faxing*), it provides more of an in-depth look at unofficial Chinese thinking about current issues in international relations and Chinese foreign policy than one finds in *Research on International Studies* (*Guoji wenti yanjiu*) or *Modern International Relations* (*Xiandai guoji guanxi*). With respect to American topics, the journal frequently carries articles on the strategic triangle, current Sino-American relations, Soviet-American relations, US policies and role in Third World "hot spots," internal political affairs and decision-making processes in the US government, and other subjects that Chinese are normally reticent to address in forums open to examination by foreigners.

The third CASS institute pursuing research on the United States is the World History Institute. The leading America watcher here is undoubtedly Huang Shaoxiang. Mme. Huang is one of China's preeminent historians on America; she is the author of the widely-used text *A Comprehensive History of the United States*.[28] Research on American history is pursued by the "history of capitalism research office" (zibenzhuyishi yanjiushi) which has 22 researchers altogether. In addition to Huang Shaoxiang, American history specialists in this section include Hua Qingzhao, Zhang Haitao, Zhu Guisheng, Hu Guocheng, and Huang Keke. Hua is an accomplished scholar of the Truman era, and Zhang has already completed major studies of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter presidencies, and is now at work on the Kennedy and Johnson years. In addition to occasional books written by staff members, the institute also publishes three scholarly journals, which carry articles on the US in almost every issue: *World History* (*Shijie lishi*), *Trends in World History* (*Shijie lishi dongtai*), and *Foreign History Knowledge* (*Waiguoshi zhishi*). Articles published in these journals are generally not too ideological in tone or content. "We try to leave Marxist-Leninist theoretical articles to other magazines, and instead concentrate on specialized subjects of interest to historians," stated the senior editor in charge of these three journals.[29]

Together, these three institutes constitute the critical mass of America watching at CASS. To be sure, the US is considered by several other of CASS's 33 research institutes. The other area studies institutes (Soviet/Eastern Europe, Japan, Western Europe, Middle East and Africa, Latin America, South Asia) do analyze America's impact upon their respective countries and regions. The new Political Science Institute carries out research on the totality of the US political system (especially federalism, the separation of powers, parties, and the electoral system), the history of American political thought, and American political science.[30] The World Religions Institute, Foreign Literature Institute, Law Institute, Sociology Institute, Journalism Institute, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought Institute all follow events in the United States relevant to their fields. The Information Institute is in charge of collecting research materials for all CASS institutes, and has amassed a very impressive collection of primary and secondary American materials in a wide range of fields.

"Under the guidance of" CASS, but funded and administered by the Shanghai municipal government, is the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS). The North American economy research section of the SASS World Economics Institute contains the most bona fide America watchers in any of China's provincial academies of social sciences.[31] This research section, which was inaugurated in 1979, has now grown to about 20 full-time researchers who are subdivided into seven research groups which deal with the American economy: overall government economic policies, US economic history, economic theory, energy policy, trade, finance, and banking. Both Chu Baoyi (director of the World Economics Institute) and Yang Weizhi (director of the North America section) are established specialists on the US economy with many publications to their credit. Other America watchers of note here are Liu Renyi (American industry), Cao Jingxing (US economic history), Lian Hui (US monopoly capitalism), Chen Biaoru, Chen Zhaoxun, Chu Yukun, Huang Fen, Zhai Xiangyou, Ge Qi, Qing Benli, Wang Riyang, Xie Kang, Xu Ke, Yang Si-

[27]Interview at the World Economics and Politics Institute, July 17, 1985.

[28]Huang Shaoxiang, *Meiguo tongshi jianbian*, Beijing, Renmin chubanshe, 1979.

[29]Interview at Institute of World History, July 18, 1985.

[30]See *Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan*, op. cit., pp. 85–87.

[31]For information on SASS see Gilles Jasmin, Ed., *Social Sciences in the PRC*, Ottawa, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1985, pp. 53–54; The Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, files of the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC. Data on the North American economy research section was gained from a personal visit by the author on April 3, 1984. It should be noted that a brochure published by SASS also refers to an "International Politics Department" within the SASS Institute of Information which "is the sole body of the Academy engaged in research in the field of international politics . . . including North America." See "*Shanghai shehui kexueyuan jieshao*" (Introduction to the Shanghai Social Science Institute), mimeo.

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zheng, Zhang Youwen, Zhou Qingchuan, and Zhu Jiqing. SASS publishes the scholarly periodicals *Social Science* (*Shehui kexue*) and *Politics and Law* (*Zhengzhi yu falu*), while the World Economics Institute helps to publish the influential *World Economic Herald* (*Shijie jingji daobao*).

Also in Shanghai is the Shanghai Institute of International Studies—SIIS—(*Shanghai guoji wenti yanjiusuo*). The institute is "under the guidance of" the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, although it exhibits great independence and, in theory, answers to the Shanghai municipal government—from which it receives the major portion of its funding. Although it is small in comparison to Beijing-based institutes, the SIIS research staff is of high quality and their publications are testimony to this. The staff totals 100, including 58 full-time researchers.

The SIIS staff is divided into five regional research sections, including an America section. This section has nine full-time researchers who are subdivided into three research groups which analyze the US economy, domestic politics, and foreign policy and global strategy. Zhang Jialin is the section chief and the deputy chief is Ding Xinghao. Other America watchers include Yao Tinggang, Dong Zhujie, Zhang Ruizhuang, Jia Hao, Gong Huifeng, Li Yueqing, and Ke Yousheng. The Institute's journals *Materials on International Studies* (*Guoji wenti ziliao*) and *International Outlook* (*Guoji liaowang*), as well as its annual *Yearbook of International Affairs* (*Guoji xingshi nianjian*) all regularly carry articles on the US domestic scene and foreign relations. In addition, the institute staff has also published books on the US economy, supply-side economics, and the US role in NATO. During the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1986–90), the institute plans to publish a three-volume series entitled *New Developments in the US Economy* (the first volume has appeared), which will deal primarily with the impact of high-technology industries on US domestic and foreign policy, as well as a book on US Asian policy since World War II. Almost all members of the research office have now spent considerable time in the United States as visiting scholars or in graduate programs.

Returning to Beijing, there are two other professional research institutes of key importance involved in America watching: the Institute of International Studies and the Institute of Contemporary International Relations.

The Institute of International Studies (*Guoji wenti yanjiusuo*) (IIS) is the principal think tank of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The MFA assigns research projects to the IIS on an irregular basis, usually prior to a state visit or at the specific request of the Foreign Minister or another leader. IIS research papers are sent mainly to the MFA, but sometimes circulate throughout the upper echelons of government. Through its many contacts with foreign scholars and specialists, the IIS also serves as a valuable source of information for Chinese elites about foreign thinking on international affairs.

The IIS maintains a research staff of about 175, but this number fluctuates because the majority of the staff is on rotation from the MFA. The staff is divided into seven research divisions (the Americas, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Middle East/Africa/South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, international economics, and comprehensive research).

Within the US Division is the US research section, which, in turn, is divided into four subgroups focused on domestic politics and society, economy, Sino-Ameri-

America watchers at the Institute of International Studies with the author: from left to right, Pan Tongwen, Zhuang Qubing, the author, Qi Mingcong, Ye Ru'an, and Li Qingzhen.

—Photo from author's private collection.

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can relations, and US foreign policy.[32] The number of staff in the US section averages about 10, but varies because of staff reassignments. Veteran America watchers Pu Shan, Hu Zhengqing, Zi Zhongyun, Guo Maogong, Yao Wei, Xue Mouhong, He Qizhi, and Zhao Jihua have all been transferred from the IIS to other units in recent years. The current director of the US Division is Jin Junhui and the deputy director is Pan Tongwen. The research staff presently includes Zhuang Qubing, Yang Jiefa, Xie Xiaochuan, Wang Haihan, and Lin Changshen. Mr. Zhuang is probably the most prolific writer of all America watchers (having published nearly fifty articles on American foreign policy and domestic politics since 1974), and is one of the keenest observers of the US scene in China. Mr. Pan specializes in the evolving nature of liberalism and conservatism in the US, and its manifestations in various policy arenas. In terms of the making of China's America policy, the US Division often contributes papers to the America section at the Foreign Ministry, sometimes writes biographic profiles and background papers prior to a state visit, and occasionally authors more substantive studies on US domestic and foreign policies.[33]

In addition to the US Division, the Comprehensive Research Division has several America watchers who specialize in strategic and military aspects of American foreign policy and international security affairs. Huang Su'an and Ye Ru'an are the most notable America watchers in this division. Mr. Ye also heads a small subgroup of IIS researchers, drawn from several research divisions, who are concerned with arms control and superpower military issues,[34] and he himself is an expert on US strategic thinking and policies.

All of the research reports written by IIS staff are classified, but the institute does publish the influential quarterly periodical *Research on International Studies* (*Guoji wenti yanjiu*), which carries unclassified versions of IIS studies. The United States receives much attention in the quarterly. In the 17 issues published between July 1981 and January 1986, 13 percent of the articles were about US foreign policy (more than any other subject) and 4.6 percent were about American domestic affairs. This journal serves the general interests of Chinese foreign policy well by articulating semi-official thinking on questions of international affairs to Chinese and foreign audiences in far greater detail, and with greater sophistication, than can official MFA pronouncements and speeches by Chinese leaders.

Somewhat similar to the IIS is the Institute of Contemporary International Relations (*Xiandai guoji guanxi yanjiusuo*) (ICIR). The ICIR reports directly to the International Studies Research Center of the State Council, and also has ties to the Ministry of State Security (the successor to the Investigation Department of the CCP Central Committee). As such, the ICIR is China's main civilian foreign intelligence research unit. It provides the senior elite of the party and government with current intelligence and finished estimates, as well as briefing materials prior to official visits. With a research staff of more than 300, the ICIR is the largest international relations research institute in China. The ICIR's emergence from total obscurity to prominent visibility since 1982 is notable. The institute has embarked on an aggressive program of international interaction, including sending its staff abroad for advanced training and hosting foreign lecturers at home. The American watching component of the institute stands to benefit significantly from these activities.

The US Division has about 30 researchers who work in subsections on domestic politics, foreign policy, military strategy, economy and foreign trade.[35] Both the ICIR director (Liu Siqing) and deputy director (Geng Huichang) have spent their careers as America watchers; Mr. Liu previously served as chief of the US Division. Song Baoxian, a specialist on US foreign policy, is current division chief. In terms of America watching, US foreign and strategic policy is the ICIR's strength. Comprehensive Research Division researchers Zhou Jirong, Wang Baoqin, Qi Ya, Ren Mei, and Gu Guanfu rank among China's top strategic analysts.

In addition, the ICIR has recruited an impressive group of younger analysts in their twenties and thirties from the ICIR-affiliated College of International Relations. All institute research is classified, but it does openly publish the influential journal *Contemporary International Relations* (*Xiandai guoji guanxi*). Articles in this journal are generally of high analytical quality and unencumbered by Marxist-Leninist terminology. In the 10 issues published between January 1982 and January 1986, 23 percent of the articles were about American domestic affairs or foreign policy—almost double the coverage of any other country or region.

The Third Tier

The third tier of America watching in China takes place in university departments, affiliated research in-

[32]Interviews with Institute for International Studies staff, November 20, 1983, and November 24, 1986.

[33]Interviews with IIS staff, November 30, 1983, and January 12, 1984, and interview with Foreign Ministry official, March 25, 1983.

[34]This group has played a key role in formulating China's policies on arms control and disarmament issues. See Shambaugh, "China's National Security Research Bureaucracy," loc. cit., and Alastair I. Johnston, *China and Arms Control: Emerging Issues and Interests in the 1980's*.

[35]Interviews at the Institute of Contemporary International Relations, October 14, 1983, and November 4, 1983.

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stitutes, and American studies centers. By virtue of faculty concentration and institutionalized programs, 15 different universities and colleges can be considered to belong to the America watching establishment. To be sure, the odd America watcher exists at numerous other institutions, but must pursue his/her work without a broader institutional commitment to the study of the United States.

The quality of American studies programs in these universities, all of which are relatively new, is uneven. The university community generally has neither the institutional tradition nor commitment to American studies evident in first- and second-tier organizations. However, in the 1980's, several have made impressive efforts to establish and strengthen American studies programs. The major impediment to the future strengthening of these programs is the lack of an interdisciplinary area studies approach. As was aptly noted in the report of a US American studies delegation which visited China in 1984:

In China, American studies generally means American subject matter—the study of the United States under the conventional rubrics of history, literature, economics, politics, and international affairs. Even there, American subjects are usually a subset of larger configurations, so that American history is taught as part of world history, American literature as part of world literature, and economics, politics, and international affairs as part of courses with an international theme.[36]

Notwithstanding this overarching characteristic, the study of the United States in Chinese universities is a burgeoning area of academic pursuit. Well over a hundred faculty members nationwide can be considered America watchers. As will be evident from the following survey of the 15 universities and colleges that have American studies programs, each has its comparative advantage. Because each has its strength and the concept of the interdisciplinary study of the US is still in its infancy, no single school clearly stands above the rest. Generally speaking, however, it can probably be said that the study of American history[37] is the strongest area of American studies in Chinese universities and colleges, followed in order by American literature,[38] American economy,[39] American culture and society, American foreign relations, and American domestic politics.[40]

Peking University (*Beida*) probably has the largest number of America watchers and constituent units involved in the study of the United States of any Chinese university. Teaching and research on the US at *Beida* is conducted primarily in the History Department, the World Economics Department, the International Politics Department, the Institute of International Law and International Relations, and the American Studies Center.

Research on American history at *Beida* is carried out by the members of the American History Teaching and Research Group (*Meiguoshi jiaokezu*) of the History Department. This group has eight associated faculty members. The director is Qi Wenying (US colonial era and early Sino-American relations). Other members include Luo Rongqu (modern US history and Sino-American relations), Yang Liwen (Black history), Zheng Yaying (history of the civil rights movement), He Shunguo (history of US western expansion), Luo Zhengqing (American historiography), Tan Shengan (history of US foreign relations), and Si Meiyun (early American history).[41]

The World Economics Department of the Economics College at *Beida* has a small American Economy Teaching and Research Group (*Meiguo jingji jiaoyan xiaozu*) headed by Professor Hong Junyan. Professor Hong specializes in US monetary and fiscal policy, and in economic cycles and structural changes in the American economy. Other members of this group include Ye Rengen, Wang Yuzhang, Ming Qingquan, Ma Guonan, Zhao Hongzhen, and Tang Kai'an.

The International Politics Department at *Beida* has an International Studies Research Group (*guoji wenti yanjiuzu*) with faculty members whose research focuses on the United States. Six of them—Zhao Baoxu,

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[36]*American Studies in China: Report of a Delegation Visit*, op. cit., p. 4.

[37]For earlier "state of the field" assessments, see Wang Chi, "Teaching and Research in United States History: The People's Republic of China," in Lewis Hanke, Ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the US, 1945–1980*, Vol. 1, White Plains, NY, Kraus International Publications, 1985, pp. 484–503; Beatrice S. Bartlett, "Archive Materials in China on United States History," ibid., pp. 504–566; William Whiteside, "Teaching United States History in Beijing University, 1982–83: Reflections and Recommendations," ibid., pp. 567–590; Wang Chi, "Chinese Studies in American History: A Summary Report," unpublished; Sheldon Harris, "Modern China's Interpretation of American History," paper presented to the American Association for Chinese Studies, Annual Meeting, November 1982; John Robert Moore, *The State of American History Studies in the People's Republic of China*, Washington, DC, United States Information Agency, 1985; John J. Deeney, *The State of American History and Literature Studies in the People's Republic of China*, Washington, DC, United States Information Agency, 1982; *American Studies in China: Report of a Delegation Visit*, op. cit., pp. 21–25; and "American History," in *Yearbook of Chinese Historical Studies* (*Zhongguo lishixue nianjian*), Beijing, Renmin chubanshe, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985.

[38]See John J. Deeney, op. cit.; *American Studies in China: Report of a Delegation Visit*, op. cit., pp. 26–30.

[39]For a "state of the field" survey, see Hu Teh-wei, *The State of American Economic Studies in the People's Republic of China*, Washington, DC, United States Information Agency, 1984.

[40]For a "state of the field" survey see Michael Baron, *The State of American Government and Law Studies in the People's Republic of China*, Washington, DC, United States Information Agency, 1982; also *American Studies in China: Report of a Delegation Visit*, op. cit., pp. 31–32.

[41]"*Beijing daxue lishixi Meiguoshizu jieshao*" (Introduction to Peking University's History Department American History Group), mimeo, October 1984, pp. 3–4.

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America watchers at Peking University: left, Hong Junyan, chairman of the World Economics Department and deputy director of the American Studies Center; at right, Zhao Baoxu and Wang Jisi, of the International Politics Department (Zhao is also a deputy director of the American Studies Center and was formerly departmental chairman as well).

—Photos from author's private collection.

Wang Jisi, Yuan Ming, Huang Xiaoming, Gong Wenxiang, and Liang Gencheng—have research interests in Sino-American relations and US foreign policy more generally, while Shen Mingming, Zhou Zhiren, Yang Ming and others follow the American domestic scene.

Other departments at *Beida* also contain America watchers and offer courses on aspects of the United States. Law Department professors Wang Tieya, Luo Haocai, and Shen Zongling are recognized authorities on American law and politics. The Law Department offers courses on US constitutional law, US civil law, and various general courses that include discussion of the United States. The Philosophy Department offers a class on contemporary American philosophy. The Foreign Languages Department offers courses on American literature, US mass media, and a survey of US culture and society.

The Institute of International Law and International Relations at *Beida,* established in 1985, has three main research foci: (1) Sino-American relations, (2) US-Soviet relations, and (3) international relations theory. Its director is former ambassador to the United States Zhang Wenjin. The institute serves as a research center for *Beida* faculty with interests in these areas, and currently has eight affiliated researchers.

Similarly, the American Studies Center (*Meiguo wenti yanjiu zhongxin*) at *Beida* serves as a conduit for faculty with interests in American studies. Established in 1983, the center has a well-stocked library of more than 2,000 books donated by the US Fulbright Program, issues an occasional newsletter on activities in American studies at *Beida*, sponsors academic symposia on the US, and plans to establish a two-year interdepartmental program in American studies leading to an M.A. degree. Law professor Wang Tieya is center director, and economics professor Hong Junyan is deputy director.

Beijing Normal University (*Beijing shifan daxue*), founded in 1902, is the oldest university in China training teachers for secondary schools. It has an American History Teaching and Research Group (*Meiguoshi jiaokezu*) in the History Department and an American Economy Research Office (*Meiguo jingji yanjiushi*) in the Political Economy Department; the faculties conduct research for the North America Research Office. The history group has several America watchers, including Huang Annian, Ma Xing, and Huang Delu. The American Economy Research Office is headed by Xue Buoying and includes five other America watchers: Tao Dayong, Cui Wei, Tong Xiantu, Ju Hengchang, and Zhang Yunlin. Professors Xue, Tao, Cui, and Zhang all rank among China's best-known Marxist scholars on the United States. Their articles frequently appear in professional journals, including *American Studies Reference Materials* (*Meiguo wenti cankao ziliao*), which is published by this research office.

People's University (*Renda*) has one of the three international politics departments in China (*Beida* and Fudan have the others), but the United States does not command much attention, although some research on America foreign policy is conducted there. Affiliated with this department is the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies which, as part of its Soviet foreign policy section, does conduct some research on Soviet-American "contention for hegemony" and Soviet-American-Japanese interaction. The bulk of America watching at *Renda,* however, takes place in the Political Economy Department. Publications written or edited by professors in this department reflect a strong Marxist-Leninist theoretical orientation. This is particularly evident in the writings of senior America watchers Wu Da-

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kun and Song Tao. Others in this department with an interest in the American economy are Gao Hongye (who translated Paul Samuelson's classic text, *Economics*), Fan Sujie, Li Xiaoqian, Wang Guangfu, Li Liqun, Mu Yin, Dai Shiguang, and department chairman Guo Ding. The department offers a seminar on the American economy. *Renda* also maintains a World Economics and Management Institute, with which noted America watchers Shi Jin and Huang Su are affiliated.

The Beijing Foreign Languages Institute (*Bei-wai*), now called Beijing International Studies University, mainly trains personnel for the Foreign Ministry and as United Nations interpreters. It is the only institution of higher education in China to award an M.A. in American studies.[42] Courses are offered on American society and culture, history, diplomacy, political institutions, and literature. *Beiwai* has relied heavily on visiting Fulbright professors to teach these courses. Deng Yanchang, a Chinese-American, is director of the American studies program at *Beiwai*, and coordinator of the US Research Group. The faculty includes Yang Limin (American history and intellectual thought), Mei Renyi (20th-century US diplomatic history), Zhu Yongtao (US history and society), Zhang Yulin (US labor history), and Zhong Meisun (modern American history). These faculty members meet bi-weekly.

The College of International Relations (*Guoji guanxi xueyuan*) is administered by the State Education Commission (the successor to the Ministry of Education), and apparently also by the Investigation Department of the Central Committee, and the Institute of Contemporary International Relations. Many of its graduates go to work at the ICIR or the New China News Agency. Faculty are divided into five teaching sections: international politics, world economics, international journalism, Chinese language and linguistics, and foreign languages.[43] America watching takes place in the first three sections, and faculty members teach courses on the US in all these areas. The college also has a journal, *College of International Relations Journal* (*Guoji guanxi xueyuan xuebao*), which publishes many M.A. theses.

The Foreign Affairs College (*Waijiao xueyuan*) is attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and trains incoming and mid-career diplomats. Courses are offered on American history, culture and literature, diplomatic history, and politics. America watching takes place in the International Economy and Political Systems Teaching and Research Office (*Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi zhidu jiaoyanshi*). The faculty includes America watchers Yang Baihua and Lu Xiaobo (both have published extensively on US political parties and interest groups), and Pan Shaozhong, one of China's leading specialists on American literature and culture.

Outside of Beijing several universities have established American studies programs. In Manchuria, Northeast Normal University (*Dongbei shifan daxue*) has a US History Research Institute. Noted historian Ding Zemin is director of the institute, which also includes Tian Xiguo (US history from the colonial period to the Spanish-American War), Wang Guizheng (US diplomatic history), Guo Yixuan (US economic history), Wang Xu (US urban history), and Bian Linan (US labor history). Professor Ding is China's leading specialist on American historians Frederick Jackson Turner and Charles Beard. Northeast Normal University also plans to establish an American studies research institute.

In Tianjin, Nankai University has a US History Research Institute affiliated with its History Department. Research in the center emphasizes four major areas: Black history, labor history, Southern history, and US diplomatic history. The center has 10 members: director Zhang Youlun (US economic and labor history, US-Soviet relations), Yang Shengmao (US historiography and diplomatic relations), Feng Chengbo (US society and economy), Zhou Jikun (American culture), Yi Tingzhen (US economic history), Lu Jingsheng (US labor history), Lin Jingfen (American agriculture), Li Qing (Black history), Wang Xinyang (US labor history), and Ni Ting (western migration). These faculty members teach their subjects in the History Department. This core faculty is one of the strongest of its type, and Professors Yang Shengmao, Zhang Youlun, and Feng Chengbai are recognized in China as being at the top of their field. It should be noted, however, that all their writings exhibit a Marxist-Leninist theoretical cast.

Nankai University also houses the esteemed Economics Research Institute of which the American Economy Research Group (*Meiguo jingji yanjiuzu*) is a part. Of the six groups within the institute, the American economy group is the largest. This group includes institute director (and former university president) Teng Weizao, a leading expert on multinational corporations (MNC's). Also interested in MNC's are Chen Yingfang and Mong Zhanlin. Tao Jikai specializes in US public finance, Xiong Xingmei studies American economic fluctuations, Wang Jizu is an expert on US monetary policy, and Chen Yue, Tang Weixia, Jiang Zheshi, and Zhu Tong are all reportedly interested in investment strategies and mergers of major American MNC's. Interna-

[42]The description of this program is drawn from *American Studies in China: Report of a Delegation Visit*, op. cit., p. 17; and John Robert Moore, op. cit., pp. 45–46.

[43]*Guoji guanxi xueyuan jieshao* (Introduction to the College of International Relations), mimeo, 1985.

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tional economics professors Yi Menghong and Yang Jinnian are also engaged in teaching and research on the American economy.

Shandong University (*Shanda*) in Jinan is indisputably China's leading institution specializing in American literature. The university's Modern American Literature Institute (*Meiguo xiandai wenxue yanjiusuo*) was headed by Professor Wu Fuheng from its inception in 1963 until 1976 when he became university president. Since then it has been directed by his wife Mme. Lu Fan. The institute grants B.A. and M.A. degrees. It publishes the prestigious quarterly journal *American Literature (Meiguo wenxue)*, which carries both literary criticism and translations.

Shanda also has an active American history program centered around the American History Teaching and Research Group (*Meiguoshi jiaoyanzu*) in the History Department. The group is headed by the noted specialist on the American Civil War, Liu Zuochang,[44] and includes five other members: Zhu Ming and Dong Hongfeng (American culture and civilization), Song Jiahang (North American history), Sui Zhaowei (US economic history), and Guan Shaoji (US intellectual history).

In conjunction with the City College of New York, *Shanda* also has plans to establish an interdepartmental American Culture Research Center (*Meiguo wenhua yanjiu zhongxin*) which will bring together a faculty of 40–50 in an attempt to integrate multi-disciplinary research on the United States.[45] The center will have five research sections: American literature, history and culture, economics, philosophy, and language.

Shandong Normal University is also active in research on American history. Its History Department offers a B.A. and M.A., and will soon offer a Ph.D. in American history. Professor Liu Zuochang (who holds a concurrent professorship at *Shanda*) heads the department's US History Teaching and Research Group. Members include Hai Enzhong (American slave trade), Cao Jing (the development of modern American capitalism), Cheng Hanzhang (American political thought and the US political system), Dong Jimin (American agricultural development), Zhang Dinghe (US economic history), and Chen Haihong (colonial and Black history). Shandong Normal University maintains close contacts with nearby *Shanda*, and appears to be a rising star in the field of American history studies in China.

American studies at Nanjing University (*Nanda*) is also growing and in time is expected to become a leading center in China. Of great impetus to this development is the opening in September 1986 of the Nanjing–Johns Hopkins Center for Chinese and American Studies (*Nan-Hou Zhong-Mei wenhua yanjiu zhongxin*). This cooperative venture in educational training is unprecedented in post-1949 China. A central part of the center's curriculum is the teaching of American studies to Chinese graduate students by American faculty.

This center builds upon a foundation of *Nanda* faculty involved in historical, political, economic, cultural, and literary aspects of American studies. The university's Department of History has both a World History Teaching and Research Group, which contains faculty who research domestic American history, and a History of Modern British and American Foreign Relations Research Group. The latter is headed by the eminent historian Wang Shengzu, who is retired from teaching but continues his research on 20th-century American foreign policy.[46] In addition to Professor Wang, the group includes Gao Xingzu (Japanese-American relations), Lu Minghua (20th-century American diplomatic history and Sino-American relations), Li Qingyu (Spanish-American War), and Shi Yinhong, Hao Yufan, and Shen Xiaofang—all of whom specialize in Sino-American relations since World War II. The university's Foreign Languages and Literature Department has an American Culture Research Office (*Meiguo wenhua yanjiushi*) headed by American literature specialist Lin Zibing. The Department of Economics at *Nanda* has only one professor who specializes in the American economy, Tuan Xinmin.

Sichuan University (*Chuanda*) in Chengdu is the only institution in southwest China with an American studies program. Prior to the establishment of its American Studies Center in 1985, research on the United States at *Chuanda* was concentrated in the History Department's American History Teaching and Research Group. This group has four members: Gu Xuejia (Sino-American relations), Gao Suyuan (Soviet-American relations), Wang Shijun (US economic history), and Ye Shangwei (US social history).

Wuhan University (*Wuda*) has an American History Research Center (*Meiguoshi yanjiu zhongxin*) and a North American Economies Research Institute (*Bei-Mei jingji yanjiusuo*). Both are very active. The American History Research Center was established as a research office (*yanjiushi*) in 1964, but was disbanded during the Cultural Revolution.[47] Today the center has 11 mem-

[44]Liu Zuochang, *Meiguo neizhanshi* (History of the American Civil War), Beijing, Renmin chubanshe, 1978.

[45]See Appendix "O" in John J. Deeney, op. cit., pp. 127–28.

[46]Interview with Professor Wang Shengzu at Nanjing University, February 19, 1985.

[47]Data on Wuhan University derives primarily from interviews with Professors Liu Xuyi and Wu Jixian on October 26–27, 1984.

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The official opening of the Nanjing-Hopkins Center for Chinese and American Studies in September 1986.

—Courtesy of the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

bers, headed by the noted professor of American history Liu Xuyi. Other members include Professor Emeritus Cao Shaolian (history of American politics), Li Shidong (American historiography and US socialist movements), Li Shiya (US colonial history and War of Independence), Li Cunxian (the Truman presidency), Zhong Wenfan (American labor movement and post-World War II foreign policy), Tan Jinjiu (US political parties and government), Wang Jintang (US history 1870–1914), and Han Tie (the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations). Together, this group is in the midst of publishing 30 monographs on various aspects of American history since the Spanish-American War. The monographs published to date, as well as Professor Liu's numerous articles, are notable for their strong Marxist-Leninist interpretations. These materials are some of the most ideological in tone and content of their genre published anywhere in China.

The North American Economies Research Institute at *Wuda* is just as active as its US history counterpart, but the studies produced by its staff have a far less ideological flavor. Headed by Professor Wu Jixian (a specialist in US economic cycles and structural readjustment who holds a Ph.D. from Harvard), the institute has 15 members, including Guo Wuxin (US urban economy), Huang Yongsi (US livestock economy), and Wang Zhizhu (US foreign trade and investment). Several other institute economists have published works on the public and private debt in the US, the social security system, capital formation, and technological development and its effect on labor productivity. The institute also publishes the internally-circulated journal *Materials on North American Economies* (*Bei-Mei jingji ziliao*).

The Shanghai International Studies University (formerly the Shanghai Foreign Languages Institute) is also developing into a leading center for American studies, especially for the training of university, normal college, and middle-school teachers. The university established its American Studies Center in 1982. The strength of this center and the university's program lies not in its Chinese faculty, but in its strong tie with the US Fulbright Program, which places American professors in residence each year. The center offers an interdisciplinary approach to American studies.

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Fudan University in Shanghai has faculty research sections on the United States in the departments of international politics, world economy, history, law, and foreign languages and literature. In addition, its American Studies Center, which was founded in 1985, has already convened several major conferences, assembled a very respectable library, and drawn up ambitious plans for future growth. Presently, the center has 15 affiliated faculty members. According to the institute's deputy director, Wang Xi, the center is intended to function as an "American-style interdisciplinary area studies center."[48]

When Fudan's International Politics Department was founded as one of three nationwide in 1964, it was charged by the State Council and Ministry of Education with concentrating on the political systems of developed countries (including the United States), while People's University was to concentrate on socialist countries, and Peking University on developing countries.[49] Since that time, professors Cao Peilin (US foreign policy and political system), Ni Shixiong (US foreign policy, Sino-American relations, and the executive branch), and Chen Qiren (US state-monopoly capitalism) have taught most of the courses on the United States. In recent years, younger faculty members have begun their teaching careers in the field of American studies. They include Gai Zheya (domestic political system and process, Sino-American relations), Yu Zhengliang (Sino-American relations), Lin Limin (governmental administration), Zhu Qianwei (American government), and Xu Zhiping (US foreign policy). Several of these individuals are now pursuing graduate studies in the US.

The World Economy Research Institute, which is loosely affiliated with Fudan's World Economy Department, has a research section on the United States. The institute was founded in 1964, and now includes about 20 researchers working on the US economy,[50] some of whom are simultaneously affiliated with the World Economics Institute at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences or the Shanghai Institute of International Studies. The current director Yu Kaixiang is a specialist on the American economy. Other institute researchers with interests in the US economy include Chen Guanlie, Jiang Xuemo, Gong Weijing, Gan Dangshan, Yang Lujun, Guo Qiyuan, Zheng Yan, Wang Qinghua, Deng Liping, Mao Zhenghu, Zhang Runsen, and others.

American history specialists at Fudan include Wang Xi (US-China relations), Jin Wenhan (American political history), Zhuang Xichang (American culture and civilization), Huang Ruizhang (late 19th-century US history), Shen Xiaohong (colonial history), Wang Yijie (19th-century Sino-American relations), and Zhou Hongjun (20th-century Sino-American relations).

The Law Department at Fudan offers several courses on American law and politics. The only faculty member with obvious research interests in the United States is Li Changdao (who specializes in state and local government); thus, the department usually draws upon faculty from other departments to teach these courses.

This completes the survey of third-tier institutions (universities) having programs in American studies and/or faculty engaged in research on the United States. To be sure, there are isolated America watchers at schools other than these 15 universities and colleges. They include Jilin University, Northwest University (*Xibei Daxue*) in Xian, the Politics and Law University (*Zhengfa Daxue*) in Beijing, Lanzhou University, Xiamen University, Shenzhen University, and Zhongshan University in Guangzhou.

The Fourth Tier

The fourth tier of institutions engaged in America watching are national research associations and scholarly societies that bring together America watchers from around the country for conferences and organize ongoing research projects on the United States. Some of



America watchers at Fudan University: from left to right, Wang Xi, deputy director of the university's Center for American Studies, the author, Jiang Zehong, and Gong Weijing.

—Photo from author's private collection.

[48]Interview, November 28, 1986.

[49]Interview at Fudan University, International Politics Department, April 14, 1984.

[50]Hu Teh-wei, op. cit., p. 16.

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these are structured by academic disciplines and study the United States in that context, such as the World Economy Research Association, the China Political Science Association, the World History Society, the International Law Society, or the International Relations History Research Association. But strictly speaking, only the American Economy Research Association, the American History Research Association, and the American Literature Research Association are completely devoted to coordinating activities on the United States in their respective subject areas. Several scholars are presently considering establishing a national American studies association; whether this initiative will supercede the aforementioned associations is not clear.

The American Economy Research Association (*Meiguo jingji yanjiuhui*) was established in 1978 and now has about 300 members nationwide. The association held its first meeting in Chengdu on November 17–24, 1979.[51] One-hundred and eighty-eight delegates attended, and 123 papers were presented, of which 40 were later published together in a conference volume.[52] Teng Weizao of Nankai University was elected chairman of the association. The second meeting convened in Hefei on May 10–15, 1982.[53] One-hundred and fifty delegates attended, and 70 papers were presented. Wu Jixian of Wuhan University was elected the new director of the association, and Chen Guanlie (Fudan University), Li Shenzhi, Li Zong, and Fan Kang (all of CASS) were elected deputy directors. The third meeting of the association was held on October 25–31, 1985, in Xianyang.[54] Guo Wuxin was appointed the new director, and six others were appointed deputies.

The American History Research Association of China (*Zhongguo Meiguoshi yanjiuhui*) was founded in 1979 and has been extremely active in strengthening the development of the field on a national basis. Huang Shaoxiang is chairperson, and Liu Xuyi, Yang Shengmao, and Ding Zemin are vice-chairmen. The association has held meetings in Wuhan in October 1979, Yantai in October 1980, Suzhou in June 1982, in Chengdu in June 1984, and in Lanzhou in 1986. The association's membership has grown from an original group of 18 to nearly 200. In addition to the biennial meetings, which have proven to be forums for lively exchanges on research findings, the association has a very active publications program.

It publishes an occasional newsletter, *American History Research Association of China Bulletin* (*Zhongguo Meiguoshi yanjiuhui tongbao*), which provides members with information about activities of the association, bibliographical surveys, scholarly exchanges with American historians, institutional and personnel developments in the field, and critical essays. The association has also published the translation series *Selected Translations on American History* (*Meiguoshi yicong*), a bibliographical index to articles and books on the United States published between 1949 and 1982,[55] and conference volumes of selected essays resulting from association meetings.[56] The most ambitious publication project of the association is the six-volume work, *A General History of the United States,* which is projected to begin publication in 1989. Volume 1 will be compiled by Qi Wenying and others in the History Department at Peking University and will cover the US up to 1763; Volume 2 will be compiled by Zhang Youlun and others at Nankai University and will cover 1763–1860; Volume 3 will be compiled by Ding Zemin and others at Northeast Normal University and will cover 1860–1898; Volume 4 will be compiled by Gu Xuejia and others at Sichuan University and will cover 1898 to 1929; Volume 5 will be compiled by Liu Xuyi and Li Cunxun at Wuhan University and will cover 1929–1953; and Volume 6 will be compiled by Han Tie and Wang Shouzhi at Wuhan University and will cover 1953 to the present. All in all, the American History Research Association of China sponsors an impressive range of scholarly activities and is one of the most active professional associations in China.

Conclusion

The above sketch of China's America watching community is testimony to the growth of American studies in China. One of the most striking facts about the leading America specialists identified in this article is that they were American-trained, either in the United States itself or in missionary schools in China before 1949. It may have taken 40 years for this American-trained generation to come to the fore fully, but it is clear that today

[51]"The First Annual Meeting of the American Economy Research Association Convened in Chengdu," *Shijie jingji* (Beijing), No. 12, 1979, p. 70.

[52]*Meiguo jingji taolunhui lunwenji* (Collected Essays of the American Economy Discussion Group), Beijing, Shangwu yinshuguan, 1981.

[53]"The Second Annual Meeting of the American Economy Research Association Convened in Hefei," *Shijie jingji,* No. 6, 1982, p. 21.

[54]"The National American Economy Research Association Convened Its Annual Meeting in Xianyang, Shaanxi," *Shijie jingji,* No. 12, 1985, p. 73.

[55]Sichuan University History Department American History Group, Eds., *Meiguoshi lunwen ziliao suoyin* (Index to Articles on the United States), Chengdu, Meiguoshi yanjiuhui, 1983.

[56]China's American History Research Association, *Meiguoshi lunwenji* (Collected Essays on American History), Beijing, Sanlian shudian, 1980; *Meiguoshi lunwenji, 1981–1983* (Collected Essays on American History, 1981–1983), Beijing, Sanlian shudian, 1983; Yang Shengmao and Lin Jingfen, *Meiguoshi lunwenxuan* (Selected Essays on American History), Tianjin, Renmin chubanshe, 1984.

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many of them are the managers of the Sino-American relationship in its many facets. With 27,000 Chinese students now on American campuses, more "America hands" are in the pipeline.

It is important to point out, however, that the America watchers are not necessarily pro-American—even if they do understand quite a lot about the United States. Understanding does not equate with sympathy. China's America watchers are ardent nationalists; they perceive the United States largely in light of what it can do to help modernize China and help restore it to its proper place in the international community. They do not seek to emulate the United States or replicate the American experience in China, even if they are strongly in favor of adopting many American methods in China's quest for modernity.

Ultimately, the America watchers are people who work to understand the United States, and to educate their countrymen about it. Over the past decade, they have presented a more factual and less ideological set of interpretations of the United States to Chinese elites and the public. In this regard, they contribute significantly to increased mutual understanding as a foundation for ongoing Sino-American relations.

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Soviet Statistics on Ukraine: Selective Omissions

I. S. Koropeckyj

A VARIETY of statistics available for the entire USSR have not been included in the recent statistical yearbooks of individual republics. In the case of Ukraine, important economic statistics have been omitted (often for the whole postwar period), even though many of them have been published for the other union republics. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's three-year campaign for "*glasnost'* " (openness) in all spheres of social life, including economic statistics,[1] has done little so far to improve this situation. It is conceivable that, in view of the time required to prepare data for publication and to publish them, three years is too short a period in which to expect or observe progress and that progress may come in the future.[2] But for the present, gaps in regional statistics continue to be a reality and their existence prompts a number of thoughts regarding official motivation for withholding data.

The purpose of the first part of this note is to examine the statistics as reported for 1985, the year for which the most recent statistical yearbooks were available for the USSR, Ukraine, and most of the other 14 union republics.[3] These volumes are invariably entitled *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo . . . v 1985 g.* [The National Economy of . . . in 1985] and are commonly referred to by the abbreviated form *Narkhoz*. The data published (or not published) in the *Narkhozy* can serve as a useful benchmark for tracing any improvements in the availability of regional statistics resulting from *glasnost'*. The second part will offer some hypotheses about possible reasons for the present "blank spots" with respect to economic statistics for the union republics, and especially for Ukraine.

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How Statistics Are Compiled

Before presenting the evidence, it is worthwhile to describe briefly the two methods utilized in the USSR to compile economic statistics.

The first stems from the dual structure found in economic planning and administration. Part of the economy is organized according to the regional principle, and, of course, the relevant statistics are available to regional authorities, including republic governments. The other

[1]See, for example, the following passage from Mikhail Gorbachev's speech of June 25, 1987: "A very important and pressing task is the fundamental reconstruction of our statistics. Drastic changes in the handling of quantitative indicators, expansion of information on problems of regional and social development, and the undertaking of various investigations based on sampling are necessary . . . . It is also necessary to expand the boundaries of materials on economic and social statistics that can be made public." *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 27, July 1987, p. 9.

[2]After this note was completed, *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR za 70 let* (The National Economy of the USSR at 70), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1987, and *Narodnoye khozyaystvo Ukrainskoy SSR: Yubileynyy statisticheskiy yezhegodnik—70* (The National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR: Anniversary Statistical Yearbook—70), Kiev, Tekhnika, 1987, became available. It appears that *glasnost'* progressed somewhat, because seven of the enumerated indicators (Items 7, 8, 9, 12, 25, 27, and 32 in Table 1) appeared in the Ukrainian handbook. Two of them (Items 12 and 25) are considered in this note to be related to national income transfers.

It seems, however, that this degree of openness still fails to satisfy public opinion in Ukraine. At a recent meeting, Ukrainian writers made the unprecedented demand that the economic balances between their republic and the USSR as a whole should be published. See *Literaturna Ukrayina* (Kiev), July 28, 1988.

[3]For Lithuania, Estonia, Tadzhikistan, and Turkmenistan, the latest *Narkhoz* available to the author at the time of writing was for 1984.

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Table 1: Selected Indicators Included in 1985 USSR Statistical Yearbook but Not for Ukraine and Various Other Republics

Not published in Ukraine[1]	Ukraine	RSFSR	Belorussia	Moldavia	Lithuania	Latvia	Estonia	Georgia	Azerbaijan	Armenia	Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan	Kirgiziya	Tadzhikistan	Turkemistan	Total
1. Economic relations with foreign countries																0
2. Growth of fixed assets and inventories by industrial branches																0
3. Energy balance				X												1
4. Output, employment, and fixed assets of agro-industrial complexes				X	X											2
5. Structure of family budgets of workers and kolkhozniks							X	X								2
6. Value of gross industrial output in current wholesale prices					X	X		X								3
7. Growth of output of machine-building by branches								X	X			X				3
8. Growth of output of chemical industry by branches								X	X			X				3
9. Growth of output of light industry by branches								X	X			X				3
10. Gross social product by economic sectors				X		X	X	X								4
11. Kolkhoz-market trade		X		X		X		X		X	X					6
12. Industrial output by administrative subordination				X	X	X		X			X		X			6
13. Birth rate by urban and rural areas		X	X	X		X		X		X	X					7
14. Capital investment by industrial branches				X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X		9
15. Employment distribution by sectors and branches (1975)																0
16. Output of pig iron (1975)																0
17. Output of cement (1975)																0
18. Distribution of fixed assets by industrial branches (1975)													X			1
19. Output of natural gas (1975)		X														1
20. Output of oil (1975)		X									X					2
21. Output of other fuels (peat, shales, wood) (1975)		X			X		X									3
22. Output of textiles (1975)						X					X	X				3
23. Utilization of profits of all enterprises and industrial enterprises (1975)		X			X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		10
24. Marketed agricultural production by social sectors and products (1975)		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		12
25. Depreciation by economic sectors (1977)		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		12
26. National income by economic sectors (1978)						X	X									2
27. Working capital by economic sectors (1978)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			12
28. Output of steel (1980)																0
29. Output of trucks and automobiles (1980)		X														1
30. Output of coal (1980)		X														1
31. Output of grain, by individual products (1980)		X		X	X	X							X			5
32. National income in current prices (1983)				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			10
Total for each republic	0	12	3	12	11	14	9	15	8	8	10	10	8	4	0	

[1]Not published since World War II, unless otherwise indicated (for the latter cases, the most recent year in which published is shown in parentheses).

SOURCES: 1985 statistical yearbooks for the USSR and individual republics, except for Lithuania, Estonia, Tadzhikistan, and Turkmenistan, for which only the 1984 yearbooks were available at the time of writing.

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part is organized according to production branches or economic sectors. Branch ministries can be of three sorts: republic, union-republic, or all-union. The first are subordinated only to the government of the given republic; the second, to the republic and to a central ministry; the third, directly to the central government.

Enterprises of republic ministries and the republic-subordinated enterprises of union-republic ministries supply their statistics to republic authorities, which in turn pass this information up to central authorities. Enterprises of all-union ministries and union-subordinated enterprises of union-republic ministries provide their statistics directly to authorities in Moscow, which in turn are obliged to share relevant data with republic governments. The statistics derived through these two channels cover the overwhelming bulk of a republic's economy. Concurrently, all enterprises located on a republic's territory are required to supply their statistics to the republic offices of the Central Statistical Administration (Tsentral'noye Statisticheskoye Upravleniye—TsSU). The TsSU processes these statistics and passes them on to republic and national authorities; the USSR TsSU compiles the *Narkhoz* for the USSR, while republic offices of the TsSU prepare the *Narkhozy* for the respective republics.

Other statistics, primarily those dealing with demographics and population welfare, are derived by using the sampling method. In most cases, the samples are taken by TsSU branches annually. The relevant statistics are updated accordingly by experts, and the samples are generalized on the basis of the statistical population of the USSR. Of course, they can be generalized for individual republics as well.

The USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan) prepares economic plans for the USSR along sectoral and branch lines utilizing data from both sources. Gosplan is obliged by law to formulate these plans in their territorial dimension with the cooperation of republic councils of ministers.[4]

Thus, one can confidently assume that both the central government and the republics possess statistics relevant to the economy and society of the republics. (That republics are in possession of relevant statistics is confirmed by former employees of the Soviet planning organs now in the West.) The only exception may be an economic activity on a republic's territory that is considered sensitive in terms of national security, information on which may be available only to the central government in Moscow.

[4]I. S. Koropeckyj, "Economic Prerogatives," in I. S. Koropeckyj, Ed., *The Ukraine Within the USSR: An Economic Balance Sheet*, New York, Praeger, 1977, p. 52.

Blank Spots

Based on what has been said, it is surprising to discover that a variety of statistical data regularly published in the statistical yearbook for the USSR as a whole do not find themselves represented in the statistical yearbooks of any, or of at least certain of the 15 republics comprising the Soviet Union. Table 1 lists 32 important indicators that can be found in *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1985 g.* (The 1985 Statistical Yearbook of the USSR) and that are absent from the *Narkhozy* of Ukraine and of various other republics.

An "X" in the table indicates the publication of the given statistic in the *Narkhoz* of the given republic for 1985 (1984 in four cases). Each statistic was made available for the USSR, and usually for one or more of the republics, but not for Ukraine. These are not all of the missing statistics, but only those that I consider most important. Also, statistics occasionally found in Soviet publications other than the statistical yearbooks are not included in our discussion.

Furthermore, there are some statistics that were made public for Ukraine but not for some other republics in 1985. To show the pattern of publication of statistics for a republic other than Ukraine would require another table of similar format. Analysis of the overall policy regarding publication of regional statistics in the USSR would require a consolidation of statistical output for all 15 union republics. This is beyond the scope of this note.[5] The aim here is more modest—to present the situation in Ukraine in this regard in 1985.

The indicators listed in the table are divided into three parts: those not published in the Ukrainian *Narkhoz* throughout the entire period since World War II, those last published in 1975, and those that last appeared at a more recent date. (The year 1975 was selected as a benchmark because it appears to have marked a high point in the publication of statistical data by regions.) It is evident that a gradual tightening of the publication of statistical data has been taking place in Ukraine. In addition to the 14 indicators missing for the entire period, 10 more were last published in 1975, and 8 more in subsequent years. For each sub-group of entries, the indicators are listed in order of increasing number of republics reporting them.

Hypotheses

If the assumption that statistical data are available to both the central government and the republics is cor-

[5]The quality of statistical data varies from republic to republic as well as between the USSR and the republics.

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rect, the table may help answer the following two questions: (1) Why were some statistics published for the USSR as a whole and not for any of the republics, and (2) Why were selected statistics of our sample published for some republics, but not for Ukraine? Since no official explanation has ever been provided in the USSR for the failure to publish these or other statistics, the explanations offered here must necessarily be of a hypothetical nature.

As the table indicates, two statistics were not published for any of the republics throughout the entire postwar period, three additional ones were published for the last time in 1975, and one more was withheld after 1980. Four possible reasons can be suggested for these blank spots.

Shortage of paper. Sometimes Soviet statisticians talking off the record aver that a shortage of paper is responsible for the scarcity of published regional statistics. But are larger statistical handbooks necessary? A glance at the Ukrainian yearbook reveals that this explanation cannot be taken seriously. Despite the fact that the 1985 Ukrainian *Narkhoz* is about two-thirds the size of the USSR *Narkhoz,* some pages of the former are not fully utilized. For example, although a page can contain more than 30 entries, there are only four entries on page 75; six entries on pages 209 and 281; eight entries on pages 171 and 345; and so on.

If space were at a premium, it is difficult to understand why, for example, the production of dinner plates and cups, and even of tea saucers, are listed separately in the 1985 Ukrainian *Narkhoz* (p. 121), while such an important indicator as the sectoral distribution of national income in the republic goes unreported. Finally, why publish the growth indexes of industrial output with four base years (p. 74), if the information in value terms (not given) would allow the researcher to calculate indexes for *any* desired base year.

Central government prerogatives. Some items may be considered to be exclusively within the purview of the central government. This might be the case with economic relations with foreign countries (Item 1). Yet, at least some data do exist at the republic level. For example, scholars have published data on Ukrainian foreign economic activities in the 1960's and early 1970's.[6]

Defense considerations. As mentioned above, some data may be considered sensitive from a national security perspective. Although the USSR *Narkhoz* publishes data on employment distribution by sectors (Item 15) and output of cement (Item 17), regional breakdowns of this information might be concealed for fear of giving some clues about the geographical distribution of economic activity of military importance.

Concealing of economic data regarding individual regions for strategic reasons is, however, becoming less important, or even unimportant, in an era of space satellites and other sophisticated intelligence gathering methods. Yet, given the well-known Soviet penchant for secrecy, one cannot completely rule out this factor in the policy of data publication.

Poor economic performance. Discontinuation of the output series for pig iron (Item 16) after 1975 and for steel (Item 28) after 1980 for individual republics was most likely motivated by the poor performance of ferrous metallurgy in recent years in Ukraine. The bulk of this industry, long touted as a showpiece of Soviet industrialization, is located in Ukraine and the Russian republic (RSFSR). Since the decline in output growth of these two products was smaller in the RSFSR than in Ukraine, the failure to publish statistics might reflect an attempt to hide the poor conditions in Ukrainian ferrous metallurgy in particular.[7]

No plausible explanation comes to mind for the omission of data on growth of fixed assets and inventories by industrial branches for all the republics (Item 2).

As the table indicates, there are a variety of USSR *Narkhoz* statistics for which a regional figure does not appear in the Ukrainian *Narkhoz* but is usually published in the *Narkhoz* of various other republics. (In this regard. Georgia stands out, publishing 15 of the indicators omitted from the Ukrainian yearbook, while Turkmenistan published none.)[8] What could explain these omissions in the case of Ukraine?

Production concentration. Certain data seem to have been omitted because the activity covered had diminished to a negligible level. Elimination of reporting on the

[6]See V O. Suprun and D. Ia. Vovko, *Ekonomichni osnovy spivrobitnytstva URSR z krayinamy-chlenamy REV* (The Economic Bases of the Cooperation of the Ukrainian SSR with Member-States of CEMA [The Council for Economic Mutual Cooperation]), Kiev, Naukova dumka, 1971; and V. O. Suprun, *Pytannya mizhnarodnoyi sotsialistychnoy spetsializatsiyi vyrobnytstva* (The Question of International Socialist Specialization in Production), Kiev, Naukova dumka, 1973.

[7]Before publication of data was discontinued, Ukraine's annual rate of growth of output of pig iron for 1965–75 was 3.6 percent; for steel, the annual growth rate in 1970–80 was 1.4 percent (see 1975 Ukrainian *Narkhoz*, p. 102, and 1980 Ukrainian *Narkhoz*, p. 110). The corresponding rates for the Russian republic were higher, 5.0 and 2.8 percent (see 1975 RSFSR *Narkhoz*, p. 73, and 1980 RSFSR *Narkhoz*, p. 64).

[8]For Turkmenistan, not only are all the listed statistics missing, but also several other statistics available for Ukraine are omitted. The reasons for this secrecy may well be different than in the case of Ukraine, but their discussion is outside the scope of this note.

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output of natural gas (Item 19), oil (Item 20), and other fuels (Items 21, which excludes coal) in Ukraine after 1975 may reflect the declining importance of this republic in comparison to the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, and (for oil shale) the Baltic republics. In 1975, natural gas production in Ukraine was still considerable, but reserves were rapidly dwindling, and the Tyumen fields of the RSFSR were assuming major importance.[9]

Declining performance was probably also a factor in the subsequent withholding of data on Ukrainian production of trucks and automobiles (Item 29) and coal (Item 30). For a variety of reasons beyond the scope of our discussion here, Ukraine's performance in these sectors has been inferior in recent years, and the republic's shares in national totals has been declining for some time.[10] Omission of data on these sectors from the Ukrainian *Narkhoz* after 1980 suggests a continued decline.

Standard of living. Although interrepublic differences in population welfare are sometimes publicly discussed, such studies are not emphasized, because of potential sensitivity regarding "unequal" treatment of individual republics by the central government. This may explain the withholding in Ukraine and various other republics of data on kolkhoz-market trade (Item 11), birth rate by urban and rural areas (Item 13), marketed agricultural production by social sectors and products (Item 24), and output of grain by individual products (Item 31).

Using net material product per capita as an indicator of population welfare, Ukraine ranked sixth among the union republics in 1985.[11] According to Gertrude Schroeder's calculations for the 1960's and 1970's, Ukraine ranked about midway among the 15 republics with respect to various welfare indicators.[12] Items 11 and 13 were not published throughout the postwar period for Ukraine and five other republics with a below-average standard of living. After 1980, Item 31 no longer appeared for Ukraine and seven other poorer republics. Item 24 ceased to be published after 1975 for Ukraine and two other republics. It appears that there has been an attempt to avoid drawing undue attention to the relatively worse conditions in the republics at the lower end of the national welfare scale.

Interrepublic transfers of national income. Transfers of national income between republics—which are decided arbitrarily by Moscow, do not bear any interest, and are not returnable—are potentially sensitive politically. Research on the outflow of national income from Ukraine was quite popular among Ukrainian economists even before the October Revolution and during the 1920's. In recent times, such analysis has continued in the West,[13] but it is definitely not encouraged in the Soviet Union. Certain of the data withheld from the Ukrainian *Narkhoz* in recent years could have been used in such analyses and may have been consciously withheld to discourage such studies. These include statistics on industrial output by republic, union-republic, and union subordination (Item 12), utilization of profits of all enterprises and of industrial enterprises in particular (Item 23), and depreciation by economic sectors (Item 25).

As James Gillula demonstrates, Ukraine was not alone in experiencing some outflow of national income to other republics. Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Azerbaijan in the 1960's and 1970's, as well as the Central Asian republics during the early 1960's, also experienced outflows.[14] However, Items 23 and 25 continue to be available for most of them; and Item 12, for some. (This apparent inconsistency will be explained below.)

Flukes. There is also the possibility that overall policy is to publish a given statistic for the USSR alone, and that in the one or two cases where a republic *Narkhoz* included it—whether by mistake or on purpose—central authorities failed to detect the breach in policy before the volume went to press. One may perhaps include in this category statistics on the energy balance (Item 3); the output, employment, and fixed assets of agro-industrial complexes (Item 4); the structure of family budgets of industrial workers, white-collar workers, and collective

[9]In 1975, Ukraine's share in USSR output of oil was 2.6 percent, and of other fuels, 3.2 percent. The republic still accounted for 23.6 percent ot total natural gas production. See the 1975 USSR *Narkhoz*, pp. 239-41; and the 1975 Ukrainian *Narkhoz*, pp. 98–99.

[10]Between 1970 and 1980, the Ukrainian shares of total USSR output of coal declined from 33.2 to 27.5 percent (for anthracite only, from 41.2 to 34.0 percent) and of trucks and automobiles, from 12.6 to 9.4 percent (for passenger automobiles, from 25.2 to 12.4 percent). See 1980 USSR *Narkhoz*, pp. 157, 171; 1980 Ukrainian *Narkhoz*, pp. 108, 118.

[11]Net material product per capita was calculated by using the data on net material product for republics in 1970 (see the 1971 Latvia *Narkhoz*, p. 56) and extrapolating to 1985 on the basis of growth indexes (1985 USSR *Narkhoz*, p. 410) and population data (ibid., p. 8). The ranking of republics in descending order is as follows: Latvia, Estonia, Belorussia, RSFSR, Lithuania, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirgiziya, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tadzhikistan.

[12]See Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Regional Living Standards," in I. S. Koropeckyj and Gertrude E. Schroeder, Eds., *Economics of Soviet Regions*, New York, Praeger, 1981.

[13]See, for example, I. S. Koropeckyj, "A Century of Moscow-Ukraine Economic Relations," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (Cambridge, MA), December 1981, pp. 471–72 and pp. 490–91, Table 1.

[14]James W. Gillula, "The Economic Interdependence of Soviet Republics," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Vol. 1, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 630 ff.

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farmers (Item 5); the distribution of fixed assets by industrial branches (Item 18); and national income by economic sectors (Item 26).

Discretionary decisions. There is no plausible reason for republic-by-republic variation in the publication of some other indicators. These include the value of gross industrial output in current wholesale prices (Item 6); the growth of output of such branches as machine-building (Item 7), the chemical industry (Item 8), and light industry (Item 9); gross social product by branches (Item 10); capital investment by industrial branches (Item 14); working capital by economic sectors (Item 27); and national income in current prices (Item 32).

It is possible that the central government, while firmly prohibiting disclosure of certain republic statistics (such as relations with foreign countries, or employment distribution), leaves the decision on publication of other indicators to the discretion of individual republics. Some republics apparently take advantage of this prerogative and publish relatively much information, while others publish relatively little.

This leaves open the question of why Ukraine would lean toward withholding rather than disclosing information. Because of their often bitter experience in the past, Ukrainian leaders in recent years have been known for their ideological conservatism and political caution. Given the option of publishing or not publishing information that might throw a negative light on or even draw attention to the Ukrainian economy,[15] the leaders in Kiev may consider it more prudent to publish few statistics.[16]

At the same time, the caution also may have stemmed from central or local concern for the reaction of public opinion, whether among the local Ukrainians or abroad, to evidence of slow growth, declining economic importance, and relatively low population welfare in Ukraine, or to the outflow of national income from Ukraine to other Soviet republics. This seemingly higher regard of Soviet leaders for public opinion in Ukraine and abroad with respect to developments in Ukraine may be motivated by the considerable weight of this republic in the total population and economic potential of the USSR as well as by its historical experience and strategic location. Negative reaction in the West to adverse economic developments seems more likely with regard to Ukraine than to other Soviet republics because research in the West on the Ukrainian economy has been more extensive than is the case with the other republics.

[15]For example, Ukrainian Party leader Petro Shelest, who fell from power in 1972, was accused of showing pride in his republic's economy. See the editorial, "On the Serious Shortcomings and Errors of a Book," *Komunist Ukrayiny* (Kiev), No. 11, 1973, p. 80.

[16]It is symptomatic that Georgia, which by all accounts seems to show the least concern for the views of Moscow authorities, lists the highest number (15) of the indicators considered here.

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Books

New-Type Socialist Armies

Larry L. Watts

GEORGE MALCHER. *Poland's Politicized Army: Communists in Uniform.* New York, Praeger, 1984.

GEORGE SANFORD. *Military Rule in Poland: The Rebuilding of Communist Power in 1981–83.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986.

CONDOLEEZZA RICE. *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army 1948–83: Uncertain Allegiance.* Lawrenceville, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1984.

Western analyses of the Warsaw Treaty organization (WTO) and its members have always been nuanced, and often determined, by US-Soviet competition. The enormous emphasis placed on the Soviet Union has contributed to the fact that until the end of the Cold War and the beginnings of détente in the 1970's there existed very few analyses of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) military forces as distinct from Soviet forces, and even these treated NSWP militaries entirely within the context of the intra-Soviet bloc conflict[1] rather than discussing them in their separate domestic contexts. In the 1980's, however, as the frequency of overt conflict within the bloc increased and as NSWP states apparently gained some leverage in their relations with Moscow, Western and notably US appraisals of the Warsaw Pact states in general, and their militaries in particular, have grown more sophisticated. In the process, military analysis has moved away from a pure capability evaluation of NSWP forces to include considerations of their individual reliability[2] as Soviet allies in case of a NATO-WTO conflict. Issues of the NSWP militaries' reliability as instruments of their regimes and of the Soviet Union during intra-state conflicts (i.e., conflicts between the regime and society) have continued to receive little attention, however.[3]

The three books to be reviewed here begin to rectify this situation. They examine NSWP military behavior, especially the motives behind it, within a broader context than a NATO-WTO conflict, and over time, using the Polish and Czechoslovak armies as case histories. They pay particular attention to the involvement of these two armies in two crises, the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981 and the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It should be noted that, although George Malcher in *Poland's Politicized Army: Communists in Uniform* and George Sanford in *Military Rule in Poland: The Rebuilding of Communist Power in 1981–83* focus on Poland and specifically on the question of why the Polish military intervened in the events of 1981, Condoleezza Rice also gives this problem

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[1]The best from this period is Robin Alison Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution,* Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1971.

[2]Two of the pioneering works representative of this approach are A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean and Alexander Alexiev, Eds., *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier,* New York, Crane-Russak, 1980, and Ivan Volgyes. Ed., *The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier,* Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1982.

[3]For an excellent discussion of this and a survey of the literature see Robin Alison Remington's "Western Images of the Warsaw Pact," *Problems of Communism,* (Washington, DC) March-April 1987, pp. 69–80.

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some attention in *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army 1948–83: Uncertain Allegiance.*

Malcher investigates the steady institutional and bureaucratic aggrandizement of the Polish military and concludes that the expansion of the military's political role was the intentional result of a strategic policy, rather than a reaction to the increasing incapacity of the Polish civilian communist elite. Thus in his view, the imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981, was the inevitable consequence of a long-term conspiracy undertaken by the Soviet-loyal "political army." Furthermore, this "instrument of a committed nucleus of politicians in uniform led by General Jaruzelski" reimposed "Soviet tutelage" in 1981 because they were "fully committed to the defense of the Soviet-Socialist system in Poland, to which they owe absolutely everything" (pp. xv and 2). Malcher supports his thesis by examining institutional forms and functions while relying almost entirely on a rather uncritical reading of official Polish and Soviet sources. Although somewhat interesting, this approach is neither well-conceived nor particularly insightful.

While Sanford essentially agrees with Malcher's thesis, his arguments are much more sophisticated and interesting. He accepts some of Malcher's conclusions, but he qualifies and expands on them. He also gives the reader more than the usual one-dimensional portrait of General Wojciech Jaruzelski. For instance, while acknowledging General Jaruzelski's priorities to be loyalty to the Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza—PZPR), socialist indoctrination, and "closer links with the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Red Army" (pp. 80–81), Sanford is careful to point out that Jaruzelski's motives are often complex. In his view, Jaruzelski is not a "Soviet stooge," but a man motivated by reasons other than Soviet subservience who has worked earnestly to prevent a Soviet invasion and to avoid the sort of "bloody suppression" of the workers that has been common in past regime-society crises (pp. 71 and 107, also 106 and 150). Sanford further notes that the role of Solidarity in the development of the crisis was not completely positive, a point which many authors, including Malcher, have missed entirely.

Rice provides us with a long-needed, monograph-length treatment of the history and development of a NSWP army. While one might quibble that she prematurely dismisses the imperial model for describing Soviet-NSWP relations, this is clearly of secondary significance. Her work is characterized by excellent research and captures one of the central problems in understanding and evaluating actions and motivations within the NSWP state: that the Soviet Union is both an external threat *and* an internal influence (p. 6).

UNDERLYING each author's arguments is the assumption that the NSWP military, particularly the Polish one, is "politicized." Since this term is used to describe a number of phenomena, it is useful to differentiate among them. Strictly speaking, politicized behavior describes a political role other than war-fighting or preparation for war-fighting (it is usually based on the premise that such political activity is inherently illegitimate); apoliticism in this context is purely technical and instrumental behavior vis à vis the civilian political leadership. Clearly apolitical behavior of this ideal type is not found in the real world—the military, after all, is an inherently political institution, formed to protect a political entity (the nation-state), and it does have legitimate political roles ranging from the presentation and defense (within constitutionally-established parameters) of its institutional interests, (eg., lobbying for budget allocations, defense systems, etc.) to certain types of domestic intervention either in conjunction with the civilian political authority (eg., where national security doctrine includes counter-insurgency and development strategy as in Brazil and Peru) or against/in place of the civilian leadership.[4] (This latter form of military-political behavior is most commonly undertaken when responsible central political authority disintegrates, whether for reasons of incapacity, massive loss of support, general participation crisis, or some other form of obstruction.)

Although the military is arguably political in this broad sense, "professional" militaries are often labelled by analysts as "apolitical" on the basis of two criteria, the first of which is a non-partisan stance regarding elements within the civilian political leadership. It is argued that non-partisanship safeguards the military from becoming divided against itself by inhibiting attempts by members of the civilian elite to enlist a part of the military on their side in leadership struggles. Where this apoliticism does not prevail, e.g., where promotions are by political affiliation or clique membership rather than merit, time-in-place, etc., coups and counter-coups fre-

[4]Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1988, and Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Abraham F. Lowenthal, Ed., *Armies and Politics in Latin America*, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1976. For the theoretical basis of this political role see R. D. McKinlay, "Professionalization, Politicization and Civil-Military Relations," in M. R. van Gils, Ed., *The Perceived Role of the Military*, Rotterdam, Rotterdam University Press, 1971.

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quently result with disintegrative effects on the military institution as, for instance, in Greece in the 1920's and 1930's, in Spain in the 1930's, and periodically in Latin America especially since the 1950's. In the case of the militaries in Warsaw Pact countries, they have clearly played a role as a swing vote in succession crises, e.g., Marshal Zhukov's support of Nikita Khrushchev against the "anti-party" group, but they have not as yet entered the political arena on the side of one civilian leadership faction against another. They, therefore, can be labelled apolitical rather than politicized according to this definition of the term.

The second criteria for judging whether a military is apolitical or politicized is the degree of successful political indoctrination. In the case of the NSWP militaries, the measure for successful indoctrination has basically become the degree to which an army serves as a representative of the communist party, even the Soviet Union, rather than the nation/society. This is the criteria that Malcher, Sanford, and Rice applied when concluding that the NSWP armies are "red and expert," i.e., politicized (Malcher, p. xvi; Sanford, pp. 32–38; Rice, p. 3).

Their conclusion is not unique. As far back as the 1950's Western analysts have argued that there has been a shift in what motivated NSWP military behavior from the traditional national entity (nation/society) to a national-sectional entity (the party) and even an extra-national entity (the Soviet Union). Since the 1960's, most of them—with the exception of Roman Kolkowicz and Raymond Garthoff—have based their conclusions on communist regime proclamations concerning the success of the ideological campaigns within the new "socialist armies."[5] Even in the late 1970's and early 1980's such proclamations were accepted as the whole story or at least an overwhelming part of it.[6] Toward the end of the 1970's, however, it became clear that to assume the successful indoctrination and politicization of armies in the Marxist-Leninist states was often to take propaganda claims, regime preferences, and continuing efforts for accomplished fact. Increasingly, observers recognized that there existed substantial theoretical and empirical grounds for questioning not only whether the ideological campaigns had met with the unqualified successes claimed, but whether they had met with any success in their important aspects at all.[7]

Clearly the conclusion of all three authors that the NSWP militaries are indoctrinated and politicized "red" entities raises some serious questions, not the least of which is how does one measure indoctrination. As cultural anthropologists and other specialists working more specifically on political culture in communist systems have already pointed out, political beliefs, like other aspects of cultural change, are not instituted by fiat. Although such changes are "always fomented by external sources . . . creative solutions are selected in terms of both their internal fitness and their ability to cope with the external adaptive problem."[8] In other words, if overwhelming external pressure is brought to bear upon a society or social group to adopt a new ideology, pattern of thinking, political belief or motivational orientation, the immediate problem to be resolved for that society or group will not be how to institute the changes, but how to relieve the external pressure. A common path of least resistance has been to *formally* adopt the changes without internalizing them or investing them with content. Over time, of course, even repeated use of forms can effect changes in culture, but unless the forms have some correspondence with aspects of the dominant culture the changes will have only tenuous relation to what the forms represent.[9]

Indeed, this "form without content" problem is a persistent theme in all of the Warsaw Pact military and Main Political Administration (MPA) press organs. Officers and MPA chiefs in charge of the ideological campaigns have described the indoctrination in terms ranging from "boring" and "mere formalism" to "verbose twaddle" which is both presented and received with "passivity," "apathy," "disgust" and even "serious opposition" by con-

[5]Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1966, and Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Policy*, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1966. See also Garthoff's "The Military in Russia: 1881–1965," in Jacques Van Doorn, Ed., *Armed Forces and Society*, The Hague, Mouton, 1966.

[6]See Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1977, and Amos Perlutter's and William M. LeoGrande's "The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems," *The American Political Science Review* (Washington, DC), Vol. 76, No. 4, December 1982, pp. 778–89.

[7]See Johnson et. al., op. cit.; Volgyes, op. cit.; and Andrzej Korbonski "The Dilemmas of Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Poland: 1945–1981," in *Armed Forces and Society* (Cabin John, MD), Vol. 8, No. 1, 1981. For the theoretical emphasis see David Albright, "A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), Vol. 32, No. 4, July 1980, pp. 553–78.

[8]Elman R. Service, *Primitive Social Organizations: An Evolutionary Perspective*, New York, Random House, 1962, p. 29. See also Alfred Meyer's discussion in "Communist Revolutions and Cultural Change," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Quildford), Vol. 5, Winter 1972, especially pp. 361–65.

[9]See especially Jack Gray's "Conclusions" in Jack Gray and Archie Brown, Eds., *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, London, Macmillan and Company, 1977, p. 257, and Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68, No. 3, September 1974, pp. 1171–191.

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scripts and officers alike.[10] Resistance is evident in the criticisms levelled against commanders, military officers, and political officers for their reluctance to engage in propaganda work and official political briefings.[11] Testifying to the lack of resonance which the ideology finds within the military, former Warsaw Pact officers have explained that "actually nobody took the propaganda seriously," looking upon it as just another "obligation" or "as part of our profession, of the job we had to do."[12]

Rather than support her basic premise that the Czechoslovak military is fully politicized, "red and expert," the main body of Rice's work provides an eloquent example of the striking failure of the ideological campaign (which includes personal contacts with Soviet officers and required training in the Soviet Union) to shift the motivational orientation of the Czechoslovak People's Army (Československé Lidová Armada—CLA) from the society/nation to the party and the Kremlin. Despite 20 years of such efforts, the CLA rejected "internationalism" (read: Soviet loyalty) and a class orientation while exalting in its national identification and societal links. This traditional military orientation is nowhere quite so succinctly stated as in the June 6, 1968, issue of the CLA's publication *A Revue*: "The CLA does not serve a class; it serves a nation, a nation of two peoples" (Rice, p. 125). Apparently a further two decades has also failed to achieve the desired shift. As the Czechoslovak Party recently lamented, "We still encounter people [in the CLA] who have a non-class understanding of the duty of defense."[13]

This "drift" toward the society/nation is not an anomolous Czechoslovak phenomenon but rather a broader military phenomenon found throughout the Warsaw Pact states, and it seriously challenges the conclusion of all three authors concerning the successful "red" indoctrination of the NSWP militaries. The MPA of the East German National Peoples' Army (NVA) still complains that national criteria are used by officers and troops in judging the "justness or unjustness of war," calling for improved political education so that they understand "their personal engagement in terms of the military necessity of the class struggle."[14] The Hungarian MPA chief, recognizing that institutional disintegration of the military results from their "isolation from society," has called for the strengthening of military-society relations.[15] Romania has long characterized its military as the "basic force in the struggle against foreign domination" and "the safe-guarding of national existence."[16] Finally, the Polish military, in 1970–71, 1980–81, and since, has stressed its links with society and the nation and supported popular protests against regime practices and policies.[17] In fact, the all-pervasive and constant indoctrination has created on occasion a "significant backlash," with the military attempting to limit or eliminate altogether the ideological campaign within it.[18] Such attempts have played some role in the party-military crises which have erupted in Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and even Albania since the death of Stalin.[19]

The assumption of all three authors that personal contacts and training in the USSR engender a sense of loyalty to the Soviet Union are not borne out by empirical data. Recent studies suggest that such training and contacts have been strictly limited and, when they do take place, have had an opposite effect to that suggested by Malcher, Sanford, and Rice. For soldiers and officers alike familiarity has appar-

[10]In the GDR, *Militärwesen* (East Berlin), October 1974, pp. 39–40 and November 1975, p. 117b. In Poland, *Żołnierz Wolności* (Warsaw), Feb. 9, 18, 19, Mar. 3, and May 6, 1981, and *Wojsko Ludowe* (Warsaw), No. 11, 1974. In Bulgaria, *Narodna Armiya* (Sofia), Apr. 12, 1983, in Joint Publications Research Service, *East European Report* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS-EER*), No. 83466, May 13, 1983, p. 29, *Vecherni Novini* (Sofia), May 6, 1980, p. 3 in *JPRS-EER*, No. 75885, June 16, 1980, p. 38 and *Armeyskiy Kommunist* (Sofia), No. 5, 1979 in *JPSR-EER*, No. 73792, July 2, 1979, p. 26. In the Soviet Union, *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 27, 1979; *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 1, July 1979, pp. 8–18. (The Soviets used the same phrasing again in 1983. See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone et al., *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II-Volume II, German Democratic Republic and Romania*, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of Defense, Ottawa, Canada, pp. 224–25.) For Czechoslovakia see Radio Free Europe (hereafter RFE), *Czechoslovak Situation Report* (Munich), No. 5, Mar. 26, 1986.

[11]*Scînteia* (Bucharest), Dec. 11, 1975; *Nephadsereg* (Budapest), July 3, 1976, p. 23, *JPRS-EER*, No. 67906, Sept. 14, 1976, p. 42; RFE, *Hungarian Situation Report* (Munich), No. 5, Apr. 27, 1985; *Narodna Armiya*, June 8, 1984 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe*, (Washington, DC, hereafter—*FBIS-EEU*), June 14, 1984, p. C/5.

[12]Alexander Alexiev and A. Ross Johnson, *East European Military Reliability: An Emigre-Based Assessment*, Report No. R-3480, Santa Monica, CA, The RAND Corporation, 1986, p. 24.

[13]*Rolnicke Noviny* (Prague), Jan. 3, 1984, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 9, 1984, p. D/3.

[14]*Militärwesen*, September 1975, p. 53 and April 1981, pp. 10,15.

[15]Zolton D. Barany and Ivan Sylvain, "Hungary" in Rakowska-Harmtone et al., op. cit., p. 445; MTI (Budapest), Feb. 24, 1982, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 25, 1982, p. F/11.

[16]For instance, Radio Bucharest, Oct. 1, 1973 and *Scînteia*, Dec. 12, 1980.

[17]*Żołnierz Wolności*, Dec. 23, 1970, and Feb. 5, 1971; *Wojsko Ludowe*, No. 7, 1981 and *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), No. 248, Oct. 19, 1983, in *JPRS-EER*, No. 85003, Dec. 22, 1983, pp. 51–53.

[18]Alexiev and Johnson, op. cit., p. 24.

[19]Rakowska-Harmstone et al., op. cit., p. 72; J.F. Brown, *Bulgaria Under Communist Rule, 1953-1969*, New York, Praeger, 1970, pp. 96–184 and Ghita Ionescu, *The Politics of European Communist States*, New York, Praeger, 1967, pp. 179–91; *Zhivot Strany* (Prague), No. 42, Oct. 15, 1969, in RFE, *Czechoslovak Press Survey* (Munich), No. 2273, Nov. 18, 1969, p. 8; Kolkowicz, op. cit., pp. 120–24; Peter F. Prifti, *Socialist Albania Since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1970, pp. 207–17.

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ently bred contempt. In their interviews with former members of these militaries, Johnson and Alexiev discovered that:

East European soldiers in fact have little personal contact with Soviet servicemen. The contacts that do occur, among officers as well as enlisted men, tend to increase rather than reduce the antagonisms felt by the East Europeans toward the Soviet Union.[20]

Michael Checinski, a former Polish officer and Voroshilov Academy alumnus, has explained that Soviet influence and control are:

Obnoxious to most Polish army commanders. They have to suppress their views and shelve their personal ambitions in accordance with Warsaw Pact orders. Their military pride is constantly wounded by a foreign superpower. Their theoretical responsibility for the defense of the national interest is increasingly made a mockery of. It is oversimplifying matters to calculate how many and what percentage of Polish army commanders studied in Soviet military academies and to ignore the deeper motives at work.[21]

AS a logical consequence of denying the NSWP military a motivational orientation toward the society/nation both Malcher and Sanford, when arguing the Polish case, posit that an allegedly "supportive" and "cooperative" relationship exists between the military and security forces based on the need of both to defend themselves against the threat to them presented by society (Malcher, p. 161; Sanford, p. 74). In essence, the two authors perceive the military and the internal security forces as representing two interchangeable "sides of the same coin."[22] This oversimplification neglects several factors which markedly differentiate the military from, and sometimes oppose it to, the internal security forces.

First, there is a world of difference between the primary military function of national/societal defense and the security role of monitoring, regulating, and enforcing social conformity within society. While the former function requires a non-partisan orientation toward society the latter is avowedly partisan. Second, because security forces are more directly oriented toward a particular political regime than society, the self-image and the status typically conferred by society upon the military profession because of the latter's role as national/societal defender—an image and status that is very necessary for military morale and effectiveness—becomes an insignificant factor in the security-society relationship. Since the security apparatus can be used within and against portions of society with little or no negative repercussions for its institutional coherence, and since it is not governed by the same compunction to identify itself with the society/nation as the military, it is not constrained by the mechanisms which such mutual identification engenders—at least not to the critical degree which would prevent it from abusing its power.[23] Members of the security apparatus do not expect that the ultimate sacrifice will be demanded of them, especially since their opponents are usually unarmed, and these members are frequently viewed by sizeable portions of the population as a necessary, or even unnecessary, evil. Third, with regard to the members of the Warsaw Pact, the security apparatus polices the society *and* the military.

Lastly, vulnerability to external influence is heightened by the security force's generally non-national and often anti-social orientation. When "brother" military officers of different states gather together, their orientation leads them to view each other as potential enemies (at least in the theoretical sense) whereas "brother" security officers of different states share a common potential foe. As such, foreign cooperation, penetration, and subversion are more easily accomplished among security forces than among military establishments. One can assume that such behavior would be fostered if the subverting power is the regional hegemon and could guarantee the physical protection of its agents in case of detection.

Partisans of the "two sides of the same coin" approach tend to cite the litany of instances where the military intervened against society (e.g., the Polish military in 1970 and 1981) as proof of the military's non-national and anti-social position without considering how the military was ordered in, the differences in military and security responses, the results which compliance (partial or otherwise) had on the military's institutional coherence, or the manner in which the military sought to justify its role. To date there have been no serious attempts to analyze military behavior separately from security behavior in domestic interventions within the WTO. This is largely due to a generally simplistic view of the instruments of state power prevalent among many Western analyses of the WTO.

[20]Alexiev and Johnson, op. cit., p. 65.

[21]Michael Checinski, *Terror and Politics in Communist Poland*, Research Paper No. 53, Jerusalem, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1983, p. 84.

[22]This is the description of the relationship given by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone in Rakowska-Harmstone et al., op. cit., p. 203.

[23]See Yves Levy, "Police and Policy," in *Government and Opposition* (London) Vol. 1, No. 4, 1966, and the remarks of Michael Checinski in Jonathan R. Adelman, Ed., *Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1984, p. 19.

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Yet, if one were to examine military behavior in times of domestic crises separately from security behavior—be it acts of military intervention or inaction (e.g., the East German army in 1953, the Hungarian military in 1956, and the Czechoslovak army in 1968)—one would see that instances of such behavior do not necessarily constitute proof that the military is a reliable instrument of the regime against society, or a force loyal to the Soviet Union. In every instance of domestic crisis in which a NSWP military was involved, fairly reliable sources have reported that portions of the military balked at their orders by refusing "to put down" demonstrations (Plzen, Czechoslovakia in 1953 and Budapest, Hungary in 1956) and "to leave the barracks and move against the workers" (East Berlin in 1953); by opting to commit suicide rather than ordering men "to fire on the workers" (Novocherkassk, USSR, in 1962); or by "willingly hand[ing] over their weapons to the crowd" and "openly side[ing] with the rebellion" (Poznan, Poland and Budapest, Hungary in 1956).[24] In addition, manuevering the military into position for interventions against society usually has required the false evocation of a possible and believable threat to national security. By contrast, such subterfuge has not been necessary with the security apparatus and in the overwhelming majority of cases the internal security forces have acted loyally and brutally in their suppression of demonstrations.[25]

The lack of coordinated military action against the invading forces in the case of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 is interpreted by many analysts as evidence that these militaries are divided between their loyalty to the domestic party leaderships and the Soviet Union. Yet it seems highly unlikely that the nationally-based NSWP militaries would shift their loyalties to an extra-national entity—especially one which has been viewed as a cultural inferior, as an exploitive suzerain and, at least in the case of Hungary, as the main national threat. That is not to say that the NSWP militaries are not susceptible to an impressive system of formal and informal controls and constraints imposed by both their domestic parties and the Soviet Union. As Rice points out, Soviet efforts to ensure "loyalty" in Czechoslovakia are based on the use of overt and coercive means (p. 231). But compliance under threat is certainly not loyalty, and removal or neglect of this threat has repeatedly led to a rescrudesence of traditional national military loyalties in the NSWP states. The significant point is that the effective control which Moscow exercises consists overwhelmingly of negative sanctions. Such sanctions neither foster pro-Soviet initiative nor elicit faithful allegiance, they can only be relied upon to constrain.

Moreover, every military is characterized by a dual loyalty tension owing to its two roles as defender of the nation/society and servant of a central political authority.[26] As a consequence, during regime-society crises in which the military is compelled to play a part, it usually will attempt to achieve some type of "national reconciliation."[27] Where such accords are not possible, the military will act according to its interpretation of nation-state interests which may or may not be congruent with the interests of the central political authority. Furthermore, there is a critical difference between domestic interventions in sovereign states where the regime is perceived as legitimate and representative of societal values, and in those states where sovereignty is severely limited, and where the regime is fundamentally illegitimate in terms of societal values in general, but where it retains some marginal legitimacy versus the alternative of having an externally-imposed regime. Finally, in the case of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the military either received no orders from the civilian authority or received specific orders to stand down. In these cases the military had to weigh the possible repercussions for the nation-state of taking action against seemingly insurmountable odds in the absence of or against civilian orders. Note that, even given those

[24]A. Ross Johnson, "Soviet-East European Military Relations" in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, Eds., *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978, pp. 243–66; Ivan Volgyes in Daniel Nelson, Ed., *Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1984, p. 190. See also, Ferenc Vali, *Rift and Revolution in Hungary*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1961; Heinz Godau, *Verführter, Verführer: Ich War Politoffizier der NVA*, Köln, Markus Verlag, 1965, pp. 78–81; Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 251; M. K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 265; Richard Hiscocks, *Poland: Bridge for the Abyss*, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 192; George Sakwa, "The Polish 'October': A Re-appraisal through Historiography," in *Polish Review* (New York), Vol. 23, No. 3, 1978, p. 62–78; and Barany and Sylvain in Rakowska-Harmstone et al., op. cit., p. 414.

[25]Robert K. Evanson, *Political Terror in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union: A Study in Comparative Communism*, unpublished doctoral disseration, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, p. 455; Otto Ulč, *The Judge in a Communist State*, Athens, OH, Ohio University Press, 1972, pp. 117–22; Johnson et al., op. cit., pp. 20–21; Volgyes in Nelson, op. cit., p. 190; Condoleeza Rice in Adleman, op. cit., p. 169.

[26]Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, London, Pall Mall, 1962, pp. 25–26 and John L. Johnson, *Military and Society in Latin America*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1964, p. 252.

[27]Larry L. Watts, "Civil-Military Relations in Eastern Europe: Some Reflections on the Polish Case," *Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies* (Stockholm), Vol. 2, No. 4, 1985, pp. 63–70.

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considerations, a significant portion of the Hungarian military fought the Soviet invaders.

Two further points deserve to be emphasized here. First, unlike the various NSWP communist parties which owe both their ideological inspiration and their leading roles to Moscow, the NSWP militaries, which do not depend on Moscow for either inspiration or for their existence, are not perceived as essentially illegitimate by their respective societies (although some of their actions may well be). Second, as a result of their base of support and fundamental illegitimacy, the various parties have a decided tendency to lean toward Moscow while the militaries, primarily because of their function and composition, divide their loyalty between their societies and the central political authorities. Rice implicitly recognizes this fact when she first characterizes the CLA as caught between the Scylla of domestic party loyalty and the Charybdis of Soviet loyalty and then, on a facing page, characterizes its loyalty dilemma by juxtaposing the "Czechoslovak nation" to "socialist internationalism" (pp. 211–12). While loyalty to the Soviet Union and to socialist internationalism are virtually synonymous, the Czechoslovak party and nation are certainly not. The tension in military loyalty is caused by the sometimes diametrically opposite pulls of the domestic party and the society within the framework of challenges to "national security."

LET us now turn to a discussion of the specific case of Poland. But before we review some of Malcher's, Sanford's, and Rice's theses on the subject of Polish military intervention in the events of 1981, several points have to be made with regard to the role of the military in surpressing the various worker demonstrations in Poland.

It is clear that during the December 1970 demonstrations the military did not carry out its orders to the extent desired by the communist party leadership under Władysław Gomułka. In some instances the military colluded with the demonstrators—as in the case of the senior officer who, "with the acquiesence of his commander . . . used his telephone to warn strikers of the impending assault"—and in general greeted its orders with disgust.[28] According to a former Polish officer on the scene at the time, even senior officers resented the threats made by Gdańsk Party Secretary Stanisław Kociołek and were outraged by both the deployment of military units throughout the region and the issuing of naval uniforms to the police.[29] Moreover, the military was sensitive about its role and sought to justify its actions to society by, for example, asserting that "on no occasion was an order given to fire directly at the crowd" and stating that the army had not been trained for such an internal role.[30] Furthermore, at the 8th Party Plenum held at the beginning of February 1971, General Wojciech Jaruzelski admitted that by using the military "difficult morale problems had arisen . . . public opinion has turned against the military."[31] Finally, that same Plenum supported and even praised what appears to have been general acts of military disobedience to party authority. Jaruzelski stated that "the officers and soldiers showed great maturity and sense of responsibility,"[32] and the Plenum noted:

that the tragedy in the towns on the Baltic Coast would have been incomparably greater if appropriate centers of the Peoples' Militia and the Army had not checked irresponsible orders.[33]

During the workers' demonstrations of 1976, General Jaruzelski reportedly declared that "Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish workers." Regardless of whether that declaration was genuine or purely apocryphal, and if genuine whether it was prescriptive or merely descriptive, the party leadership did not order the military to intervene but instead chose a relatively "political" solution consisting of some compromises to the workers' demands and selected use of the police forces.

Similarly, during the imposition of Martial Law in Poland in December 1981, the military—contrary to what both Malcher and Sanford argue (Malcher, p. 49; Sanford, pp. 60 and 74)—did not play an "internal role" that involved confrontations with Solidarity members in cooperation with the security forces. In fact, their failure to do so caused friction in military-security relations since, as one of the planners of Martial Law, Colonel Ryszard Kukliński, explained, the General Staff saw no role for the military "in direct confrontation with striking workers" while the Ministry of Internal Affairs "wanted greater commitment of the army in direct collisions with society."[34] According to former members of both organizations, tensions were high and frequent fights—both verbal and physical—erupted between the military and the ZOMO (Motorized Security Forces).[35] This attitude on the part of the military that much of what the security forces do is not legitimate appears to be confirmed by General Václav Prchlík's efforts in

[28] Alexiev and Johnson, op. cit., p. 67.
[29] Ibid.
[30] *Żołnierz Wolności*, Mar. 4, 1971.
[31] *Nowi Drogi* (Warsaw), Special Issue, May 1971 in *JPRS-EER*, No. 54071, Sept. 17, 1971.
[32] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Feb. 12, 1971.
[33] *Życie Literackie*, No. 7, Feb. 14, 1971.
[34] Interview with Col. (rt) Ryszard J. Kukliński, *Kultura* (Paris) 4/475, April 1987, pp. 3–57.
[35] Alexiev and Johnson, op. cit., p. 75; A. Ross Johnson and Barbara Kliszewski, *The Polish Military After Martial Law: A Report of a RAND Conference, October 14, 1982*, No. N-2001-AF, Santa Monica, CA, The RAND Corporation, 1983, p. 5.

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Czechoslovakia (1963) and General Jaruzelski's efforts in Poland (1984) to bring to trial and convict security officers, in the latter case against the expressed wishes of Moscow.[36] In both cases, security personnel up to the level of deputy minister of the interior were implicated. As Jonathan Adelman has pointed out, the militaries of the NSWP states have been a major factor in "inhibiting" security force "domination."[37] Resenting and even loathing these forces, just as society does, the military forces "have served as a counter-balance to secret policy ambitions." Apparently, the differentiation in military and security roles and motivational orientations is also understood and grudgingly accepted by security personnel. According to a former member of ZOMO:

In the 1970s emphasis was placed on expanding ZOMO-type units and great sums of money were allocated to them, because the military cannot be counted on in such situations of internal unrest. The military's duty is to protect the borders.[38]

To return to the authors' discussion of 1981 events in Poland, Sanford's explanation of Jaruzelski's methods and motives leading up to and following martial law best underscore the problems posed when one operates on the premise that NSWP militaries are successfully politicized. Jaruzelski's affirmation of the military's close links with society are interpreted by him as a means of strengthening the army for its successful use against the population (p. 81). The General's refusal to use the military against the workers on the Baltic seacoast is considered "not so much a patriotic refusal to risk civil war or ethical morality" but rather the result of calculations regarding the possibility and costs of "winning" such an encounter (p. 97). His attacks on the party are seen as necessary "to defend the socialist order" (p. 100). Finally, his attempts to form a state where the law applies equally to the ruled *and* to the rulers are considered to be directed toward the founding of a "Communist *rechtstaat*," rather than toward the attainment of the more traditional military goal of a non-ideological *rechtstaat* (pp. 211–21). When judging public pronouncements regarding such aims it should be born in mind that within the NSWP states no elites outside the Church are free to formally eschew ideology.

Of the three authors, only Malcher dismisses the Soviet threat as a major factor in the implementation of martial law, while both Sanford and Rice downplay its significance with corresponding implications for their analyses. Sanford posits that, while Soviet pressure was very great and pushed Poland toward martial law, "it is not proven that Jaruzelski and the military really needed much pushing," a conclusion somewhat at odds with his later description of Jaruzelski's "agonizing" over the decision to implement martial law (pp. 102, 106, 107, 109).

In considering the motivation for martial law in Poland, Rice asserts that:

Nationalism, so often cited as the key to the Polish party-military relationship, was hardly a factor here. Jaruzelski may have seized power to make action by the Soviets unnecessary, but he also did so in defense of communist rule and as a surrogate for the failing party. (p. 238)

However, one has to deliberate the question of whether a defeat of communist rule in Poland would not have engendered the very Soviet intervention that Jaruzelski was seeking to avoid. For while the limits of autonomy for the NSWP states are in constant flux, there are at least two points on which the Soviets have remained intransigent: that the communist party continue to have a leading role and that membership in the Warsaw Pact be continued. Thus, Jaruzelski's action (which was not actually a seizure of power since he already formally possessed that power) was very much in defense of Polish communist rule, but it may have been equally—or even more—in defense of the Polish society/nation. As long as attempts to negate the two requirements result in invasion, one cannot legitimately differentiate between defense of the society/nation against foreign intervention and defense of the party.

Clearly, the threat of such an invasion was real. According to Colonel Kukliński:

the Moscow Summit meeting [December 5, 1980] did not abandon the threat of invasion. It merely made it clear to the Polish leadership that there was to be no retreat from the blow to be struck. If the Poles could not strike it, the Red Army together with other Warsaw Pact troops would strike it for them.[39]

What is more, on the domestic front, with the virtual dissolution of the civilian political authority there was little hope for halting, much less re-

[36]Rice, *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army*, p. 107. Watts, loc. cit., pp. 25–29. The trials in Czechoslovakia, which came at the tail end of an officer rehabilitation campaign instigated in 1955 by the then Chief of the Czechoslovak MPA Prchlík, aimed at apportioning blame and bringing to justice those security officers who had partipated in wrongful purges of military personnel during the Stalin period. The trials in Poland involved three security officers charged with the kidnapping and murder of a pro-Solidarity priest, Father Jerzy Popieluszko.

[37]Adelman, op. cit., p. 270.

[38]Alexiev and Johnson, op. cit., p. 75.

[39]Kukliński in *Kultura*, p. 20.

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versing, the very profound economic and political disintegration. This, in turn, conditioned to some extent the external threat and began to have its impact on the institutional viability of the Polish military.

Part of the problem with many analyses of the Polish events is that, with few exceptions, the level and direction of internal disorder within Poland has not been thoughtfully analyzed.[40] It bears emphasis that the initial reason why Solidarity became a source of domestic instability was that the status quo had become fundamentally unacceptable to the vast majority of Polish workers. Why it remained a source of instability has often been attributed solely to the regime's failure to make good on its concessions. However, in addition to this, the mutual distrust which has long characterized regime-society relations, the increasing atomization and radicalization of Solidarity, and Moscow's ability and interest in provoking and maintaining further instability until what it considered as "appropriate" measures were taken, all figure quite highly.

Given an external threat that was immediate, apparent, and believable, a deepening domestic malaise with both internal and external origins, and the absence of a clearly defined central political authority, martial law would have been a logical reaction of any still-coherent military institution. While this tells us little of Polish political processes and may appear to be a narrow perspective, as others have noted, the military view of politics is a narrow and essentially negative one and the assumption of political leadership roles by the military usually involves the adoption of the politics of "anti-politics," a phenomenon having a logic of its own and extending across cultural and ideological boundaries.[41]

In this respect rebuilding the party, a controversial issue in itself, which Sanford claims is proof of Jaruzelski's desire to reestablish "communist hegemony" (pp. 2–3), is not a very useful indicator of the military's loyalty or intentions. First, one expects the military to try and rebuild the central political authority, and, as the only authority acceptable to the regional hegemon, the communist party is the indicated choice. Second, just as the post-Solidarity trade unions under Jaruzelski are not the same farce as their pre-Solidarity predecessors, neither is the post-Solidarity communist party, which already bears the distinct stamp of traditional military values, likely to be the same sort of pre-Solidarity party that such ousted hardliners as Stanisław Kociołek, Tadeusz Grabski, and Stefan Olszowski once desired.

TO conclude, despite required membership in the various communist parties, persistent ideological indoctrination, obligatory training in Soviet institutions for senior officers, and the questionable existence of personal contacts, the military institutions of the NSWP states have not substantially altered in their traditional motivational orientations. Alex Alexiev noted over a decade ago that:

all Communist armies have remained nation-state dependent. As such, their raison d'etre continues to rest on the presence of a well-defined national political entity and a clear concept of quintessentially national (often of a geopolitical nature) interests.[42]

This is so because the functional imperative which necessitates the existence of the military, the defense of the society/nation, has not altered, is in fact implicitly and sometimes explicitly acknowledged by the regimes throughout the region, and forms perhaps the most important link between the military as an institution and society. Where this is not true, the reciprocity of perception mechanism causes the military to be characterized by low social prestige, low morale, disciplinary problems, and minimal effectiveness—i.e., it becomes an institution in disintegration, as occurred, for example, in post-1968 Czechoslovakia and post-1956 Hungary.

As for literature on the Warsaw Pact, as Robin Remington recently pointed out in this journal, it appears to be marked by efforts to continually reinvent the wheel. Attempts to redefine the role and motivational orientation of "communist" armies when they continue to fall within expected traditional military behavioral patterns is such an effort. Indeed, it may be that assuming the success of Marxist-Leninist political and ideological indoctrination in constructing "socialist armies of a new type" among the Warsaw Pact states compromises rather than strengthens otherwise well-conceived research efforts. As a motivator, such indoctrination may be an insignificant or perhaps even a counter-productive factor in officer and troop behavior. A more fruitful line of inquiry would be to direct one's energies to examining the strain placed upon the traditional dual loyalty tension within the military by the Soviet suzerain and the impact of attempts by the regime to obscure the difference between the military and security institutions.

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[40]For a consideration of the impact of this disorder on Polish national security see Watts, loc. cit., pp. 1–92 and especially pp. 35–52.

[41]See, for instance, Bruce Loveman and Thomas Davies, Eds., *Politics and Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America*, Lincoln, NE, University of Nebraska Press, 1978.

[42]Alexander Alexiev, *Party-Military Relations in Romania*, Santa Monica, CA, The RAND Corporation, 1977, p. 3.

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Insiders' Views of the Soviet Army

Sergei Zamascikov

VIKTOR KONDYREV. *Sapogi—Litso Ofitsera* (*Boots Are a Reflection of the Officer*). Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd., London, 1985.

VLADIMIR RYBAKOV. *Tiski. Armeyskiye Ocherki* (*Vices. Army Sketches*). Possev Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1985.

YURIY POLYAKOV. *"Sto Dnei do Prikaza"* ("100 Days Until the Discharge Order"). Published in *Yunost'* (Moscow), No. 11, 1987.

WESTERN works on the subject of the Soviet armed forces number in the thousands and the literature is growing rapidly thanks to the efforts of the hundreds of analysts who study this subject for a living. Most works address the traditional technical and "order of battle" side of military affairs, while a disproportionately small number deals with such "soft" issues as morale, living conditions, attitudes, and day-to-day life within the Soviet military.[1]

Yet, it is precisely the "soft," "inside the Soviet army" category of military issues that has generated the greatest interest among specialists, and even non-specialists. Indeed, many analysts of the Soviet military have often complained that the subject on which they have the least information is not the Soviet Union's sophisticated weapons system (which is becoming less secret with the advances of Signal Intelligence or SIGINT and of satellite reconnaissance), but the state of mind of the Soviet fighting man and the daily life inside the Soviet barracks. Until not too long ago, there existed only a few Western studies on this subject, and these were mostly based on information from the official Soviet press. They could hardly satisfy the demand for more and better information.[2] But then came a number of fictionalized writings by former Soviet servicemen living in the West, and recently—with the advent of *glasnost'*—even by a resident of the Soviet Union, which have provided a wealth of new and credible information concerning the life of the servicemen in the USSR.

Such books are not numerous, even in the West. In the Soviet Union, military censorship has effectively obstructed the publication of truthful accounts of military life by defining as classified information even such seemingly innocent items as the time soldiers have their meals or the names of commanders. Another factor contributing to the paucity of such books, has been the authors' fear of severe persecution by the authorities—either of themselves or, in cases where the authors live in the West, of relatives left behind. Former servicemen with a talent for writing have frequently felt compelled to choose some other, less dangerous subject for their books. Ironically, those authors in the West who decided to describe their military experience, despite the possible consequences, have often faced a Western community of analysts disinterested in fictionalized accounts of military life. Such an attitude has further served to discourage works of this kind.

Yet fictionalized stories of life in the Soviet military written by former Soviet servicemen deserve attention. Not only do they provide information on the structure of Soviet military life and relations within the ranks of the army that is not to be found elsewhere, but they bring a

[1]The best illustration of this interest is the success that books written by Victor Suvorov, a former Soviet military officer, have had—particularly *The Liberators* (Macmillan, New York, 1981) which provided Western readers with an unusual glimpse of the everyday life of Soviet officers.

[2]Among the few Western studies on the Soviet military that extensively used first-hand accounts by former Soviet servicemen is the pioneering study by Alex Alexiev and S. Enders Wimbush, *The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces*, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, March 1982.

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welcome break from the grossly idealized accounts of military life given by the official Soviet literature. They allow the Western reader to escape the rather common tendency to see the Soviet soldier as being "ten feet tall." Instead, one can meet these "mysterious" men face-to-face. Moreover, they provide extremely lively and entertaining reading.

In an attempt to introduce the Western reader to this largely unexplored source of information, this essay will review three major works from this category of literature. The choice of these works was prompted by the tremendous debate which surrounded the publication of Yuriy Polyakov's "One Hundred Days to the Discharge Order"—the first credible account of Soviet military life by a resident of the Soviet Union to be published in the USSR. The various discussions of his work in the Soviet press immediately invited comparison with similar works by Viktor Kondyrev and Vladimir Rybakov which have been published in the West.

The three works reviewed here are based on the military experiences of their authors, young Soviet men who were drafted and served for two years in the Soviet armed forces during the late 1960's and early 1970's. The three authors have different backgrounds, education, and views, and their writings are as different as they are. Yet, there is something that unites them all—truthfulness and a desire to render an authentic account of Soviet military life.

VICTOR KONDYREV'S book *Boots are a Reflection of the Officer* tells the story of the *dvukhgodichniky*, a category of Soviet servicemen largely ignored by Western analysts. This category consists of university or institute graduates who are normally called up for a two-year period of active service. Prior to this call-up, they have been exposed to the comprehensive courses of reserve officer training provided at almost all Soviet institutions of higher learning. All male students fit to serve are required to take these courses (female students are trained to be nurses at the local military hospitals). After graduation a large percentage of the students who have completed training is called "to fulfill its military duty" for two years and is usually sent to very remote areas.

In Kondyrev's book, the characters find themselves in a remote Far Eastern military district, close to the Chinese border. They are part of a large contingent of forces that the Soviet leadership sent into the wild and uninhabited areas along the Chinese-Soviet border after bloody border clashes between the Soviet and Chinese armies in 1969. As newly-made lieutenants, the main character in the novel and a number of his university colleagues are tasked with constructing a military base from scratch, after being dropped into the wilderness with little more than a few saws and axes.

Authenticity is one of the most important features of this largely autobiographical story, which even captures the full flavor of the language spoken by military personnel. This language can best be described by the following old joke that continues to be popular among Soviet servicemen:

A general asks a sergeant how many languages does he speak. The sergeant replies that he speaks three languages. "Name them," says the impressed general. "The Russian language, the commanders' language and obscene language, sir." "Wrong," says the general, "you only speak two languages, since the commanders' language and obscene language are the same."

Interestingly, the unusually rich lexicon that is widely used by Soviet fighting men (which probably would not shock anyone in any army in the world) has been banned by Soviet censorship from appearing in print—even the use of its most innocent items is forbidden. In this respect Kondyrev's book, which was published in England, captures real army life better than Polyakov's, which had to pass Soviet censorship.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Kondyrev's book is the description of the everyday life of Soviet officers. Having gone through a similar experience myself, I can vouch for its accuracy. The life of officers, as described in *Boots*, is not very different from the colorless existence of their subordinates. Senseless drilling, dull work, rudeness from superiors are the features of experience common to both soldiers and officers. The only difference seems to be that drunkenness among officers is officially tolerated as the only available form of entertainment, while privates must indulge "secretly"—which also seems to be an accepted norm. It is impossible to keep anything secret in a small godforsaken garrison where everyone knows everything about his neighbor and even about his family.

What *Boots* and the other stories reviewed here prove is that the Soviet army, despite its formidable appearance, is still an integral part of Soviet society—a society that is in the midst of a profound economic, social, and moral crisis. The characters in each story experience the reality of being Soviet men in uniform. This reality sharply contrasts with what is presented in Western studies. There the Soviet military is described as a very special "island of efficiency, discipline, and high-tech," quite different from the rest of the corrupt society. Yet, read how

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one of the characters in Kondyrev's book compares life in the army to civilian life:

Why do we call this a bordello? Soldiers are serving, officers give commands, the guns are firing, the planes are flying. This is not a bordello, this is our life. Yeah, you are right, the decorations are different. But the rule is the same: Words are one thing, but deeds, quite another. According to the words, in the middle of the terrible turmoil there is this mysterious, paradise-like island, our mighty armed forces, where everything is different, everything is well organized and works miraculously well. So why then, when we see the reality here for what it is, do we start complaining? The rule is the same. If you want to call it a bordello, it's the same bordello as the one outside. My God, we were fooled. Its just that screwups like that don't even bother us in our civilian life. (p. 208)

Kondyrev takes his characters, essentially civilian people with peaceful professions, e.g., mining engineers, through all the gloomy cycles of the Soviet officers' garrison existence, showing us the gradual process of their "militarization." The more appropriate word here would probably be "degradation," since Kondyrev's pitiless prose shows us the step-by-step transformation of college-educated family men into strange military creatures primarily preoccupied with satisfying their unquenchable thirst for alcohol, sex, and money (so that they can buy more alcohol).

Yet Kondyrev's characters are not entirely devoid of humanity, nor are they stupid. Following a well-established Russian tradition, they conduct endless discussions over vodka, trying to understand what is happening to them and their fellow human beings, why they are becoming what they are—quite despicable creatures (they have no illusions about themselves). The predictable conclusion, which these Red army commanders reach by default, is that the deliberately harsh and dehumanizing nature of the Soviet army is to blame. As one of the lieutenants eloquently expresses it:

I can't help but be surprised with your arrogance. Under the pretext of fulfillment of the sacred duty and under the threat of imprisonment, young people were forced to come here. They are quartered in animal-like conditions, they are fed worse than pigs, they are humiliated in the stockade, abused in the barracks, they serve two years without leave, and after that you think you have the right to expect of them a conscientious attitude toward their service. Not just simply not to argue with their superiors, but, with enthusiasm and energy, to carry out orders given by any moron. (p. 125)

THE COLLECTION of 69 short stories by Vladimir Rybakov entitled *Vices* is the third book written by this young author who now lives in Germany and works for the Frankfurt-based émigré journal *Possev*. His previous books, *Heaviness* and *The Brand*, also dealt with his experiences in the military.[3]

Most of the sketches in *Vices* are very brief, less than five pages long. Unlike Rybakov's first two books, which were based purely on his own experiences, *Vices* is a peculiar mixture of the author's own thoughts and memories, of stories that were related to him by friends serving in other units, and of material he gathered from interviews with Soviet POW's held by the Afghan mujahedin. The result is a somewhat motley, but extremely interesting, mosaic of life in the Soviet army as seen by its workhorses—the privates, sergeants, and warrant officers. The well-known Russian writer, Georgiy Vladimov, quite justly wrote in his introduction to this collection that it is " . . . an army guidebook, an encyclopedia of life in the barracks" (p. iv).

Written in a deliberately calm, detached, conversational style, these stories strike the reader with their simplicity and authenticity. One can not help but get a feeling of sitting in the middle of the soldiers' *kurilka* (smoking room) and listening to the storytelling—an inseparable part of life in the army. The topics discussed cover the spectrum of army existence, everthing from conscription to desertion, from the soldiers' mess halls and the inedible rations they receive to that of nationality conflicts and the role played by the ubiquitous KGB officers. Accounts of the horrendous war in Afghanistan form a special segment of the book.

Rybakov's view of life in the Soviet army is more pessimistic than that of Kondyrev and Polyakov. For him, the Soviet army is a cruel machine designed to crush a young man's personality and remake him into an obedient robot ready to carry out any and every order. This is how he describes the process of dehumanization that soldiers undergo:

The Soviet soldier is a citizen who, for two years, surrenders all his rights to the state. He finds himself in the world where, immersed in discipline and regulations, he will try, not to understand, but to rid his mind of everything that is unclear to him. He constantly hears that the less a soldier thinks, the better for him. And often, on becoming a serviceman, he yields to the power trying to depersonalize him. Moreover, there is more political indoctrination in the

[3]See A. Rybakov, *Tiazhest'* (*Heaviness*), Possev Verlag, Frankfurt, 1977, and *Tavro* (*The Brand*), Possev Verlag, Frankfurt, 1981.

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army than anywhere else, and the army censorship is more captious than the civilian Glavlit. *It says a lot that Dostoyevsky is banned from many army libraries, and that almost all units forbid subscription to the journal Inostrannaya Literatura* [Foreign Literature]. *I remember myself dreaming about sleep, about an extra shirt in winter, about good boots, but never about freedom. I thought more often about the next day's breakfast, about the twenty grams of butter, than about a soldier's honor. Neither I, nor my friends stole, we tried to be honest with each other and lie judiciously to the bosses. We tried not to exploit the rookies, tried not to lose the person inside ourselves. Some lost it, even a month ago they were all right, and today they are ready to sell out anyone. These guys were broken. And they became worse than enemies!* (pp. 181-82)

This sensation of hunger, familiar to anybody who served in the Soviet army is also, according to Rybakov, an integral part of the soldier's training. "Hunger made future junior Soviet army commanders out of us," reflects one of his characters (p. 10). This type of "conditioning" seemingly produces the only possible conclusion: "To survive with the wolves—do as the wolves do." Those who try to resist will inevitably face the KGB officer. In the short story *"Molchi-Molchi"* ("Keep Your Mouth Shut"),[4] Rybakov gives a chilling description of the power possessed by the KGB officer:

The head of the special department is terror—invisible, without color or scent—but this terror is felt by the soldier's every nerve cell. Young officers, somewhat drunk, would call Molchi-Molchi *the Tsar's Eye, and add: "The scoundrel is sitting there, smiling, but what he's got in his scull, only the devil knows; what he's writing there about us to the HQ . . . ." These words meant that for the young officers* Molchi-Molchi *was neither a comrade, nor an officer, in the full meaning of the word. He was a foreign body. He was watching our thoughts and did not trust us, in accordance with his position, did not trust that all of us, soldiers and officers, would defend our country, if the need arose. And he had more power than anybody else, and to resist him equaled suicide.* (p. 23-24)

It is this fear, in combination with "conditioning" by hunger and humiliation, that makes Kireyev, a character in Rybakov's story "Two Tales" (*"Dva rasskaza"*), carry out orders to shoot at defenseless civilians who, his superiors feared, were going to "defect to China." It is this fear and the stupefying routine of army life that makes him senselessly kill the Afghan people. As Rybakov puts it: "Kireyev never thought of the Afghans as people. Never felt anything toward them. When ambushed he'd shoot. Simply shoot, because that's what he ought to do" (p. 192).

Rybakov's special segment on Afghanistan is probably one of the first literary accounts of the hell that is the Afghan war. As already noted, this part of the narrative is based on the author's extensive interviews with Soviet POW's in Afghanistan. The stories included in this section take us through the excruciating experiences of Soviet teenagers who have been thrown into a dirty war and have very little choice but to become a part of its bloody reality. But first, the characters have to go through the humiliating experience of being rookies, who in Afghanistan are called "ghosts" (*dukhi*). These are creatures without any rights, essentially personal slaves of any soldier who has served more than 18 months. Despite claims to the contrary appearing in the Soviet official press, humiliating practices are very much a part of life in the Soviet contingent in Afghanistan. In fact, one of the characters in a Rybakov story decides to desert and face possible death from a mujahedin bullet, rather than face the constant debasement and cruelty by his own comrades, who claim the right to do so on the basis of having served one year longer than he.

This depressing portrayal of the Soviet soldier's life caused Vladimov to compare it in his introduction to life in the Soviet prison camps. Indeed, as he points out, Rybakov's characters share with prison camp inhabitants not only the same attributes of daily life but also a "camp psychology" and even a "camp phraseology." "The legitimate grandchildren of the *Gulag*," he writes, "they meet the past (which, by the way, lives on) not too far away from the place where they serve and defend the sacred borders" (p. vi). It is not surprising that some soldiers choose suicide as an alternative to the unbearable existence in the army.[5]

What is most surprising about the many characters in *Vices* is that, despite subhuman conditions, some manage to preserve their "stock of fundamental goodness." It is goodness that prompts one of Rybakov's favorite characters, Makashin, to adopt a hungry child and marry the child's alcoholic mother. According to the author, "he gave the gift of life to two people" (pp. 63-64). Goodness is also the reason why some of Rybakov's characters dare to risk their lives to protest the dehumanization to which they are subjected. Finally, goodness leads some of Rybakov's characters serving in Af-

[4]The title of the story is a not too friendly nickname given in the army to KGB officers who form the so-called special department.

[5]Aleksiev and Wimbush, op. cit., p. 42.

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ghanistan to choose not to participate in the bloodshed, but instead to desert. Rybakov ends his book with the chilling scene of a soldier carrying his sick, drug-addicted friend through the Soviet check point and the minefields to nowhere—to Pakistan, to someplace where there is no war . . . .

YURIY POLYAKOV'S "100 Days Until the Discharge Order" is particularly interesting due to its long and troubled history before and after publication. The author, a young writer who did his military service in the 1970's, began writing the novella in 1980. For years he tried to publish it in one of the Soviet literary journals, but without success. In what became an all too familiar story during the pre-*glasnost'* era, he was told by the editors that they liked the story, that it was well-written, but the most frequent reason for a refusal was that "the time is not ripe yet" for publishing such things.

Indeed, for some time, it seemed even to the author himself that it would be impossible to break the wall of silence which surrounded the lives of five million Soviet citizens who wear military uniforms. For almost sixty years—since the publication of Issak Babel's immortal *Konarmiya*[6]—a realistic portrayal of the Soviet armed forces was considered by the authorities to be identical with divulging military secrets. The fate of Polyakov's book seemed even more questionable, because he chose to depict the so-called "non-regulational relationships" between the first- and second-year conscripts, the existence of which is officially denied.

Polyakov, nevertheless, persistently lobbied both editorial offices and the various official bodies for permission to publish his work. Happily, the lobby effort coincided with the appearance of the official policy of *glasnost'*. Nonetheless, it took several additional months before the novella was allowed to be published. By then, almost every editorial house in Moscow had a copy of the manuscript and *samizdat* versions of the novella were being circulated. As it happens with many books in the USSR, "100 Days" became a factor in both the literary and political life of the country, even before it was published.

The major development that decided its fate occurred during the 20th Congress of the Young Communist League in 1987, which Polyakov attended. The author managed to take the floor during panel discussions dealing with the issues of "military-patriotic education." To the evident displeasure of the military delegates, Polyakov raised the issue of the bullying and humiliation of rooky conscripts by veteran soldiers. As evidence of an official cover-up of the problem, he mentioned that his novella could not be published—despite being accepted by *Yunost'*—because of the pressure coming from the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy (MPA). His criticism proved too much for the Komsomol Congress debate, even in the era of *glasnost'*. Polyakov's statements were immediately rebutted by Hero of the Soviet Union Igor Chmurov, who stated that, without a shadow of a doubt, the phenomena described by Polyakov are not "typical," and that in Afghanistan, where Chmurov earned his Gold Star, they do not exist at all. Polyakov continued to defend his position, citing more examples, and was supported by some of the panel participants. The official version shown on Soviet TV, however, supported Chmurov and was critical of Polyakov.

The upshot of this discussion was the eventual publication of the story, albeit after a period of seven additional months. Prior to its publication, the military press (not without "encouragement" from the MPA) launched a "preventive strike," describing the yet unpublished story as the "flight of imagination of a mama's boy" who was simply scared of the hardships of military life.[7] Ironically, some military publications even printed letters from "angry readers" who wrote to protest Polyakov's story before having even had a chance to read it.[8] (The analogy with the many campaigns against other literary works cannot escape one's mind.)

Nevertheless, after the November issue of *Yunost'* hit the newsstands, the story became an instant hit. Even in the time of *glasnost'*, when every new book has to compete with many of the classic works previously banned and now released again, Polyakov's story did remarkably well and, according to a readers' poll, was voted the third most popular book of 1987.[9] Its success is easy to explain. Besides being well written, it touches on a subject that is familiar to almost half of the adult population of the Soviet Union.

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[6]In 1920, Issak Babel, one of the greatest Russian writers of the 20th century, served in the First Cavalry commanded by Semen Budenny. He captured his cavalry experiences in 35 short stories which were published under the title *Konarmiya*. Babel was purged during the Stalinist period and perished in a gulag in 1941. During Khrushchev's period, Babel was "rehabilitated" and *Konarmiya* was published in an abridged form.

[7]For the official military reaction to Polyakov's novella, see Yuriy Fedorko, "Turning Away From the Truth," *Sovietskiy Patriot* (Moscow), Mar. 2, 1988; Lt. Col. P. Tkachenko, "Not For the Sake of Condemning," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Mar. 11, 1988.

[8]For letters sent by readers, see "The Hotline of Trust," *Sovetskiy Voin* (Moscow), No. 2, 1988, pp. 32–33.

[9]See "A Novella Teaches the Truth," *Komsomol'skoye Znamya* (Kiev), Feb. 2, 1988. For some additional positive responses to Polyakov's novella see V. Kondratyev's review in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Feb. 10, 1988, p. 4, trans. in Foreign Broadcast and Information Bureau, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Feb. 19, 1988, p. 90.

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The scope of action in Polyakov's novella is confined to one artillery battery in an unidentified military unit. The main character is lance-corporal Kupryashin, an intelligent city boy who has only 100 days left to serve before receiving his order of discharge. The action, which takes place mostly during one day, is built around the constant humiliation of a shy and physically weak private named Yelin by the sadistic lance-corporal Zubov. No longer capable of taking the constant beatings and bullying by Zubov, Yelin runs away and commits suicide. The whole unit is awakened in the middle of the night and sent out to search for him. During this search Kupryashin recollects the entire period of his military service: from the moment he came to the unit as a rookie, until, after serving for 18 months, he joined the proud ranks of the *stariki* (old timers). Intelligent and sensitive, Kupryashin tried to defend Yelin and others like him against the constant torment inflicted on them by the *stariki*. However, nearly two years of service in the military has made the futility of such efforts clear to him, for as the story quite persuasively shows, these so-called "non-regulational relationships" are an integral part of life in the Soviet army, and the commanders de facto condone them.

The "non-regulational" hierarchy is a complicated pecking order. Early in the story, Polyakov presents a table illustrating the following breakdown of unofficial "ranks" among soldiers: At the bottom is the *salaga* (little fish) or *synok* (little son), a recruit who has completed one to six months of service and is required to follow unquestionably every order given by a veteran soldier; above him is the *skvorets* (starling) or *shnurok* (shoelace), who has completed six to 12 months of service and is distinguished from the *salaga* only in terms of having greater experience and hope for future rights; at the third level is the *limon* (lemon), who has already served 12 to 18 months and who manages the work done by a *salaga*, but must still obey orders from more seasoned veterans; at the fourth level is the *starik* (old man), who has served over 18 months and who has wide-ranging rights and is not required to follow any orders except those from the commanders; at the top level is the *ded* (grandfather) or the soldier whose order of discharge has been signed and who now awaits its processing and the final order to go home, and his status is that of a civilian who through the irony of fate still has to wear a military uniform (p. 48).

Those writers on the Soviet military who like to emphasize the similarity between the Soviet army and other armies of the world may be well advised to read Polyakov's description of the ritual accompanying the day of the order for discharge:

Those who never served will never understand what 100 days until the discharge order means! It not only means that the minister of defense has filled it out with ink . . . . Having found out about the order, stariki *run into the woods—to put up discharge crosses with their names and bits of soldiers' wisdom. For example:*

Jr. Sergeant A. F. Korkin
1982-1984
Serve, little son, as this grandfather
has served. And this grandfather
liked the service.

The most important thing is to attach the cross as high as possible to the tree . . . . But the really important thing begins after lights out: stariki, *who from that moment become* dedy, *elevate everyone else into the next higher rank of the unwritten hierarchy of the barracks. This is done with the help of an army issue belt. Everyone gets it in a certain place of their anatomy according to the number of months spent in service to the dear armed forces."* (p. 48)

The reason why "100 Days" brought such a sharp attack from the official military press was not solely or even primarily due to its depiction of the mistreatment received by first-year soldiers. (Lately, the official Soviet press has also begun to give a fair amount of space to this phenomenon.) What irritated the military officials, and particularly the main political administration, was the sober, matter-of-fact, and painfully realistic portrayal of life in the Soviet barracks. Even more infuriating for them was the fact that the story was written by an undeniably talented author who knew the life he describes intimately. Anyone who went through the Soviet military service can unmistakenly recognize such characters as the sadistic corporal Zubov who is extremely cowardly when it comes to facing up to his commanding officer; the vicious warrant officer Vysoven'; the often drunk battery commander Uvarov; and finally, the man everyone despises, the battalion political officer Osokin known by the nickname "shell-shocked."

Indeed, there is nothing in Polyakov's novella that would be unfamiliar to anyone who has had a taste of life as a private in the Soviet army. (In fact, my only criticism of the author is that he tries to somewhat smooth over the rough edges—although this seems to be more the fault of the censor-editor than the author.) Everyone knows that first-year soldiers are bullied; that they nearly never sleep since at night they have to complete the work demanded of them by the *stariki;* that their rations of meat and butter are taken away from them by those same *stariki;* that many officers are drunkards; that political lectures are excruciatingly dull; and that life in the army, particularly during the first year, can easily become a nightmare. Yet, even in the age of *glasnost'*, life in the military is still some-

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what of a last refuge of socialist mythology—in the words of one of Kondyrev's characters, "the paradise island in the middle of gloom" (p. 208).

Polyakov's characters are contemporary teenagers who know that there is no impenetrable wall between the Soviet army and the society that surrounds it. In fact, as one of the characters of "100 Days" argues, even the division between *stariki* and *salagi* is not unique to the military:

You think that people are divided into salagi *and* stariki *just in the army? You're wrong. Open your eyes: some folks walk to work, and others are taken in chauffer-driven limos, some stand in food lines, and other shop in the special elite stores . . . .* (p. 67)

This, most of all, is probably why Polyakov's story caused such a controversy. Clearly the novella's message is not simply that the Soviet army has a perverse pecking order among the servicemen. Had that been the case, Polyakov's work would have been quite acceptable today, in the age of *glasnost'*. The real message of "100 Days" is that the Soviet system is rotten, and rather than be exempt from it, the military is part of it, and not even the best part of it at that.

DO THE novels described here dispel some of the myths that exist in Western literature about the Soviet armed forces? Can they be trusted any more than official Soviet books and manuals? There is no simple "yes" or "no" answer to these questions. My own experience and conversations with former Soviet servicemen suggest that, on the one hand, books written by former servicemen cannot substitute for official Soviet writings. On the other hand, and this is my main argument here, it is simply imprudent to limit the study of Soviet military affairs solely to officially written accounts, or for that matter, to Soviet materials photographed or intercepted by Western forces. One cannot form a balanced opinion about the Soviet military machine without taking a look at it from the inside, and in this area, there is no substitute for such books as those reviewed in this essay. For despite *glasnost'*, there are a great number of military subjects that cannot be adequately studied without using either interview material or these first-hand written accounts. Such subjects include: national conflicts, religion, drug abuse, relationships between first- and second-year soldiers, and, of course, the war in Afghanistan.[10] As for dispelling myths, these books are probably one of the few sources openly available in the West, that portray realistically the Soviet soldier and his life.

[10]For a recent in-depth evaluation of the utility of émigré experiences see *Federal Government Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, US Senate. One Hundreth Congress. First Session. October 8, 9, 21, 1987. US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. 1988.

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